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Difficulty recognising emotion can have a major impact on psychosocial outcome 
following acquired brain injury. Current measures are time consuming and outdated. 
The need to have an easily administered screening test which enables clinicians to 
quickly assess this ability has been identified.  In this thesis, the development of the 
Brief Emotion Recognition Test (BERT) is described. The test consists of 14 short 
video clips of actors portraying positive, negative and neutral emotions. After watching 
each video clip viewers are asked to choose which emotion is being portrayed from a 
list of six emotions (happy, sad, surprise, anger, fear, disgust) and neutral. Half of the 
clips include facial expressions only (“no phrase”) and the other half include facial 
expressions and congruent vocal cues in the form of neutral carrier phrases (“with 
phrase”).  The performance of 92 neurologically healthy adults was compared with 
that of 20 adults who had sustained moderate-to-severe acquired brain injury (ABI).  
Performance on the BERT was found to be correlated with an existing measure of 
emotion recognition (Emotion Evaluation Test - EET).  Correlations were higher in the 
ABI group than the neurologically healthy group. Test retest reliability in the ABI group 
was good, and moderate in the neurologically healthy group.  Overall the ABI group’s 
performance on the BERT was impaired relative to the neurologically healthy group.  
Both groups performed worse on the “with phrase” BERT, with the ABI participants 
finding this part of the test particularly difficult. In the neurologically healthy group, 
intelligence was not found to be associated with performance on the BERT.  However, 
it was found to be associated with the ABI group’s performance on the “with phrase" 
BERT. The groups differed in education and intelligence.  Education was not found to 
be a significant predictor of group differences, intelligence was.  The neurologically 
healthy group were more accurate regarding five clips in the ‘no phrase’ condition; two 
of the seven in the ‘with phrase’ trial; and in the total overall score.  Overall, findings 
for this pilot study suggest the BERT provides a useful means of rapidly screening for 
emotion recognition difficulties after brain injury. Further research is needed establish 
the new test’s psychometric properties.  Evaluation of the findings, relevance to 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review  
1.1 Acquired brain injury 
Acquired brain injury (ABI) is brain damage that occurs after birth.  There are many 
types of ABI including those resulting from external traumatic events such as accidents 
and physical assaults and those resulting from internal events such as strokes, brain 
tumours and brain infections.  
Incidence 
ABI is a major health issue affecting approximately 10 million people worldwide 
(Langlois, Rutland-Brown & Wald, 2006).  It will be one of the major causes of death 
and disability by the year 2020 (Hyder, Wunderlich, Puvanachandra, Gururaj & 
Kobusingye, 2007).   Brain injury is the most common cause of death and disability in 
people aged 1–40 years in the UK and each year 1.4 million people attend emergency 
departments in England and Wales with a recent head injury (NICE 2014; Clinical 
Guidance 176).   
Personality and behavioural changes after ABI 
Cognitive and neuro-physical impairments are common after ABI.  Depending on 
factors such as the location and extent of damage; age (brain plasticity); premorbid 
functional and intellectual level; medical and emotional health; and the support system 
that exists, physical and cognitive recovery can often occur within the first few months 
after injury (Zillmer, Spiers & Culbertson, 2008). As well as cognitive and physical 
impairments, individuals can suffer a range of personality and behavioural changes 
such as becoming self-centred, insensitive to others needs, slowness, poor memory 
and irritability (Brooks, Campsie, Symington, Beattie & McKinley, 1986).  These are 
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evident shortly after injury and long-term (Langois et al., 2006; Milders, Ietswaart, 
Crawford & Currie, 2006; Oddy, Coughlan, Tylerman & Jenkins, 1985; Rosenberg, 
McDonald, Rosenberg & Westbrook, 2016).  The research suggests that these 
changes in personality and behaviour do not dissipate over time (Marsh, Knight & 
Godfrey, 1990; McKinlay, Brooks, Bond, Martinage & Marshall, 1981; Oddy, 
Humphrey & Uttley, 1978) without intervention.  Most people rely on their partners or 
families to support them after an ABI (Wood, Liossi & Wood, 2005).   The consequence 
of this is that the impact of ABI is not just on those who have suffered the injury but 
also on their partners and families (Anderson, Parmenter & Mok, 2002; Endberg & 
Teasdale, 2004; Hoofian, Gilboa, Vakil & Donovick, 2001; Harris, Godfrey, Partridge 
& Knight, 2001; Kreutzer, Gervasio & Camplar, 1994). Changes in family and social 
relationships and overall quality of life are often reported (Teasdale & Endberg, 2005). 
Early studies identified that a lot of families complain about personality, behavioural 
and emotional changes in the person who has experienced a brain injury. For 
example, Thomsen (1974), in a study of 40 severely brain injured individuals and their 
families found that 84% of families complained of changes which included behaving in 
socially inappropriate ways, egocentricity, self-centeredness, being argumentative, 
disinterested and insensitivity to others. In a follow up study, Thomsen (1984) found 
that the psychosocial consequences of brain injury, namely, emotional problems and 
personality change were more debilitating than physical disabilities and increased the 
risk of social isolation, caregiver distress and unemployment. Thomsen’s work 
highlighted how psychosocial changes after ABI have a significant impact on 
individuals and the importance of addressing these in order to improve outcome. 
Brooks et al. (1986) carried out a one year and five year follow up of a group of 55 
severely brain injured individuals.   At the five year follow up they managed to contact 
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42 of the original participants and assessed that these were a good representation of 
the original sample.  Using structured interviews, a close relative of each brain injured 
patient was asked about the patient’s physical and mental state, behaviour, self-care 
abilities and personality.  Relatives were asked to report any changes in the patient 
which had emerged after the injury and were still present.  Relatives were also asked 
to report any strain or distress experienced as a result of the changes.  This was 
measured using a seven point self-report scale ranging from the low point “I feel no 
strain as a result of changes in my spouse/relative”, to the maximum of “I feel severe 
strain…” Seventy four percent of relatives reported personality change at the five year 
follow up (up from 60% at one year follow up) and personality change was found to be 
related to high levels of distress in the relatives. 
Research shows ABI has a significant impact on family functioning and levels of 
psychological distress (for example: Hoofian et al., 2001; Kreutzer et al., 1994; 
Kreutzer, Marwitz, Hsu, Williams & Riddick 2007; Livingston, Brooks & Bond, 1985).  
After ABI there is a high likelihood of depression, family burden and loneliness and 
this is associated with difficulties the ABI person has in social situations (Hoofian et 
al., 2001; Testa, Malec, Moessner & Brown, 2006).  Families are confronted with 
dealing with many changes including cognitive, behavioural and neuro-physical 
changes.  Anxiety and depression is evident in 25-30% of relatives and 60-80% report 
some emotional distress (Kreutzer et al., 1994; Livingston et al., 1985).   
ABI severity 
ABI severity is usually defined as ‘mild’, ‘moderate’ or ‘severe’ according to the amount 
of altered consciousness experienced after the injury (Saatman & Duhaime, 2008). 
The Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs (2008), measures 
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levels of ABI severity by three factors: the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & 
Jennet, 1974); duration of post trauma amnesia (PTA) and the duration of loss of 
consciousness (LOC) after the injury.  The GCS is used to assess the central nervous 
system status of a patient.  It has three elements; eye response, verbal response and 
motor response.  These elements are scored out of five and summed up.  The 
maximum score is 15 which indicates a fully awake patient and the minimum score is 
three which indicates deep coma or a brain-dead state (Jennet & Bond, 1975).  Table 
1 illustrates how levels of ABI severity are defined by the Department of Defense and 
Department of Veterans Affairs (2008).  The current study has used this table to 
categorise ABI severity.  
Table 1. Levels of ABI severity (Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs, 2008) 
 GCS Duration of PTA Duration of LOC 
Mild 13-15 < 1 hour < 30 minutes 
Moderate 9-12 30 minutes – 
24 hours 
1-24 hours 
Severe 3-8 < 1 day         ˃24 hours 
 
Reduced social contact and loneliness 
Research has established that the number of relationships and frequency of social 
contact decreases after ABI and there is a tendency to rely on family for social contact 
(Elsass & Kinsella, 1987; Thomsen, 1974). People with ABI have reported loneliness 
as being a main problem for them (Oddy et al., 1985).  Difficulty maintaining 
relationships including established relationships built up over many years occurs and 
there is evidence that even when the number of acquaintances before and after injury 
remains constant the number of close friends decreases (Endberg & Teasdale, 2004).  
A correlation has been found between relatives’ reports of personality changes and 
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the number of friends that the person with ABI has maintained contact with (Weddell, 
Oddy & Jenkins, 1980).  It has been suggested that reduced social contact and high 
levels of loneliness may be as a result of the difficulties people with ABI have in social 
situations (Hoofian et al., 2001).   
Therefore, after ABI people often have reduced social contact. The social contact that 
does occur is different to what it was before the ABI in terms of frequency and type 
and loneliness and social isolation are problems for people after ABI.    
Breakdown in marital relationships 
Divorce and separation rates are higher than average after ABI.  Marital breakdown 
after a “severe” outcome been assessed as up to 78% (Thomsen, 1984) and 42% in 
those with “good” outcomes (Tate, Lulham & Broe, 1989; Wood & Yurdakul, 1997).  
Deterioration in marriages following ABI has been found to be directly associated with 
loneliness and altered interpersonal skills of the ABI individual (Wedcliffe & Ross, 
2001). 
Gosling and Oddy (1999) reported poor marital dissatisfaction and lack of emotional 
responsiveness and expressed affection in couples 1-7 years following ABI.  They also 
found that partners were more dissatisfied with the relationship than the person who 
had had the ABI.  This may suggest that sometimes after ABI individuals are not aware 
of the impact their behaviour is having on relationships (Koskinen, 1998; Wood, 2001). 
Research shows that difficulties engaging and interacting socially is a particular 
problem after brain injury (Greenwood, 1999).  There is evidence that after brain injury, 
behaviour can appear to be lacking in empathy, be inappropriate and self-centred and 
this can make it difficult to maintain social relationships (McDonald & Saunders 2005; 
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Wood & Williams, 2008).  Despite these difficulties being well documented, there is a 
lack of literature on how neuro-behavioural problems affect the relationships that 
people with ABI have (Wood et al., 2005).   
1.2 Emotion recognition problems after ABI 
Psychosocial functioning problems often pose greater problems to adjustment after 
injury than cognitive or physical functioning (Gratton & Ghahramanlou, 2002; Yates, 
2003). The impairments that contribute to psychosocial problems are not well 
understood (MIlders, Fuchs & Crawford, 2003).  They are likely to be multifactorial and 
include cognitive, physical and emotional factors as well as external factors such as 
reduced social and financial opportunities (Bornhofen & McDonald, 2008a).   The 
occurrence of emotion recognition problems after ABI has been identified. Research 
has shown that a substantial number of people are impaired in their ability to recognize 
emotional facial expressions after ABI (McDonald & Flanagan, 2004; McDonald & 
Saunders, 2005; Radice-Neumann, Zupan, Babbage & Willer, 2007; Rosenberg et al., 
2016).  
Studies investigating the proportion of people who have emotion recognition problems 
after ABI have reported various figures, some as high as 51% (Biszak & Babbage, 
2014).  In a meta-analysis of 13 studies involving 296 adults with moderate-to-severe 
ABI and 296 matched controls (Babbage et al., 2011) it was reported that there was a 
relatively large effect size (1.1 SD) differentiating people with ABI from matched 
controls.  This meta-analysis estimated that up to 39% of people with ABI experience 
problems recognising facial emotions from static photographs.  
Brain injuries, especially those that result from traumatic impact such as in motor 
accidents, often result in damage to particular areas of the brain including the 
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prefrontal, temporal and parietal lobes, the amygdala and other structures which have 
connections within and to the limbic system (Radice-Neumann et al., 2007). These 
areas are associated with emotion and so it is perhaps not surprising that problems 
with emotion recognition often occur after ABI.   
Emotions are communicated largely through facial expressions (Jackson & Moffat, 
1987).  Difficulty recognising facial emotion can interfere with a person’s ability to 
interpret how others are feeling and is likely to be related to the communication 
problems and difficulties in social relationships that are often reported after ABI 
(Radice-Neumann et al., 2007).  Negative consequences of not being able to interpret 
facial emotional expressions may include not responding appropriately to others; not 
being able to gauge the appropriateness of their own behaviour; and not fully 
understanding the communication of others (McDonald, 2003). Despite the fact that 
emotion recognition is a critical aspect in the development and maintenance of social 
relationships (Radice-Neumann at al., 2007) and problems in relationships after ABI 
have been recognised for some time, it is only relatively recently that research into 
impairments in emotion recognition following ABI has been carried out (McDonald, 
2013).   
In a recent study, May et al. (2017), found there was an association between poor 
post-injury behaviour (including community integration) and emotion recognition after 
ABI.  They also found that this association could not be explained fully by injury 
severity, time since injury or education.  This finding supports the suggestion that 
emotion recognition is an important factor in aiding and maintaining good social 
functioning.  We know that post injury social behaviour is related to social outcome 
(Struchan, Pappadis, Sander, Burrows & Myszka, 2011), and that changes in social 
behaviour can contribute to caregiver burden and distress (Katsifaraki & Wood, 2014).   
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Emotion recognition problems present shortly after injury 
Research has investigated whether emotion recognition problems are present shortly 
after injury in order to try to establish whether the deficits are caused by the injury itself 
or secondary factors.  Research comparing emotion recognition problems in 
participants who were an average of just 2.6 months post injury (Green et al., 2004) 
and during first 60 days of injury (Borgaro, Prigatano, Kwasnica, Alcott & Cutter, 2004) 
with matched controls found that the ABI participants were significantly less accurate 
than controls identifying emotions.  In other words, the findings of these studies 
suggest that deficits in emotion recognition exist shortly after injury and are therefore 
caused by the injury itself rather than environmental changes or from secondary 
factors such as depression or anxiety which often occur after ABI.  As well as there 
being evidence that emotion recognition deficits exist shortly after ABI, longitudinal 
research has demonstrated that without intervention emotion recognition impairments 
in facial and vocal expressions do not change over time (Ietswaart, Milders, Crawford, 
Currie & Scott, 2008; Milders et al., 2003).  
As a significant proportion of individuals with ABI have impairments in emotion 
recognition and research shows these problems are as a result of the injury rather 
than secondary factors such as anxiety or depression, it makes sense for these 
impairments to be screened for shortly after injury.  Indeed, Borgaro et al. (2004) have 
highlighted the importance of screening for emotion recognition deficits during 
rehabilitation and have suggested that the availability of a brief screening measure 
would be particularly useful, especially in an acute setting where patients’ ability to 




Emotion recognition research using photographs 
One of the first studies to report emotion recognition problems after ABI was that of 
Prigatano and Pribram (1982).  They used the Ekman and Friesen (1971) black and 
white photographs of facial expressions.  These photographs portray the six basic 
emotions (happy, sad, fear, anger, surprise, disgust) and neutral that have been 
demonstrated by Ekman and Friesen (1971) to be universal across cultures.  A 
substantial number of subsequent studies using photographs have reported findings 
of emotion recognition impairments after ABI (for example, Borgaro et al., 2004; 
Green, Turner & Thompson, 2004; Jackson & Moffatt, 1987).  In addition these studies 
have established that emotion recognition problems after ABI are common and have 
drawn attention to how emotion recognition problems are likely to adversely affect 
social and emotional behaviour.   
Vocal emotion recognition  
Emotion in voices is portrayed in the meaning of the vocal content (the what) and also 
in prosody (the how) (Dimoska, McDonald, Pell, Tate & James, 2010).  The term 
prosody includes the intonation pattern (pitch contour) of speech, word stress (a 
complex subjective variable based on timing, pitch, and loudness) and pauses that 
sometimes occur at the ends sentences (Wingfield, Lahar & Stine, 1989). 
Research has established that a significant number of individuals with ABI have 
difficulties recognising emotion from vocal expressions (Braun, Baribeau, Ethier, 
Daigneault & Proulx, 1989; Hornak, Rolls & Wade, 1996; Marquardt, Rios-Brown, 
Richburg, Seibert & Cannito, 2001; McDonald & Flanagan, 2004; McDonald, 
Flanagan, Martin & Saunders, 2004; Milders et al., 2003; Spell & Frank, 2000; Zupan, 
Neumann, Babbage & Willer, 2009).  Some of these studies have investigated both 
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vocal and facial emotion recognition (Knox & Douglas 2009; McDonald & Saunders 
2005; Milders et al., 2003; Spell & Frank 2000; Zupan, Babbage, Neumann & Willer, 
2014) and have found that individuals with ABI perform less well on both types of tasks 
compared to matched controls without brain injury, though impairment has been found 
to be greater for vocal emotion than facial emotion recognition (Spell & Frank, 2000).  
Whilst deficits in interpreting facial emotion recognition has been widely explored, 
difficulties interpreting vocal cues of emotion has received much less attention (Zupan 
et al., 2009). Accurate interpretation of vocal emotion cues is important, particularly 
when facial cues are absent or ambiguous because these cues contribute to more 
accurate identification of emotion (Zupan et al., 2009). One of the first studies to 
compare face and vocal emotion recognition (Braun et al., 1989) reported that ABI 
participants were impaired in facial emotion recognition but were not impaired 
identifying emotions from verbal narratives with the exception of narratives portraying 
anger where there was significant impairment.  However, subsequent research has 
established that difficulties recognising vocal emotion is not limited to the emotion 
anger and that individuals with ABI have difficulty recognising vocal expressions of all 
emotions (for example; Ietswaart et al., 2008; McDonald & Saunders, 2005; Milders et 
al., 2003).   
Taken together the studies have established that as well as there being facial emotion 
recognition problems after ABI there are also vocal emotion recognition problems.  The 
studies have also highlighted how vocal emotion recognition deficits after ABI 
contribute to social communication problems (Spell & Frank, 2000; Zupan, et al., 2009) 
and these problems are likely to adversely affect social integration and social 
functioning (McDonald & Flanagan, 2004; McDonald & Saunders, 2005; Orbelo, Testa 
& Ross, 2003;  Zupan et al., 2009). 
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Dynamic multi-modal displays of emotion 
Static displays of emotion in photographs are simple to use and allow the viewer time 
to view a fixed emotional expression.  However, in everyday communication we use 
verbal cues, facial expressions, context, past experience and other non-verbal 
information cues to make sense of social interactions (Bornhofen & McDonald, 2008a).  
In other words recognising emotions displayed in photographs or audio recordings 
(unimodal displays) is arguably different to recognising emotions in real life social 
interactions as they fail to provide the viewer with all the cues and information which 
are present in most normal interpersonal exchanges (Bornhofen & McDonald, 2008a).  
In the last decade or so, progress has been made in developing tests of emotion 
recognition that are dynamic (moving) and multimodal making them more ecological.  
The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT; McDonald, Flanagan, Rollings & 
Kinch, 2003) is one test that simulates real life settings in the form of videoed vignettes.  
The TASIT has three parts.  The first part is the Emotion Evaluation Test (EET).  This 
consists of 28 video vignettes of professional actors portraying one of the six standard 
emotions and neutral.  All the scripts are ambiguous monologues or dialogues devoid 
of specific emotional content. The video vignettes are used to emulate real emotional 
expressions and viewers have to identify the emotional expression being portrayed by 
the designated actor in the vignette by choosing an emotion from a list of the six 
standard emotions and neutral.  Responses are recorded on a sheet and scored 
manually. 
McDonald and Saunders (2005) used the EET in a study involving 34 adults with 
severe ABI and 28 adults without brain injuries.  Four different media were used: still 
images; moving facial displays; audio only; and audio visual media (EET).  The study 
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found that individuals with ABI performed more poorly than individuals in the control 
group in all of the four different media.  McDonald and Saunders (2005) discovered 
that the ABI group were significantly impaired recognising emotions in both the audio 
and audio-visual displays and eight of the thirty four were significantly impaired 
recognising the emotions in the photographs whilst only one of the thirty four was 
impaired in the recognition of the moving visual displays with no sound.  The ABI group 
was most impaired in the dynamic audio visual task. The findings led the authors to 
suggest that recognition of emotion in visual moving displays involves different brain 
systems (for example the parietal cortices), to recognising emotions in still displays.    
Knox and Douglas (2009) compared the performance of 13 individuals with ABI and 
13 matched controls on emotion recognition of static stimuli (Ekman photos) and 
dynamic displays (18 items from the EET presented without no sound).  The study 
found that the ABI group were impaired interpreting facial expressions in both static 
and dynamic displays, though performed significantly worse on the dynamic display 
task.  The control group’s performance was similar in both the tasks. The finding in 
this study that dynamic displays of emotion were more difficult for individuals with ABI 
to identify than static photographs is different to the findings of McDonald and 
Saunders (2005).      
Knox and Douglas (2009) suggest the reason why individuals in the ABI group 
performed worse on the dynamic stimuli task may be that the dynamic displays 
demanded more executive functioning than the static stimuli (photographs).  They 
suggest that when viewing dynamic displays the viewer has to focus on a greater 
number of cues and information and the performance of individuals with ABI is affected 
by their ability to process these cues, impaired information processing speed or 
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working memory deficits.  Further, the authors point out that static images allow the 
viewer to look at a single image for a longer time and do not require the viewer to rely 
as much on their working memory, therefore they minimise the impact of slowed 
information processing or attention deficit.  
Damage after ABI is diffuse so deficits in facial emotion recognition with vocal content 
may be due to difficulty processing cues in the visual and/or auditory modality or how 
the cues in the two modalities are integrated (Madigan, DeLuca, Diamond, 
Tramontano, & Averill, 2000). Zupan et al. (2009) argue that information from the 
visual and auditory channels are automatically integrated during the interpretation of 
emotion. They suggest that when both facial and vocal cues are available, an emotion 
can be more confidently identified if what is seen and heard are perceived to be 
consistent with one another (e.g both sad).  They argue that perception of emotion is 
a bimodal process and that social interactions rely on the interpretation and integration 
of facial and vocal emotion cues.  This explains why congruous facial and vocal 
expressions are easier to understand than incongruent ones (Marquardt et al., 2001). 
It has been suggested that emotional processing is dependent on emotional control 
(Pessoa et al., 2002) and that problems in emotional recognition may be due to 
insufficient resources such as attentional control (Ridout et al., 2007) being available 
to process all the information.      
Williams and Wood (2010a) replicated the study of McDonald and Saunders (2005) to 
investigate if different media presentation affected emotion recognition.  They 
expected individuals with ABI to find dynamic displays more difficult than static 
displays, on the basis that audio visual media (dynamic displays) requires the 
individual to process conversational content as well as emotion and prosody and this 
is a complex dual processing task which is often impaired after ABI (Williams & Wood, 
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2010a).  Williams and Williams (2010a) asked 64 participants with ABI and matched 
controls to complete an audio visual test (the EET) and a static photograph test (the 
Ekman 60 faces test).  The study found that the ABI group was significantly impaired 
on both the audio visual test and the static photographs test compared to the control 
group.  Moreover, it was found that both groups were more accurate in recognising 
emotions displayed in audio visual format, though the difference was more marked in 
the ABI group.  The authors suggest that this finding may be explained by the fact that 
the audio-visual test provided more clues than static photographs and these cues help 
us to recognise emotions.  They also point out that the static photographs used in the 
study were black and white and visually outdated.   
Williams and Wood (2010a) concluded from their study that mode of stimulus is an 
important factor influencing emotion recognition abilities.  They suggested that their 
findings provide evidence that emotion recognition is affected by type of media 
presentation and that their findings may give support to Adolphs (2002), and Adolphs, 
Tranel and Damasio (2003) suggestion that different neural pathways process 
different types of emotional stimuli. Adolphs et al. (2003) suggest that dynamic 
emotional media is processed by the parietal cortical systems, whereas still emotional 
media is processed by other neural pathways including the limbic system, bilateral 
inferior and anterior temporal lobe and medial frontal cortices.    
Subsequent research by Zupan and Neumann (2014) supports Williams and Wood’s 
(2010a) finding that individuals with ABI find it easier to recognise emotions from 
context rich dynamic stimuli than static photographs.  The reason may be as Williams 
and Wood (2010a) suggest, namely that there are more cues available in dynamic 
stimuli.  Further, if visual and auditory information is combined when interpreting 
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emotion (de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Zupan et al., 2009) then the more information 
and cues available the easier it is to recognise the emotion (Williams & Wood, 2010a).  
However, Zupan et al. (2009) acknowledge that more research is needed on the 
integration of facial and vocal emotion cues of emotion in static versus dynamic stimuli. 
Therefore, the majority of the research comparing emotion recognition of static stimuli 
and dynamic audio visual stimuli has found that individuals with ABI find dynamic audio 
visual displays easier.  
Valence - Negative and positive emotions 
Research suggests that some emotions are generally easier to recognise than others.  
Happy facial expressions have been found to be identified more accurately, earlier 
and faster than other facial expressions (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008). Identification of 
negative emotions (i.e. sadness, anger, disgust and fear) has been found to be more 
difficult and slower to recognise after ABI (Adolphs et al., 1999; Calvo & Lundqvist, 
2008; Croker & McDonald, 2005; McDonald et al., 2003; Jackson & Moffat, 1987; 
Williams & Wood, 2010a).  Also, research has shown that those with ABI are poorer 
at judging neutral expressions than matched controls (McDonald et al., 2003). 
However, whilst there appears to be increased difficulty in identifying neutral items, 
neutral items are not mistakenly identified as any particular emotion by individuals with 
ABI (Williams & Wood, 2010a).  
Are particular neural structures involved in recognising different emotions and 
different media? 
The fact there is a valence difference has led some to propose that this is because 
there is independent cognitive processing of specific emotions (Parry, Young, Saul & 
Moss, 1991).  Research findings suggest that particular neural pathways are involved 
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in processing different emotions (Adolphs, 2002; Wang et al., 2002).  There is 
evidence that the amygdala is involved in recognising fear (Adolphs, Baron-Cohen & 
Tranel, 2002; Calder, Young, Rowland, Perrett, Hodges & Etcoff, 1996; Adolphs, 
Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1994).  The amygdala has also been associated with 
recognising sad expressions (Adolphs & Tranel, 2004).  It has been estimated that 
approximately 50% of patients with amygdala damage have impaired ability to 
recognise sad facial expressions (Fine & Blair, 2000).  
There is also research suggesting that the ventral striatum is involved in recognising 
anger (Calder, Keane, Lawrence & Manes, 2004). Further, it has been reported that 
functional neuroimaging demonstrates that the facial expressions associated with 
disgust engage different regions of the brain (insula and putamen) than other facial 
expressions (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun & Young, 2000; Sprengelmeyer, Young, 
Calder, Kamat, Lange & Homberg, 1996). 
The temporal structures of the brain have been identified as being important in emotion 
recognition by Rankin, Kramer and Miller, (2005).  Facial emotion recognition has been 
associated with the right superior temporal sulcus and the amygdala and orbitofrontal 
cortex (Iidaka et al., 2001; Narumoto et al., 2001; Rosen et al., 2002; and Winston et 
al., 2002).  Voice prosody has been associated with the right superior temporal sulcus 
and the amygdala (Adolphs, 1999; Scott, Morris, Scott & Dolan, 1999, Young & Calder, 
1997).  
The literature demonstrates that different modes of stimuli affects emotion recognition 
performance in individuals with ABI (McDonald & Saunders, 2005; Wood & Williams, 
2010a, Zupan et al., 2009).  Evidence that different neural pathways may be involved 
in processing different emotions and different modes of stimuli comes from studies 
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involving individuals with brain lesions (Adolphs et al., 2003; Tolmeo et al., 2016; and 
Wang et al., 2002) 
Adolphs et al. (2003) found that a patient who had extensive bilateral brain lesions 
could only recognise happiness from static images or single verbal labels but could 
recognise all basic emotions except disgust from dynamic displays and stories. The 
authors suggest dynamic emotional media may be processed via the parietal cortical 
systems whereas the limbic system, bilateral inferior and anterior temporal lobe and 
medial frontal cortices may be involved in processing still emotional media.  
Wang et al. (2002) in their study of a schizophrenic patient with bilateral anterior 
cingulate gyrus lesions and a lesion in right amygdala found that this patient was 
significantly worse at recognising fear compared to three groups of controls (normal 
control group; brain injured group with lesions that did not include the amygdala, 
hippocampus or cingulate gyrus and a schizophrenic group).  Recognition of the other 
five basic emotions was not significantly different from that of the controls.  The authors 
concluded that their finding that this patient was worse at identifying fear but not the 
other basic emotions supports the view that the brain has separable networks for 
processing different emotions and that the cingulate gyrus and amygdala are involved 
in the recognition of fear. Moreover, Ridout et al. (2007) reported that patients with 
lesions to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) demonstrated impaired facial emotion 
recognition performance (as measured by the EET) than those without ACC lesions. 
Further evidence comes from the study of Tolomeo et al. (2016).  They compared 
emotion recognition in patients who had treatment resistant depression and who had 
undergone bilateral anterior cingulotomy, with patients who had treatment resistant 
depression who had not received surgery and healthy controls.  They found that 
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patients who had the surgery were worse at recognising the negative emotions of fear, 
disgust and anger and had no impairment in recognising the facial expressions of 
surprise, happy or sadness.  They also found that larger volume lesions predicted 
more impairment in identifying fear, anger and disgust but did not predict identification 
of happy or surprise.  The research findings of Tolomeo et al. (2016) provides some 
evidence that the anterior mid-cingulate cortex is part of a network associated with the 
experience of negative emotion and pain and engages cognitive control processes for 
optimising behaviour in the presence of negative emotion and pain.  This finding 
supports the existing evidence that the anterior cingulate has a causal role in 
recognising negative emotions.   
Taken together these studies have implications for individuals with ABI.  They provide 
evidence that different neural systems are involved in the recognition of different 
emotions and different types of media.  The implication is that in the future it may be 
possible to identify the type of emotion recognition deficits an individual has from the 
location or type of injury sustained or the location or type of injury from the emotion 
recognition deficit. 
Subjective emotional experience 
Reduced emotional experience has been reported after ABI. Hornak, et al. (1996) 
obtained self-reports of participants’ ability to experience the emotions of sadness, 
enjoyment, anger, fear and disgust since sustaining their injury.  They found that 
several of the participants with ABI reported blunted affect, particularly for negative 
emotions such as sadness.  In another study investigating subjective emotional 
experience, Croker and McDonald (2005) found that the majority of participants with 
ABI reported some change in the post-injury experience of every day emotion, 
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although the pattern of changes differed greatly between individuals.  They found that 
reduced subjective experience, especially of sadness and fear was associated with 
poor emotion matching but not emotion labelling.  Other research has reported that 
damage to the prefrontal cortex results in a decreased ability to experience one’s own 
emotions and this may make it difficult to perceive emotion in others (Hornak et al, 
2003). 
Alexithymia 
Alexithymia is difficulty differentiating feelings and body sensations and difficulty 
identifying and describing one’s own emotions (Bird & Cook, 2013). Those who have 
alexithymia usually have externally orientated and concrete style of thinking (Taylor, 
Bagby & Parker 1997) and tend to reflect less on their emotions as well as others’ 
emotions than those without this trait (Lane et al., 1996).    
The incidence of alexithymia in the general population is estimated to be between 10 
and 14.8% (Berthoz, Pouga & Wessa, 2010; Koponen, et al., 2005; Wood & Williams, 
2010b). The majority of research investigating the relationship between alexithymia 
and deficits in emotion recognition in neurologically healthy populations has found that 
there is an association (Lane et al., 1996; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 1993; Parker, 
Prkachin & Prkachin, 2005; Prkachin, Casey & Prkachin, 2009).  Alexithymia appears 
to be a contributor in behavioural and psychiatric disorders including disordered 
eating, somatoform disorders and depression and anxiety (Connelly & Denney, 2007; 
Pedrosa-Gil et al., 2008; Ridout, Thom & Wallis, 2010). It has been linked to poor self-
awareness (Allerdings & Alfano, 2001), anxiety and depression (Wood, Williams & 
Kalyani, 2009).   
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The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Parker, Taylor & Bagby, 1993) has been 
used in the ABI literature to measure alexithymia.  Using this measure it has been 
found that there are high levels of acquired alexithymia following ABI (Henry, Phillips, 
Crawford, Theorodou & Summers, 2006; Koponen et al., 2005; Williams & Wood, 
2010b). For example, Williams and Wood (2010b) found that 60.9% of individuals in 
their ABI group had alexithymia compared to 10.9% in the control group.   It has been 
suggested that what appears to be poor emotion recognition (or empathy) may be due 
to alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013).  
There is a paucity of literature looking at the link between alexithymia and emotion 
recognition problems after ABI (McDonald, Rosenfeld, Henry, Togher & Bornhofen 
2011).  McDonald et al. (2011) investigated levels of alexithymia (using the TAS-20) 
and emotion recognition performance on two tasks (matching and labelling photos of 
the 6 basic emotions) in 20 individuals with ABI and 20 adults without brain injuries. 
The study found that the association between alexithymia symptoms and emotion 
perception deficits was generally limited.  The only correlation they found between 
alexithymia and emotion perception in the ABI group was between the labelling of 
positive emotions and the TAS-20 (measure of alexithymia) subscale “Externally 
Orientated Thinking”.  The authors reported that this was surprising because most of 
the participants including the ABI participants in the study found the positive emotions 
easy.  Consistent with existing research (such as Henry et al., 2006; Kopenen et al., 
2005; Williams & Wood, 2010b), the study found that the ABI participants had a higher 
incidence of alexithymia and were more impaired in the recognition of negative 
emotions than the neurologically healthy controls, but that these scores were not 
associated with the TAS-20 scores.  The findings led the authors to conclude that 
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deficits in emotion recognition in ABI are not part of a broader disorder of acquired 
alexithymia as measured by the TAS-20. 
One of the most recent studies to look at the relationship between alexithymia and 
emotion recognition problems in people with ABI was conducted by Neumann, Zupan, 
Malec and Hammond (2014).  In this study 60 individuals with ABI and 60 age and 
gender matched controls were evaluated for alexithymia (using the TAS-20); facial and 
vocal emotion recognition using Diagnostic Assessment of Non-verbal Accuracy 2- 
Adult Faces and Voices (DANVA2-Faces; Norwicki & Duke, 1994); and empathy using 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis1980).  The study found that the 
participants with ABI had significantly higher alexithymia; poorer facial and vocal 
emotion recognition; and lower empathy scores. For the ABI participants, facial and 
vocal emotion recognition variances were significantly explained by alexithymia (12% 
and 8%, respectively); however, the majority of the variances were accounted for by 
one of the subscales of the TAS-20, externally-oriented thinking.  The authors 
concluded that people who have a tendency to avoid thinking about emotions 
(externally-oriented thinking) are more likely to have problems recognizing others’ 
emotions and assuming others’ points of view.  
Other studies using the TAS-20 with ABI populations (Henry et al., 2006; Wood & 
Williams 2007; Wood, Williams & Kalyani, 2009) suggest that alexithymia and emotion 
recognition are associated.  It has been suggested that acquired alexithymia in ABI is 
a generalised deficit in processing emotional stimuli which includes emotion 
recognition problems (Wood & Williams, 2007). Further, there is evidence that 
acquired alexithymia in individuals with ABI may be linked to the development of 
somatoform disorders and poor self-awareness (Allerdings & Alfano, 2001; Wood, 
Williams & Kalyani, 2009).  
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However, the use of the TAS-20 with its three subscales has not been properly 
investigated in ABI samples (Wood et al., 2009) and the reliability of the TAS-20 
subscales in the ABI population has been questioned by some including Henry et al., 
(2006); and McDonald et al. (2011). Poor verbal skills, and memory problems have 
been found to contribute to being assessed as having alexithymia as measured by the 
TAS-20 (Wood & Williams, 2007).  Further, the TAS-20 is a self-report measure and 
is therefore vulnerable to the influence of other variables such as subjective ratings of 
emotional experience, self-perception, affective disorders and lack of self-awareness 
(Testa et al., 2006; Wood et al., 2009) which are known to be present after ABI (Croker 
& McDonald, 2005; Hornak et al., 1996).   
Alexithymia and its possible role in emotion recognition problems is mentioned in this 
chapter for completeness.  Alexithymia was not measured in the current study for a 
number of reasons.  Firstly, there are questions about the use of the TAS-20 in ABI 
samples (Henry et al., 2006; McDonald et al., 2011. Wood et al., 2009).  Further 
investigations are needed to ascertain its appropriateness in measuring alexithymia in 
ABI population.  Further, the main aims of the current study were to develop a 
screening test of emotion recognition, generate normative data from an age stratified 
sample and compare the performance of neurologically healthy participants with a 
sample of individuals with ABI.  It is acknowledged that in any research project there 
are limitations on what can be investigated and the author recognises that further 
research investigating the role of alexithymia (and other factors such as executive 
function and affect) in emotion recognition would be beneficial.  This is discussed in 
more detail in the discussion chapter of this thesis.  
1.3 Theory of emotion recognition  
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Research has therefore established that emotion recognition difficulties after ABI often 
exist and negative emotions like fear, anger, disgust and sadness are more difficult to 
recognise than positive emotions such as happiness.  Moreover, research findings 
report that emotion recognition is variable according to the location of the ABI (Calder 
et al., 1996; Hornak et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2002) and the media being used (Knox 
& Douglas, 2009; McDonald & Saunders, 2005; Wood & Williams, 2010a).   
How do we recognise emotions?  One theory is that we use mirror neurons. A mirror 
neuron is a neuron that fires both when an animal acts and when the animal observes 
the same action performed by another (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  Brain imaging 
research has demonstrated that neurons show activity during the execution and also 
the observation of an action (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallesse, 2001). In humans, brain 
activity consistent with that of mirror neurons has been found in the premotor cortex, 
the supplementary motor area, the primary somatosensory cortex and the inferior 
parietal cortex (Molenberghs, Cunnington & Mattingley, 2009).  Levenson and Ruef 
(1992), have called this “shared physiology”. Psychologists sometimes refer to this as 
“emotional contagion” (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1994), “affective empathy” 
(Zahn-Waxler, Robinson & Emde, 1992) and “automatic emotional empathy” (Hodges 
& Wegner, 1997).  
Gallesse (2001) in his “shared manifold” hypothesis of emotion recognition suggests 
that recognising emotions is not exclusively dependent upon visual abilities or the 
capacity to represent the mental states of self and others which is often referred to as  
the ability to mentalize (Frith & Frith, 2003) or “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen, 1995). 
According to this theory the same neural structures that are involved in processing 
and controlling actions, felt sensations and emotions are also active when the actions, 
sensations and emotions are detected in others (Gallesse, 2003).  Thus, when we 
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observe a particular emotional expression our motor system becomes active and 
“resonates” with that emotion as if we were feeling the same emotion. Gallesse (2003) 
suggests that it is through this “shared manifold” that intersubjective communication 
and ability to understand others is possible.  According to Gallesse (2001), action 
observation implies action stimulation.  He points to the everyday occurrences of 
observing others yawning or laughing which result in us performing the same action 
as evidence of this. 
According to Gallesse (2001), our felt capacity to have relationships with others and 
how we “mirror” ourselves in the behaviour of others and recognise them as similar to 
us are rooted in empathy and it is empathy that enables us to generate a link between 
ourselves and others and have meaningful relationships. According to this theory 
emotions experienced by others become meaningful to us because we can share them 
with them.  We understand the emotions of others through a mirror matching 
mechanism. 
Radice-Neumann at al. (2007) rely on similar presumptions in their two stage theory 
of facial emotion recognition.  They suggest that the first stage involves an individual 
correctly recognising the relevant facial features that depict the emotion (Tarr & 
Gauthier, 2000; Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000).  The second stage requires the 
individual to correctly interpret his or her own emotional state (Adolphs, Damasio, 
Tranel, Cooper & Damasio, 2000; Hornak et al., 2003). Thus, the second part of facial 
emotion recognition is self-emotion processing which involves the interpretation of 
one’s own emotional state to facilitate the identification of the feelings of others 
(Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs Damasio, Tranel, Cooper & Damasio, 2000).  Damasio 
(1999) suggests that one of the mechanisms which enables us to feel emotion is the 
activation of neural “as if body loops”. 
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The idea that the perception of someone’s emotional state activates the observer’s 
corresponding representations which in turn activate somatic and autonomic 
responses (Blair, 2005) has some evidence to support it.  It has been reported that 
when someone is impaired recognising a particular emotion they are also impaired in 
subjectively experiencing that emotion (Calder et al., 1996). Further, there are studies 
that have reported evidence supporting “mirroring” of facial emotions and how this 
ability is sometimes not seen in those with ABI (Knox and Douglas, 2009; McDonald 
et al., 2011).   
However, some neuroscientists, for example Hickok (2008) argue that whilst mirror 
neuron theories are interesting and on the face of it are a reasonable idea, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence to support them.  Hickok (2008) points out that the studies 
by Rizzolati et al. (2001; 2004) were based on motor responses in monkeys and that 
to extend this work to emotions in humans is overgeneralising.  What is clear is that 
more research is needed to better understand mirror neurons and the role they play in 
humans and emotion recognition.   
The new screening measure of emotion recognition deficits developed in the current 
study will add to the debate about how we recognise emotions.  It could be used to 
screen for emotion recognition problems whilst investigating through measurement of 
physiological responding and neuroimaging (for example using Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)), whether the same 
neural structures that are involved in controlling actions, sensations and emotions are 
also active when the actions sensations and emotions are detected in others as 
suggested by Gallesse (2003). In other words, the new screening measure could be 
useful in investigating evidence of associations between emotional recognition 
problems neural structures involved in emotion recognition and motor or physiological 
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responding to emotional stimuli. The current research findings on physiological 
responding to emotional stimuli is now discussed. 
Physiological responses to emotional stimuli  
Physiological emotional under-arousal has been reported in individuals with mild head 
injury (Baker & Good, 2014). Hopkins, Dywan and Segalowitz (2002) measured the 
electro dermal activity (EDA) of a group of participants with ABI and matched controls 
when presented with faces that varied in emotional expression found that the ABI 
group failed to increase EDA in response to negative facial expressions and had a 
reduced ability to identify negative emotions particularly fear compared to the matched 
controls.  De Sousa et al. (2011) measured physiological responding using facial 
electromyography (EMG) and skin conductance using finger electrodes.  They 
reported that there was reduced physiological responses to the emotional expression 
of anger in their ABI injury group compared to the control group.   
In a study investigating startle response, Williams and Wood (2012) measured EMG 
activity and the eye blink component of startle reflex recorded electromyographically 
from the orbicularis oculi muscle beneath the left eye.  Eye blink amplitude and latency 
were computer scored using a commercial startle system (SR-HLAB San Diego 
Instruments, CA). The performance of individuals with ABI and matched controls, was 
compared.  It was found that the ABI group produced the usual attenuation responses 
of startle response to pleasant pictures but a significantly lower startle response to 
unpleasant pictures and also rated the unpleasant pictures as less arousing that the 
control group. Measures of attention and information processing speed were also 
taken, though some of this data was incomplete. The authors concluded that 
unpleasant stimuli failed to arouse an aversive emotional reaction in individuals with 
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ABI and suggest that ABI may disrupt the neural pathways and structures which are 
involved in the aversive-defensive motivational system.  They also argue that their 
findings support the conclusion offered by Saunders, McDonald and Richardson 
(2006) that there is a reduction in emotional responsiveness following ABI and not 
attention or information processing. 
Together, the research on physiological responding provides evidence that 
physiological responding to emotional stimuli is affected by ABI and negative emotions 
seem to be particularly affected.  The evidence suggests that some people with ABI 
may process negative emotions differently to people who do not have an ABI.  The 
current study will contribute to the literature in this area by providing a quick and easy 
to administer stimuli that will enable deficits in emotion recognition whilst 
simultaneously measuring physiological responses.  
1.4 Empathy and emotion recognition 
According to Grattan and Eslinger (1989) empathy “refers to the capacity to apprehend 
another person’s situation or state of mind in such a way that there is a potential for 
sharing and increased understanding through an interpersonal relationship” (p.176). 
The ability to recognise and understand emotions is part of empathy, and difficulties 
recognising emotions are likely to interfere with a person’s ability to interpret how 
others are feeling, in other words their ability to empathise (Grattan & Eslinger, 1989).   
Empathy is commonly understood to have two components (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Davis, 1980).  One of the components is understanding the feelings of others.  This is 
commonly known as cognitive empathy and is understood to denote the ability to 
recognise the mental state of another person and the ability to take the mental 
perspective of another person, allowing one to make inferences about their mental or 
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emotional states i.e. understand other people.  Cognitive empathy is thought to involve 
perspective taking and theory of mind (Eslinger, 1998).  
The second component of empathy is sharing the feelings of others which is commonly 
known as affective or emotional empathy (Baron-Cohen, 1995).  Emotional empathy 
is the capacity to experience affective reactions to the observed experiences of others, 
it is our emotional reactions to people (Baron-Cohen, 1995, Davis, 1980, Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011).   It is the ability to emotionally resonate with others’ feelings while 
understanding that they are distinct from one’s own (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004).  Emotional empathy is generally thought to be an unconscious process 
involving the sharing of emotions, affective responsiveness and emotional contagion. 
The key difference between cognitive and emotional empathy is that the former 
involves understanding the other person’s point of view, whereas emotional empathy 
includes sharing or experiencing the other person’s feelings (Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972).  The ability to recognise emotions is often seen as a precursor for empathy 
(Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger & Aharon-Peretz, 2003). Evidence of a relationship 
between emotion recognition and empathy in neurologically healthy individuals exists 
(Lawrence et al., 2006).   
Theories of empathy have many similarities to the theories of emotion recognition 
mentioned above.  Preston and de Waal’s (2002) theory of empathy is based on a 
perception-action model.  According to this model, perceiving another in a given 
situation automatically results in matching the other’s neural state because perception 
and action rely on the same neural circuits.  The perception of an object’s state 
activates the subject’s corresponding representations which in turn activate somatic 
and autonomic responses which results in the person feeling something like what the 
37 
 
other person feels and enables the person to understand the other person’s internal 
state (Preston & de Waal, 2002).   
Feshbach (1987) suggests that empathy involves 3 processes.  The first process is 
cognitive and is the ability to recognise the emotions in others; the second process is 
also a cognitive one and involves the person assuming the perspective and role of 
another person.  The third process involves emotional responsiveness.  Feshbach 
(1987) argues that “empathy is conceived to be the outcome of cognitive and affective 
processes that operate conjointly” (p.273).  
It has been suggested that as well as being a form of empathy in its own right, the 
ability to recognise the mental state of another is necessary for empathy to occur 
(Batson, Fultz & Schoenrade 1987).   The basis of this is that perceiving the internal 
mental state of another is presumed to act as a stimulus to activate an empathic 
response (Batson et al., 1987); to be empathic requires being able to recognise the 
emotions of others and respond appropriately. Milders et al. (2003) suggest that if the 
neurological structures associated with emotion recognition are impaired by ABI, it is 
likely that these individuals will have difficulty showing empathy and may not respond 
empathically to the emotional needs of others. They suggest that individuals who have 
impaired emotion recognition are likely to be unable to show empathy and may be 
seen as indifferent to the emotional needs of others.  
The research literature on empathy impairments after ABI is fairly limited.  However, 
those that do exist suggest that such impairments are not uncommon.  Indeed 
research suggests that up to 60-70% of adults with ABI self-report little to no emotional 
empathy compared to 30% of matched controls, (de Sousa, McDonald & Rushby, 
2012; de Sousa et al., 2010, 2011, Wood & Williams, 2008; Williams & Wood 2010a).  
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Poor empathic skills have been found to be widespread in individuals with ABI, and 
lack of empathy on the part of the individual with ABI to express their appreciation of 
the caregiver’s stress has been related to a reduction in life satisfaction in caregivers 
(Wells, Dywan & Dumas, 2005).  Moreover, individuals with ABI who have behavioural 
changes have been found to have lower empathy as measured by the Empathy 
Measure (Hogan, 1969) than neurologically healthy controls (Grattan & Eslinger, 
1989). 
Interestingly, Wood and Williams (2008) found there was no association between 
severity of ABI and emotional empathy which suggests that emotional empathy may 
be processed in a way that is relatively independent of cognitive deficits.  
The link between emotion recognition and empathy in the ABI population is further 
established by MRI and fMRI studies which suggest that the processes involved in 
empathy are mediated by structures that have been shown to be involved in emotion 
recognition, namely those located in the dorsolateral prefrontal lobe, orbitofrontal 
cortex, amygdala and periamygdala structures and anterior temporal lobe structures 
(Rankin, Kramer & Millar, 2005). 
Several studies by de Sousa (2010; 2011 and 2012) have investigated the relationship 
between self-reported emotional empathy, cognitive empathy and physiological 
responding.  This research has provided further support that individuals with ABI have 
lower empathy as measured by the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES; 
Mehrabian, 2000) and Inter Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) than matched controls 
and also have less emotional reactivity (as measured by facial EMG activity according 
to the guidelines of Fridland & Cacioppo, 1986) to facial expressions than matched 
controls (de Sousa et al., 2010).   
39 
 
To summarise, there is a link between emotion recognition and empathy.  Research 
has found that deficits in empathic functioning are a frequent legacy of ABI (Wood & 
Williams, 2008; Williams & Wood, 2010a) and there is evidence that deficits in 
empathy are associated with behavioural changes (Grattan & Eslinger, 1989).  It has 
been suggested that empathy deficits may underpin some of the neuro-behavioural 
disorders associated with brain injury (Wood & Williams, 2008) and affect the ability of 
people who have an ABI to understand others and maintain satisfying social 
relationships.  
1.5 Existing emotion recognition tests 
Until recently studies investigating emotion recognition impairments after ABI used 
static photographs of actors portraying the six standard emotions of happy, sad, fear, 
disgust, anger and surprise (Ekman & Friesen, 1976).  The EET (McDonald et al., 
2003) was one of the first developed measures to use dynamic audio visual stimuli.  It 
has the advantage of using stimuli which are more ecological, include spontaneous 
expressions as stimuli and combine visual and auditory social cues (McDonald et al., 
2003).  However, the EET is only one part of the TASIT.  The TASIT was designed 
primarily to be a test of social inference not emotion recognition.  Whilst the EET, with 
its dynamic displays of emotion was a step forward in measuring emotion recognition 
difficulties, it has some practical limitations.  It is now visually outdated and is time 
consuming to complete making it impractical for many clinicians and individuals with 
ABI to use especially those individuals in the early stages after ABI who often have 
limited attention and concentration (Cattran, Oddy, da Silva Ramos, Goodson & Wood, 
2018).   Performance on the EET is likely to be affected by problems with information 
processing and working memory (Cattran et al., 2018) which limits its usefulness with 
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individuals who have significant deficits in these domains.  Another limitation is how 
the EET is administered.  After each video clips is viewed, the viewer or someone on 
behalf of the viewer is required to enter the viewer’s response on a paper record and 
calculate correct number of responses at the end of the test.  An online test would be 
far easier to administer and results would be available automatically and not need to 
be manually calculated.   
A more recently developed test is the Emotion Recognition Task (ERT) developed by 
Kessels et al. (2014).  This involves the viewer watching morphed faces of facial 
features of individuals portraying one of the six standard emotions.  The test is 
particularly interested in levels of emotional intensity, hence the use of morphing 
images and the images are displayed for a short period of time.  This test is therefore 
different to real life dynamic images. 
Another emotion recognition test using dynamic stimuli is the Geneva Emotion 
Recognition Test (GERT; Schlegel, Grandjean & Scherer, 2014).  In this test 14 
emotions (anger, pride, joy, amusement, pleasure, relief, interest, surprise, anxiety, 
fear, despair, sadness, disgust, irritation) are portrayed dynamically by 10 actors in 83 
short video clips with audio.  Whilst the dynamic audio-visual displays are more 
ecological, the use of so many emotions makes identifying the emotions difficult and 
the 14 emotions are not recognised in other research and are not widely agreed to be 
universal across cultures, unlike the 6 emotions identified by Ekman and Friesen 
(1971).   
The most recently developed measure of emotion recognition is the Complex Audio-
Visual Emotion Assessment Task (CAVEAT; Rosenberg et al., 2016).  In this recent 
study 32 ABI participants and 32 matched controls were shown 38 video clips of actors 
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portraying 22 emotions (11 positive and 11 negative and asked to choose the emotion 
the actor was feeling from a list.  Construct validity was assessed by administering the 
task alongside other measures of social cognition including the EET (TASIT: 
McDonald et al,. 2003); Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001); a measure of emotional empathy, the 
Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES; Mehrabian, 2000); and a self-report 
questionnaire assessing Alexithymia (the difficulty of identifying and describing 
feelings) called the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 
1994).  They also used a number of neuropsychological measures including the 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) which 
is a measure of emotional functioning with established psychometric qualities (Brown, 
Chorpita, Korotitsch & Barlow, 1997; Henry & Crawford, 2005).  It was found that the 
CAVEAT was associated with all of these measures.  However, a major shortcoming 
of this study is that it did not use the six standard emotions commonly used in other 
emotion recognition research.  This means it is difficult to compare it to other emotion 
recognition research.  To perhaps rectify this, the authors (Rosenberg et al., 2016) 
carried out a second study.  In study two, a subset of video clips from the CAVEAT 
which was limited to the six standard emotions (happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise and 
disgust) were shown to 16 participants with ABI and 12 neurologically healthy 
participants.  In study two the findings indicated that the ABI group performed worse 
than the control group in recognising the six emotions.  However, these differences 
were reported as “trends” rather than statistically significant differences.  
The full CAVEAT is very time consuming to complete.  Further, asking viewers to 
identify an emotion from a list of 22 emotions makes it complex and confusing.  Even 
the shortened version of the CAVEAT takes 20 minutes to complete and whilst there 
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were trends in the ABI sample performing worse than the control group some of the 
emotions had quite similar percentages e.g. surprise and happy in both groups.  
Perhaps the two main limitations of the study as acknowledged by Rosenberg et al. 
(2016) themselves is that more research is needed to obtain normative data and test 
retest data needs to be obtained.  
Measures of empathy 
It is worth mentioning at this stage that the current measures of empathy are self-
report measures.  Whilst on the face of it simple to use, they have limitations including 
the ability of some of those with ABI to properly understand and complete them.  Also, 
the usefulness of using self-reports of individuals with ABI may be compromised due 
to deficits with awareness (Douglas, O’Flaherty, & Snow, 2000).  Further, these 
measures of empathy are measures of day to day empathy.  Empathy is likely to play 
a role in emotion recognition and therefore it is important to investigate how the two 
things are related. 
1.6 Rationale and aims of research 
1.6.1 Relevance to counselling psychology 
Counselling psychology considers how people relate with one another, how they think, 
feel and behave.  It is interested in peoples’ relationships and how individuals function 
in their everyday lives.  A key aim of counselling psychology is to reduce psychological 
distress and promote the well-being of individuals, groups and families.    
A significant number of individuals who have an ABI suffer with anxiety and depression 
and there is evidence that the percentage of people suffering may be as high as 50% 
(Ponsford, Olver, Ponsford and Nelms, 2002).  Further, it has been reported that 25-
43 
 
30% of relatives also have anxiety and depression with 60-80% reporting some 
emotional distress (Kreutzer et al., 1994; Livingston et al., 1985). In view of the 
significant number of people who have ABI (NICE 2014; Clinical Guidance 176), and 
the high rates of affective disorder and psychological distress in this population group 
it is likely that counselling psychologists will come in to contact and work with 
individuals with ABI and their families.   
Being able to identify when people have problems in emotion recognition is important 
because difficulties interpreting how others are feeling is likely to be related to the 
communication problems and social difficulties that they are experiencing (Radice-
Neumann et al., 2007). Emotion recognition problems affect the stability of 
relationships and are known to be related to social behaviour particularly the ability to 
communicate with others (Watts & Douglas, 2006); participate in social activities (Knox 
& Douglas, 2009) and social inclusion (May et al., 2017).  We know that changes in 
social behaviour after ABI such as lack of concern for others, self-centredness, 
irritability (Williams & Wood, 2010; Wood & Yurdakul, 1997) are often more difficult for 
families to deal with than physical or cognitive changes (Brooks et al.,1986; Katsifaraki 
& Wood, 2014).   
It is important to identify emotion recognition impairments because these problems 
can threaten the stability of relationships (Watts & Douglas, 2006).  Often the patient’s 
family is the main emotional and social support available and maintaining this support 
enables many patients with ABI to function (Wood et al., 2005).  When close 
relationships break down, often the injured person struggles to function and can end 
up in residential care (Wood at al., 2005).  The ability of family members to adjust after 
ABI depends to a large extent on how predictable the behaviour of the ABI person will 
be in different situations (Wood et al., 2005).  Accordingly, the better we are at 
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identifying and understanding emotion recognition impairments (and other neuro-
behavioural characteristics) the better we will become at helping individuals and their 
families.   
1.6.2 Reasons why a new screening measure of emotion recognition is needed 
Currently, there are few assessment tools that directly assess neuropsychological 
disorders in the social and interpersonal sphere of ABI (McDonald et al., 2004) even 
though changes in social relationships are common (Ponsford et al., 1995) and one of 
the most distressing and disabling aspects of ABI (Brooks et al., 1986). Non-cognitive 
neuro-behavioural (NCNB) changes include increased impulsive and disinhibited 
behaviour along with lowered motivation and impaired emotional regulation and social 
perceptual abilities including emotion recognition problems (Cattran, Oddy, Wood & 
Moir, 2011). The term ‘personality change’ is commonly used to describe such 
changes, as family members in particular often perceive them as giving rise to a 
change in the person.   There is a lack of literature looking at NCNB sequelae after 
ABI (Cattran et. al., 2011).  Cattran et al. (2011) and Silver et al. (2011) report that 
efforts to objectively quantify NCNB changes which include facial emotion recognition 
problems in individuals following brain injury have been hampered by a lack of short, 
valid and reliable measures that have been designed for use with this population. As 
the prevalence of emotion recognition impairments after ABI is estimated to be 
between 13-39% it should be screened for (Babbage et al., 2011).   
We know that problems with emotion recognition and expression can have an adverse 
impact on inter-personal relationships and affect outcome (Wood & Williams, 2008). 
However, despite the evidence that it adversely affects social functioning (Knox & 
Douglas, 2009; McDonald & Flanagan, 2004; McDonald & Saunders, 2005; Radice-
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Neumann et al., 2007; Rosenberg, et al., 2016) and affect post-injury behaviour (May 
et al., 2017), currently emotion recognition is not the focus of most neuropsychological 
examinations.  An exception is Cambridge Cognition (CANTAB) who now include in 
their cognitive test the ERT (Kessels et al., 2014) which is a morphing images emotion 
recognition task focusing on emotional intensity (discussed above).  
The extent of emotion recognition problems is variable (Bornhofen & McDonald, 2008). 
It can be found in mild and moderate brain injuries, in other words, it is not limited to 
severe brain injuries (Kubu, 1999).  Also, the actual emotion perception deficits also 
vary (McDonald & Saunders, 2005).  This may be due to the different pathology of 
brain injury as well as the impact of other cognitive deficits that are present (Allerdings 
& Alfano, 2006). To be able to determine the impact of a particular psycho-social 
problem like emotion recognition impairment a screening test to measure the 
impairment is needed (Wood & Williams, 2008).  The current study is important 
because it will enable emotion recognition problems to be screened for. 
The new screening measure developed in the current research is important and will 
add benefit by enabling emotion recognition problems to be screened for more easily.  
Having such a screening measure available will be beneficial in the assessment and 
treatment of emotion recognition problems.  Identification of emotion recognition 
problems will benefit individuals with ABI and their families because it will mean that 
problems can be identified and consequently, better understood and managed. Better 
informed rehabilitation has the potential of improving relationships and decreasing the 
problems of loneliness and sense of isolation that often exist after ABI.  Moreover, 
improved understanding and support is likely to reduce the likelihood of the 
development of affective disorders in those with ABI and their families and improve 
outcomes (Wood et al., 2005). Improved psychosocial support is likely to be very cost 
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effective both in financial and personal terms (Humphreys, Wood, Phillips & Macy, 
2013). 
The new screening measure will have significant implications for treatment planning.  
Rehabilitation therapists can develop treatment interventions to help families and 
others working with individuals with ABI to learn appropriate ways of coping with these 
problems (Wood et al., 2005).  This may include helping family members to make clear 
statements and their emotional meaning as clear as possible (Marquardt et al., 2001).   
To summarise, the development of a quick and easy to administer online screening 
measure of emotion recognition problems in individuals with ABI has been identified.  
A more clinically useful measure than those that currently exist is needed. It will be of 
benefit to counselling psychologists and others working with individuals with ABI and 
their families. It will be of benefit in screening for problems during assessment and 
could be used in rehabilitation and as an outcome measure.  
The aims of this pilot study were:  
1. To develop a short simple valid and reliable screening instrument to use in 
clinical, research and rehabilitation contexts for detection of emotion 
recognition problems using contemporary stimulus items.   
2. The new screening test would consist of short video clips of actors 
portraying the six standard emotions and neutral.  There would be two parts 
to the test.  One part would screen for deficits recognising facial expressions 
(no vocal cues) and the second part would screen for deficits recognising 
emotions expressed facially with vocal cues. 
47 
 
3. To generate normative data from an age stratified sample of neurologically 
healthy participants and compare the performance of the neurologically 
healthy participants with a sample of participants with ABI. 
4. To explore whether performance on the new test instrument had any 
association with general intelligence, gender, education or age. It would 
have been interesting to investigate other factors that may influence emotion 
recognition such as depression, anxiety, alexithymia and cognitive function.  
However, it was not practicable to investigate all of these factors in the 
current study because of time and resource constraints.  Moreover, the 
author did not want to put excessive demands on the participants taking part 
in the study. The aim of this study was to develop a new screening measure 
of emotion recognition problems and it was anticipated that its findings 
would identify areas where further future investigations would be useful.  
 
It was hypothesised that:  
1. There would be test retest reliability.  There would be a significant correlation 
between scores on first and second administration.   
2. Performance on the new test would be correlated with performance recognising 
emotions measured by an existing emotion recognition scale (EET) which will 
confirm criterion validity. 
3. Performance on the BERT would be significantly positively correlated with the 
ability to empathise measured by scores on two existing empathy rating scales 
(BEES and IRI). 
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4. Performance of the ABI participants on the BERT and EET would be worse 
than the performance of the neurologically healthy participants. 
5. Performance would be improved in both groups in the second part of the new 
test (“with phrase” BERT), which provides more cues (facial expression and 
vocal cues), and there would be smaller group differences for the “with phrase” 
BERT than the “no phrase” BERT. 
6. It would be possible to calculate clinical cut off scores from this study.  
Published tests such as the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA: Robertson, Ward, 

















Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The rationale, aims and hypotheses central to the study are set out in the previous 
chapter at section 1.6. This chapter sets out how the aims were achieved. 
2.2 Methodology  
A key aim of the study was to develop a new screening instrument that would be quick 
and simple to administer.  To achieve this it was decided that the BERT would be an 
online test.  It was decided that all of the tests and measures used in the study would 
be administered online.  This enabled participants to complete the tests involved in the 
study at a place and time that was most convenient to them and allow for recruitment 
of participants who were geographically dispersed.  Online administration also enabled 
the data in the study to be collected easily and in a structured way which made analysis 
more straight forward. 
2.3 Recruitment 
Neurologically healthy adults – normative sample/control group 
A key component of the study was to recruit neurologically healthy adult participants 
– the normative sample/control group.   
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This group was made up of community volunteers and staff working at the University 
of the West of England (UWE).  An advert (see copy in Appendix 1) was placed in 
UWE’s online staff magazine and adverts were placed on the social media Facebook 
and in community group settings (see copy in Appendix 2).  To ensure there was an 
age stratified sample, participants were recruited in the following age bands; 18-34yrs; 
35-49 yrs.; 50-64yrs and 65-80yrs.  
Participants who were interested in taking part contacted the researcher by email.  The 
participant was sent a copy of Participant Information Sheet A (Appendix 3) by email 
and asked to read this carefully.  The participant contacted the researcher if he or she 
wanted to take part.  On receiving this confirmation the researcher sent the participant 
an email with a PDF attachment (Appendix 4) which contained instructions about the 
test. The participant completed the test online using the information contained in the 
instructions. In order to obtain test retest data the participants completed the BERT 
(but not the other measures) again at least one week later. An email was sent to the 
participants reminding them to complete the BERT again one week after the first 
administration (Appendix 5).  After completing the BERT for a second time an 
automatically generated email was sent to the participant providing them with details 
of a £10 voucher code to thank them for taking part in the study. 
Inclusion criteria: Participants had to self-report that they were English speaking (in 
order that they could understand tasks and instructions which were written in English).  
They also had to self-report that they were over 18 years of age, had no history of 
psychiatric or developmental disorder or problems with their sight or hearing which 
would make it difficult to complete tasks on a computer. 
Details of neurologically healthy controls recruited 
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Demographic details of the neurologically healthy participants are contained in table 3 
(page 73).  Ninety-two neurologically healthy participants (42 males and 50 females) 
were recruited.  This sample size was sufficient because it provided sufficient power 
to show medium effect sizes in the planned analyses and enabled enough participants 
in each of the four age bands. The power calculation was done retrospectively by a 
colleague with statistical expertise.  Please see email from statistician Paul White in 
Appendix 6.  He ran a simulation model (Chow, Shao & Wang, 2003) and used this 
with the achieved sample sizes and observed p values.  After adjusting to estimate the 
lower bound of power, the estimated power was calculated to be 85%. 
 
The age range for participants was 20 to 80 years old, with a mean average age of 
47.4 years (SD 15.4). Most (96.7%) had some educational qualifications with nearly 
three quarters (73.9%) having a degree or postgraduate qualifications. Three 
participants had no formal qualifications.  Number of years of education for the control 
participants was on average 15.58 years (SD 2.34) as detailed in table 3 (page 73). 
At the time of study, 87% of control participants were in employment and 13% were 
retired.  The control participants were employed in occupations ranging from senior 
managerial/professional (n=12); intermediate managerial/administrative/ professional 
(n=36); junior managerial/administrative/professional (n=28); semi-skilled manual 
(n=4); and retired (n= 12). 
Estimates of intellectual ability were determined by control participants completing the 
Spot the Word, second edition (STW2; Baddeley & Crawford, 2012). The STW2 
scores (mean = 93.97; SD = 4.80) equate to a mean estimated IQ for the control group 
of 118. An IQ score of between 85 and 115 is generally considered to be average (this 
assumes a standard deviation of 15).  Most people have an IQ of score of between 95 
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and 105. Thus the estimated IQ score of 118 for the control group suggests that the 




The ABI adult participants were recruited through three Headway centres in the 
southwest of England.  Headway is the UK-wide registered charity that works to 
improve life after brain injury. It has a network of more than 125 groups and branches 
across the UK and provides support, services and information to people who have had 
a brain injury, their families and carers, as well as to professionals in the health and 
legal fields. Three Headway centres were approached by the researcher.  These were: 
Headway Bedford; Headway Somerset; and Headway Swindon.   
After ethical approval had been granted (see ethics section below) the researcher 
visited the Headway centres to talk to prospective participants and Headway staff 
about the study.  Each Headway centre identified a member of staff who would liaise 
with the researcher and support the study.  This person was responsible for identifying 
ABI participants who satisfied the inclusion criteria, and deal with administrative 
matters such as giving out participant information sheets.  
Inclusion criteria: The inclusion criteria for the ABI participants was the same as for 
the neurologically healthy control group.  In addition they had to have an ABI and be 
able to give informed consent to take part in the study (see section on Ethics below 
for details).  
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A Participant Information Sheet B (see Appendix 7) was given to prospective 
participants by the Headway centres.  Prospective participants informed their 
Headway centre if they were interested in taking part in the study.  They were given a 
consent form (see Appendix 8) to read.  Once a participant had confirmed their wish 
to take part in the study, a mutually convenient time was arranged for the researcher 
to visit the participant at their Headway centre. The researcher was available whilst 
the ABI participants completed the tests that made up the study.  The ABI participants 
could also complete the test at home or at a different place and time if they preferred.  
One week after the first administration of the test the ABI participants were asked to 
complete the BERT again.  The researcher was available whilst the participants 
completed the BERT for a second time.  After completing the BERT twice the ABI 
participants were provided with a £10 voucher to thank them for taking part. 
Details of ABI sample recruited 
Twenty participants (10 males and 10 females) who had sustained moderate to severe 
ABI were recruited.  Five were recruited from Headway Somerset; seven from 
Headway Swindon and eight from Headway Bedford.  ABI participants were aged 
between 25 to 80 years (mean age 50.7 years; SD 13.3).  14 participants (70%) had 
post trauma amnesia (PTA) or loss of consciousness (LOC) of more than 24 hours 
indicating ‘severe’ brain injury and five participants (25%) had PTA or LOC between 
1-24 hours indicating ‘moderate’ brain injury. Information on PTA and LOC for one 
participant was not available. 
The majority of ABI participants (60%) had had a stroke or brain haemorrhage, 25% 
had sustained traumatic brain injury as a result of road traffic accidents or physical 
assault, and 10% had had aneurysms and one person a brain tumour. 
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Participants sustained ABI an average of 14.1 years previously (SD = 14.5 years, 
range 11 months – 48 years). 
Thirty percent of ABI participants had no educational qualifications; the remainder had 
secondary school or vocational qualifications. One participant had a university degree.   
Seventy five percent of ABI participants had been in employment at the time of ABI in 
a range of skilled, semi-skilled and management roles. One was in full time education 
and two were retired. It was not possible to determine occupational status of two 
participants. 
The number of years of education for the ABI participants was on average 11.55 years 
(SD 2.04) and is presented in table 3 (page 73). 
STW2 was completed by 75% of ABI participants, resulting in a mean estimate of 
premorbid intellectual ability of 107 for the group as a whole. This estimate suggests 
that the premorbid intellectual ability of the ABI group was average as it falls within the 
range of 85-115 which is generally accepted to be average. However, it is lower than 
the estimated IQ of the control group which was 118 which is above average. 
All participants were informed of the study procedures and gave consent to take part 
in the study.   
Summary of the groups’ characteristics 
The groups were matched on age and gender.  They differed on IQ, number of years 
of education and occupational background.  The control group was higher than the 
ABI group in these categories.  Details of the groups’ characteristics are presented in 
table 3 of the Results chapter (page 73) and demographic details are contained in 
Appendices 12 and 13.  
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2.4 Ethical Practice 
ABI participants – obtaining informed consent 
Before any of the ABI participants could take part in the study, steps were taken to 
ensure that the participant could give informed consent. The staff working at the 
Headway centres were asked to make sure that information about the study was only 
given to participants who could give informed consent. Each centre was instructed by 
the researcher that in cases where there was any doubt or uncertainty that a person 
was able to give informed consent then that person should be excluded from the study.  
The researcher was fortunate to have the guidance and support of her supervisor, 
Professor Nick Alderman and her Director of Studies, Dr Tony Ward to advise on the 
issue of informed consent.  The researcher expected all ABI participants to be able to 
understand the purpose, the procedures, the potential risks and benefits of taking part 
and that they understood that participation was voluntary.  The researcher expected 
participants to talk lucidly about the study, ask questions and confirm they were happy 
to take part.  
Ethical approval 
The study and its procedures were approved by the National Health Service National 
Research Ethics Service (NRES) Committee South West - Frenchay Research Ethics 
Committee (reference 15/SW/0229) and UWE Research Ethics Committee (reference 
HAS/14/03/64). The study was carried out in accordance with the British Psychological 
Society’s (BPS’s) Codes of Ethics (2009); the BPS’s Ethical Guidelines (2014); and 
BPS’s Code of Human Research (2010).   
All participants were informed of the study procedures, what their participation in the 
study would entail and gave consent to take part in the study.  The study involved 
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vulnerable participants and accordingly specific measures were taken as outlined 
below: 
 Prospective participants were informed that taking part in the study was 
voluntary. 
 Participants were informed they could withdraw from the study without giving a 
reason at any time until the research report of the study had been submitted for 
assessment or publication by contacting the researcher. 
 Prospective participants were given a detailed participant information sheet 
which gave information about the study; what would be involved if they decided 
to take part; researcher and supervisor contact details; and advised that 
information provided would be kept confidentially.   
 As discussed above, fully informed consent was sought from all the ABI 
participants.  The Headway centres were specifically asked to ensure that any 
prospective participants they identified were able to give informed consent.   
 It was made clear to the participants that the tasks they would complete were 
for a research study and their personal performance on the tasks would not be 
disclosed to them.  
All data collected has been kept confidentially with only the researcher, her director of 
studies and supervisor having access to the raw data which has been stored securely 
in password protected files in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998).   
Whilst it was not anticipated that there would be any particular risks to participants in 
taking part in the study, it was acknowledged that there is always the possibility for 
research participation to raise uncomfortable and distressing issues.  Accordingly, 
participants were given the contact details of the researcher and her director of 
studies.  No participants sought further information or advice from the research team.  
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They were offered the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study before, 
during and after taking part.  In addition, for the ABI participants a procedure was in 
place so that participants could be referred to relevant support services at their 
Headway centre if needed.  
2.5 Procedures 
2.5.1 Development of the Brief Emotion Recognition Test “BERT” 
Prospective items for inclusion in the new test instrument comprised video clips of 
actors portraying seven responses.  The responses were the six standard emotions 
(happy, sad, fear, disgust, anger and surprise) which are widely accepted to be 
universal across cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971) and neutral (no emotion).  The 
video clips of the actors were both with and without verbal cues.  
Equipment used 
A Sony HVRZ7 camera with a resolution of HDV 1080p was used to video the actors.  
The footage was shot against a green screen and background was keyed out. The 
green background was replaced with a neutral grey graphic.  When recording the 
camera was approximately three meters from the actors. The head and shoulders of 
the actors was in the screen shots.   
Editing software was Premier Pro 2015 for the general editing, Adobe after Effects 
2015 for the Chroma key work and Adobe Media Encoder 2015 for the final conversion 
to MPEG 4 format. 
Item selection took place over three stages. 
Stage 1: Generation of preliminary pool of video clips 
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Firstly, drama students (five male and five female) were recruited from the drama 
department of UWE.  They were video recorded portraying the six standard emotions 
and a neutral response in which no emotion was present.  They were asked to feel the 
emotion they were portraying whilst they were video recorded. Actors were recorded 
portraying each of the different emotions without any verbal content. Our rationale for 
this was that participants would have to identify the emotion being portrayed by facial 
expressions and upper body language alone.  The actors we also recorded portraying 
each of the different emotions whilst saying one of the following neutral carrier phrases 
  “What did you do that for?”  
 “I’m going out now” 
 “How did you do that?” 
The prosody was congruent with the facial expression.  The rationale for using neutral 
carrier phrases was that participants would be using facial expressions and prosody 
to identify the emotions being portrayed and that the semantic content of the phrase 
being spoken would not provide any additional cues i.e. the “with phrase” video clips 
would not be a straight forward semantic task.  The order of the neutral carrier phrases 
was varied for each of the actors.  A large initial pool of 140 video clips was created. 
Stage 2: Selection of a smaller pool of video clips 
In the second stage, this initial pool of video clips was reduced.  The pool of clips was 
viewed and rated independently by the researcher and another researcher with 
experience in this area. Ratings were then compared to see which ones had been 
rated highly by both the researchers. The best two examples of each of the six 
standard emotions and neutral (no emotion) with verbal content (14 clips) and no 
verbal content ( a further 14 clips) together with two video clips with verbal content and 
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two without verbal content that could be used as practice items (four additional clips), 
were selected to use in the candidate pool.  These 32 video clips were judged by the 
researcher and her director of studies to clearly and unambiguously represent the 
emotions.   
Stage 3: Generation of the final pool of video clips 
The reduced pool of 32 video clips were independently viewed by an opportunity 
sample of the researcher’s colleagues consisting of 10 neurologically healthy 
volunteers (five males and five females).  These volunteers self-reported that they had 
no history of ABI, psychiatric or developmental disorder or problems with sight or 
hearing which would make it difficult to complete tasks on a computer.  The volunteers 
were asked to choose from a list of the six standard emotions and neutral which 
emotion was being portrayed in each video clip.   
The recognition rates of the 10 individuals who viewed the 16 “no phrase” and 16 “with 
phrase” clips (total 32 clips) is presented in Appendix 9.    Recognition rates of the 
control group on the “no phrase” and “with phrase” BERT are also presented in 
Appendix 9.   
Performance of males and females 
The overall performance of males and females was the same on the “no phrase” video 
clips (mean 14.2; SD 1.10).  The average performance of males and females was the 
same (mean 14.2) on the “with phrase” video clips though the standard deviation for 
the males was slightly higher (SD 1.10 compared to SD 0.84 for the females) 
demonstrating that there was more variation in the males’ scores.  
Percentage recognition rates of the selected clips 
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The percentage recognition rates of the selected nine clips (two practice items, six 
clips of the six basic emotions and neutral) were 97.14% for the “no phrase” clips and 
91.45% for the “with phrase” clips.  In other words, the recognition rates were lower 
for the “with phrase” clips than the “no phrase” clips. 
In the “no phrase” clips the average recognition rates were 97.5% for negative 
emotions and 95% for positive emotions.  In the “with phrase” clips the average 
recognition rates were 87.5% for negative emotions and 90% for the positive emotions.  
These figures compare favourably to the recognition rates found in the control group 
who took part in the study.  The control groups’ recognition rate was 98.75% for 
negative emotions and 100% for positive emotions in the “no phrase” BERT and 
90.25% for negative emotions and 93% for positive emotions in the “with phrase” 
BERT (see table 2). 
Table 2 Average recognition rates of the 10 individuals on the video clips that were selected for the 
BERT and recognition rates of the control group. 
Emotion “no phrase” recognition rate % “with phrase” recognition rate % 
 10 individuals Control group 10 individuals Control group 
 Angry 100 95 90 98 
Surprise 100 100 90 86 
Neutral 100 100 90 86 
Fear 90 100 90 96 
Disgust 100 100 80 80 
Happy 90 100 90 100 
Sad 100 100 90 87 
Positive emotions 
(happy and surprise) 
95 100 90 93 
Negative emotions 
(angry, fear, disgust 
and sad) 
97.5 98.75 87.5 90.25 




A video clip for each of the six standard emotions and neutral plus two additional clips 
that would be used as practice items (P1 and P2) were selected.  In other words nine 
clips were selected for the “no phrase” BERT and nine clips were selected for the “with 
phrase” BERT.  Selection of clips for the BERT was based on the items having a 
minimum recognition rate of 80% suggesting interrater reliability.  A final pool of 18 
video clips was created. Fifty percent of the final video clip recordings were male and 
fifty percent were female. 
Generation of the online test 
The final pool of video clips were put online. The order of the clips in the BERT was 
determined randomly and presented to each participant in the same fixed order.  The 
order of the clips was not varied/counterbalanced. This was because the aim of the 
research was to develop a standardised test.  This requires that the test is the same 
each time the test is administered. Limitations of not counterbalancing and using a 
fixed order are discussed in the Discussion chapter of this thesis.   
The two parts to the BERT are: 
 “no phrase” BERT – a series of short (nine to seventeen seconds) video clips 
of actors portraying the six standard emotions and neutral using facial 
expressions only (no sound); 
 “with phrase” BERT - a series of short (seven to nine seconds) video clips of 
actors portraying the six standard emotions and neutral using facial 
expressions and prosody which was congruent with the facial expression.  
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An example of the stimuli is presented in figure 1 below.  The example is a screen shot 
of practice item 1 of the “no phrase” BERT.  Other examples of the stimuli are 












2.5.2 Other materials 
Various psychometric properties of the BERT were determined by comparing 
responses of the neurologically healthy control group and ABI group with a number of 
additional measures.  The other measures were: 
Existing emotion recognition measure: The Awareness of Social Inference Test 
(TASIT): Part 1 – Emotion Evaluation Test (EET; McDonald et al., 2003). 
The EET consists of 28 video vignettes of professional actors portraying one of the six 
standard emotions and neutral (no emotion).  All the scripts are ambiguous 
monologues or dialogues devoid of specific emotional content. The video vignettes 
are used to emulate real emotional expressions and viewers have to identify the 
emotion the target actor is feeling by choosing an emotion from a list of the six standard 
emotions and neutral. This test assesses the ability to interpret emotional expressions 
and paralinguistic cues in order to make judgments about speakers’ mental states 
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(McDonald, 2011) and has been reported to have good psychometric properties with 
test retest reliability having a reported range of 0.74 to 0.88 (McDonald et al., 2006). 
Emotional Empathy test: The Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES; 
Mehrabian, 1997). 
The BEES is a measure of emotional empathy (Mehrabian, 1997).  It is a 30 item self-
report questionnaire that is able to distinguish between people who are more 
responsive to another’s emotional experience from people who are less responsive 
(Mehrabian, 1997).  Responses are rated using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 
very strong agreement to very strong disagreement. The author has reported a mean 
normative scale of 45 (SD = 24) with high score equating to higher emotional empathy 
(Mehrabian, 2000).   The BEES has good internal consistency and test retest reliability 
(alpha=0.87, r=0.77, Chauhan et al., 2008; Mehrabian, 2000). It has been used in the 
general population, and in ABI populations to measure emotional empathy (for 
example: Wood & Williams, 2008; Williams & Wood, 2010a; de Sousa et al., 2010; de 
Sousa et al., 2011).  
Multifaceted empathy test – Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) 
The IRI is a 28 item self-report questionnaire that is measured on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from zero (does not describe me well) to four (describes me very well).  
It consists of four, seven item subscales each intended to measure some aspect of 
empathy: Perspective Taking (the ability to shift to another’s emotional perspective); 
Empathic Concern (feeling warmth and compassion for others); Fantasy (the ability to 
put oneself in a fictional situation); and Personal Distress (feeling fear or anxiety in 
response to seeing others in distress).  Scores are calculated for each of the 
subscales.   
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Davis saw empathy as a multidimensional phenomenon of distinct but related 
constructs that involve reactivity to others.  The IRI has been found to be positively 
correlated with the Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan, 1969; Davis, 1980) which 
measures cognitive empathy and provides evidence that the IRI measures cognitive 
empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger & Aharon-Peretz, 2004). High 
scores equate to higher cognitive empathy.  Further validation of the IRI has come 
from Bernstein and Davis (1982) who found a correlation between the perspective 
taking scale and accuracy in person perception.  The four subscales that comprise the 
IRI have been reported by Davis (1983) to have satisfactory internal reliabilities (alpha 
ranges 0.71 to 0.77) and satisfactory test retest reliabilities (alpha ranges 0.62-0.80).  
Further, the IRI has been reported to be reliable in ABI (Shamay-Tsoory et. al., 2004). 
Verbal intelligence measure – Spot the Word, Second Edition (STW2; Baddeley 
& Crawford, 2012)  
STW2 is a measure which can be used as an estimate of pre-morbid intelligence.  
Performance on STW2 is reported to be highly correlated with verbal intelligence (Mill, 
Hill Vocabulary Score; Raven, 1958) and performance on the NART (Nelson, 1982). 
It involves presenting participants with one hundred pairs of items comprising one real 
word and one nonsense word invented to look like a word but having no meaning. 
Participants are required to identify the real word in each pair of items.  This is a test 
of understanding written vocabulary and correlates highly with other well-known tests 
of written vocabulary such as the National Adult Reading Test (NART) (r=0.87) 
(Nelson, 1982; Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-Smith, 1993). STW2 was used rather than 
the NART because it has been shown to be relatively stable following neurological 
impairment and is a good estimator of premorbid abilities as it shows good discriminant 
validity (Yuspeh & Vanderploeg, 2000).   Also, no verbal response is needed, thus it 
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avoids the potentially discouraging effects of repeated failure of word pronunciation 
that is associated with the NART (Baddeley et al., 1993).  
2.5.3. Administration of the new test and other measures to the control group 
The BERT, EET and other measures (BEES, IRI and STW2) were administered online 
in the same order to the participants in the control group. The order of the video clips 
in the BERT and EET and the questions of the other measures (BEES, IRI and STW2) 
were presented in the same order to every participant.  This was because the aim of 
the research was to develop a standardised test.  As mentioned above, this requires 
that each time the test is administered it is in the same order so it is the same test for 
everyone who completes it.   
Participants accessed the tests that made up the study “the tests” by following the 
instructions that had been sent to them.  All participants were required to confirm their 
consent by checking a response box on the online consent form before completing 
any of the tests.  Participants were asked demographic questions about their gender, 
age, occupation and level of education.  Participants were shown the “no phrase” 
BERT, followed by the “with phrase” BERT, then the EET, BEES, IRI and finally STW2.  
An instruction slide preceded each of the tests.  In the BERT and the EET participants 
are shown video clips of actors portraying emotions.  After viewing each video clip the 
participant is instructed to choose the emotion they think the actor is portraying.  They 
are provided with a list of the emotional categories (six standard emotions and neutral) 
and have to select one of the emotions (forced choice paradigm).  Before completing 
the BERT and EET participants had the opportunity to complete two practice items 
and receive feedback on whether or not they had selected the correct response.  
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All online measures were administered in a single session. Time taken to complete 
the measures was about 45 minutes. 
As mentioned above, the new test instrument (“no phrase” BERT and “with phrase” 
BERT) was re-administered one week after it was first administered to assess test 
retest reliability.  The other measures were not re-administered, as these measures 
already have established test retest data. Participants were sent an email reminding 
them to complete the new test instrument again.  In the second administration the 
format and content of the test instrument was exactly the same as the first 
administration.  The second administration took approximately 5-10 minutes to 
complete. 
2.5.4 Collection of validity data from the ABI group 
In order to provide some preliminary findings of the construct validity of the new test 
instrument we wanted to compare the performance of a sample of ABI individuals with 
the performance of the neurologically healthy controls.  To do this the new test 
instrument (BERT) and the other measures (EET, BEES, IRI and STW2) were 
administered to a small group of participants who had suffered ABI.  These participants 
were recruited from three Headway centres (see above).   
The tests were administered to the participants from Headway Bedford and Headway 
Swindon online.  These ABI participants followed the same procedure as the 
neurologically healthy controls.  They were required to confirm their consent by 
checking a response box on the online consent form before completing any of the tests 
and were asked demographic questions about their gender, age, occupation and level 
of education (see screen shots in Appendix 10).  The tests administered were exactly 
the same (content and order) as those administered to the neurologically healthy 
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controls.  In other words, they were shown the “no phrase” BERT, followed by the “with 
phrase” BERT (see screen shots in Appendix 10), then the EET, BEES, IRI and finally 
STW2.  As with the neurologically healthy controls, an instruction slide preceded each 
of the tests.  Before completing the BERT and EET the ABI participants had the 
opportunity to complete two practice items and receive feedback on whether or not 
they had selected the correct response. All online measures were administered in a 
single session. Time taken to complete the measures was about 45 - 60 minutes. 
Lack of sufficient internet access at Headway Somerset meant that the new test and 
other measures could not be administered online to the five Headway Somerset ABI 
participants. The researcher showed each of these participants the video clips that 
made up the “no phrase” BERT, “with phrase” BERT and the EET on a laptop screen.  
The size and format of the video clips on the screen was the same as the video clips 
in the online presentation.  The order that the video clips were shown in was exactly 
the same as in the online version.  The participants had a written list of the six standard 
emotions and neutral and were asked to point to or read from the list which emotion 
was being portrayed in each of the video clips.  The five participants from Headway 
Somerset completed paper version of the BEES, IRI and STW2.  The order of the 
questions was the same as in the online version.  Time restrictions at Headway 
Somerset meant that participants from this centre completed the tests in a number of 
sessions.  
All 20 participants in the ABI group completed the BERT (“no phrase” and “with 
phrase”) and EET.  Whilst the majority (12) of the ABI participants completed all of the 
measures, time and other restrictions resulted in 8 of the ABI participants not 
completing all of the measures.  
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The researcher attended the various Headway centres one week after the first 
administration to help ensure the second administration of the BERT took place.  In 
the second administration the format and content of the test instrument was exactly 
the same as in the first administration.  The second administration took approximately 
5-10 minutes to complete. 
2.6 Data analysis 
Data from the online tests was collected in Excel spreadsheets (Microsoft Excel, 
2016).  Data collected manually from the Somerset Headway participants was 
recorded in Excel spreadsheets in the same format as the online test result data. 
Normality Analysis 
Preliminary analysis of responses to the BERT using the Kolmogorov-Smirov Lilliefors 
significance correction test of normality showed most of the variables were not 
normally distributed.  The analysis indicated that there was skewness in the data.  The 
only variable that was normally distributed was the “with phrase” BERT variable.  
Results of Kolmogorov-Smirov Lilliefors analysis are contained in Appendix 11.  
Summary of Normality analysis 
The majority of the BERT data was found not to be normally distributed.  In view of 
this non-parametric methods were used to analyse the BERT data. Non- parametric 
tests make no assumptions about parameters of the population distribution.  This 
compares to parametric tests that do make assumptions about the population 
distributions.  
Statistical analysis was undertaken using SPSS v22 (IBM Corp., 2013).  The 
statistical methods used to analyse the data were: 
70 
 
 Spearman’s Rho to investigate correlations between the correct scores for 
each part of the BERT (“no phrase”, “with phrase”, and total correct score) and 
the EET (an existing measure of emotion recognition deficits); the BEES and 
the IRI (measures of empathy). Spearman’s Rho was used because it is a non-
parametric test that can be used to measure the strength of association 
between two variables.  Pearson’s test was not chosen because it is used when 
the data is normally distributed. 
 Spearman’s Rho to investigate whether age, education or intelligence 
influence performance on the new test. It was not appropriate for Pearson’s 
test to be used as this relies on data being normally distributed and the data in 
this study was not normally distributed. Spearman’s Rho is a non-parametric 
test able to measure the strength of association between two variables.   
 Spearman’s Rho correlation was used to check out test retest reliability.  The 
data was not normally distributed so a non-parametric test was needed. 
 Mann Whitney U test was used to analyse gender and other differences 
between the two groups (discriminant validity). This test was chosen because 
it is a non-parametric test that can be used to compare ordinal data.  It was not 
appropriate to use Chi square analysis to analyse gender and other differences 
between the groups because some of the cells in the analysis had values of 
less than five (Bewick, Cheek & Ball, 2004). 
 Fisher’s exact test was used to compare the number of individuals in each 
group getting the items in the BERT (“no phrase”, “with phrase” and total) 
correct or incorrect. It was not appropriate to use Chi square because some of 
the cells had values of less than five (Bewick, Cheek & Ball, 2004). 
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 Cut off scores were calculated to enable the test to be used in a clinical and 
research settings. The calculation method used to calculate clinical cut off 
scores was SD x 1.65 (the multiplier used for normal distribution to cut off the 
top and bottom 5%) subtracted from the mean scores (Singh, 2006).  The 
sensitivity (the ability of the test to correctly identify those people who had 
emotion recognition problems) and specificity (the ability of the test to correctly 
identify those people who did not have problems with emotion recognition) of 
the BERT was investigated using the cut off scores (Rumsey, 2003). 
 Hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to explore whether the 
variables group, STW2 and years education explained or contributed to 
observed difference in performance on the BERT and explore the contribution 
of these variables to performance on the BERT. 
 Mann Whitney U test was used to analyse if participants who scored below the 
cut off score on the BERT differed on the other measures (EET, BEES, IRI and 
STW2). This test was chosen because it is a non-parametric test that can be 
used to compare ordinal data.   
 
2.7 Summary of methodology 
A quantitative approach was used.  A new test instrument (BERT) was created 
consisting of video clips of actors portraying the six standard emotions and neutral (no 
emotion) using facial expressions only (“no phrase” BERT) and using facial 
expressions and vocal prosody (“with phrase” BERT).  Normative data from an age 
stratified sample of 92 neurologically healthy adults was obtained.  Statistical analysis 
was used to determine validity, reliability and cut off scores for the BERT. Statistical 
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analysis of the influence of age, gender, education or intelligence on performance on 
the BERT was carried out. 
Data from a small sample of ABI adult participants was examined and compared with 
data from the neurologically healthy control group to provide some preliminary findings 
on whether the ABI group’s performance was poorer than the control group and 
whether performance was influenced by the stimuli used – facial expressions only and 









Chapter 3: Results and Analysis of Results 
3.1 Introduction 
The results from this study will be presented in several sections.  Firstly, group 
characteristics will be outlined highlighting where the groups were well matched and 
different.  Findings relating to test retest reliability will then be outlined followed by the 
findings of associations of the BERT with the other measures used in the study, 
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particularly the key other measure of emotion recognition, the EET. Results of the 
analysis comparing the control and ABI groups’ performance on the BERT and the 
other measures is then reported.  Finally, there is an explanation of the clinical cut off 
scores, their specificity and sensitivity.  
3.2 Group characteristics  
Analysis of the participants’ characteristics (presented in table 3, page 73) revealed 
that the groups did not differ significantly in terms of their age (control group M=47.37, 
SD=15.43; ABI group M= 50.70, SD=13.27; U (N1= 92, N2= 20) = 798.00, p>.05).  
However, the control group had a significantly higher IQ (M=93.97, SD= 4.80) than the 
ABI group (M=76, SD=15.62); U (N1=92, N2=15) =139.00, p<.05 and the control 
groups’ years education (M=15.58, SD=2.34) was higher than the ABI groups’ 
(M=11.55; 2.04); U=139.00, p<.05.  The groups also differed in occupational 
background. Fifty four percent of the control group identified as being senior or 
intermediate professional compared to only 15% in the ABI group.  Further 45% of the 
ABI group identified as casual/lowest grade/ worker or unemployed compared to only 
5% of the control group.  There were no significant sex differences on the BERT, all 
tests p>.05. 
 
Table 3: Summary of the groups’ characteristics  
 Control group ABI group Mann Whitney U 
(p value) 
 n mean SD n mean SD  
Age (years) 92 47.37 15.43 20 50.70 13.27 798.00 (p>.05) 
STW2  92 93.97 4.80 15 76.00 15.62 139.00 (p<.05) 
Years education 92 15.58 2.34 20 11.55 2.04 (p<.05) 
Time since ABI (years) N/A N/A N/A 20 14.1 14.5 _ 
Occupational background        
 Senior professional 12 
(13%) 
_ _ 0 
(0%) 







_ _ 3 
(15%) 
_ _ _ 
 Junior professional 37 
(40%) 
_ _ 8 
(40%) 
_ _ _ 
 Skilled manual worker 5 
(5%) 
_ _ 2 
(10%) 
_ _ _ 




_ _ 2 
(10%) 
_ _ _ 




_ _ 5 
(25%) 
_ _ _ 
 
3.3 Reliability – test retest 
Analysis of the participants’ performance on first administration (T1) and second 
administration (T2) of the BERT is presented in table 4.  
Table 4: Spearman’s Rho correlations for the control and ABI groups’ performance on first and 
second administrations of the BERT 
 Control group ABI group 
“no phrase” 1st and 2nd 
administration 
n=79 Spearman = - 0.022 
 
n=15 Spearman = 0.651* 
p value = 0.845 p value = 0.009 
“with phrase” 1st and 2nd 
administration 
n=79 Spearman = 0.360* n=15 Spearman = 0.571* 
p value =0.001 p value = 0.026 
Total correct score 1st and 
2nd administration 
n=79 Spearman = 0.349* n=15 Spearman = 0.781* 
  p value =0.002  p value =0.001 
*Significant at the p<0.05 level of significance  
3.3.1 Test retest reliability - control group 
Seventy-nine participants in the control group repeated the “no phrase” and “with 
phrase” parts of the BERT.  The time between administrations was at least seven days 
(M= 14 days; SD= 8.30).  
Spearman’s Rho correlation  
Analysis revealed a positive correlation between T1 and T2 of the total correct BERT 
score (rs (79) = .35, p< .01) and “with phrase” BERT score (rs (79) =.36; p<.01) in the 
control group.  However, the correlation values were lower than expected and suggest 
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the correlations are moderate. No statistically significant correlation was found 
between T1 and T2 of the “no phrase” part of the BERT (rs (79) = -.0.02; >.05).   
Percentage agreement across two administrations 
The percentage agreement scores (i.e. the number of participants who got the same 
score on the BERT at T1 and T2) for the control and ABI groups are presented in table 
5. 
Table 5: Percentage agreement across two administrations of the BERT for the control and ABI 
groups 
Part of BERT completed Control group (n=79) 
Percentage agreement 
ABI group (n=15) 
Percentage agreement 
“no phrase” 95% 53% 
 
“with phrase” 65% 33% 
 
Total (“no phrase” and 




“no phrase” BERT 
Seventy five of the 79 participants in the control group achieved the same score on 
both administrations.  This equates to a percentage agreement score of 95%.   
“with phrase” BERT 
Of the 79 participants in the control group who repeated the “with phrase” part of the 
BERT, 51 achieved exactly the same score on both administrations.  This equates to 
a percentage agreement score of 65%.   
Analysis of the control group’s performance on the “with phrase” BERT revealed that 
72% of the participants correctly identify all of the items.  However, there is a little 
variation in the data on the 2nd administration. 
“total correct score” on the BERT 
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Forty nine of the 79 participants who repeated the BERT achieved the same score on 
both administrations.  This equates to a percentage agreement score of 61%. 
3.3.2 Test retest reliability - ABI group 
Fifteen participants in the ABI group repeated the “no phrase” and “with phrase” parts 
of the BERT.  The time between administrations was at least 7 days (M=10.01, 
SD=5.75).   
Analysis of the ABI group’s performance at T1 and T2 (presented in table 4) revealed 
that there was a statistically significant correlation on all parts of the BERT (“no 
phrase”, “with phrase” and total correct score). The Spearman’s Rho correlation 
coefficient values for the “no phrase” BERT was 0.65; for the “with phrase” BERT was 
0.57 and for the total correct BERT was 0.78 suggesting strong positive correlations 
between the scores at T1 and T2 and some evidence of test retest reliability.  
Percentage agreement across two administrations 
Percentage agreement figures for the ABI group on the BERT are presented in table 
5.   
Analysis of the ABI group’s performance on the “no phrase” BERT revealed eight of 
the 15 ABI participants who repeated the test got the same score on both 
administrations.  This equates to a percentage agreement score of 53%. For the “with 
phrase” BERT only five participants who completed the “with phrase” BERT twice 
achieved the same score on both administrations (33%). In terms of the total correct 
BERT score (“no phrase” and “with phrase” correct scores), six ABI participants got 
the same total score at T1 and T2 equating to a percentage agreement score of 40%.  
3.3.3 Summary of reliability 
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There were significant positive correlations for all parts of the BERT in the ABI group 
on T1 and T2.  The strongest correlation found was for the total correct BERT.  There 
was a correlation for the control group’s performance on T1 and T2 of the “with phrase” 
and total correct BERT.  No correlation was found for the control group’s performance 
on the “no phrase” BERT, however the percentage agreement score was very high.  
There was a high ceiling effect. 
3.4  Concurrent Validity  
Concurrent validity of the BERT was determined via correlation coefficients with 
existing measures of emotion recognition and empathy deficits that were administered 
in the study.  These were the EET, BEES and IRI.  In addition, analysis was carried 
out to investigate the relationship between the BERT, age and STW2.   
3.4.1 Concurrent Validity - control group  
A series of Spearman’s Rho tests were carried out to analyse the control group’s 
performance on the BERT and the other measures (EET, BEES and IRI). The analysis 
is presented in table 6. 
Analysis revealed that the control group’s performance on all parts of the BERT (“no 
phrase”, “with phrase” and total correct score) was correlated with the EET an 
established measure of deficits in emotion recognition. This finding suggests that the 
BERT may measure what the EET measures namely deficits in emotion recognition. 
Table 6: Spearman’s Rho correlation figures and p<0.05 significance values for the control group on 
the BERT and other measures   






Age  -0.249* 
 
0.014 -0.049 




BEES   0.037 
 
0.315* 0.316* 
STW2  0.054 
 
0.174 0.199 
IRI  Fantasy scale 0.050 
 
0.237* 0.258* 
Empathic concern 0.140 
 
0.113 0.132 
Perspective taking -0.79 
 
0.063 0.042 
Personal distress 0.131 
 
0.043 0.069 
n= 92 for all cells except for EET correlation where n= 91 and Spot the word where n= 89 
*Correlation significant at the p<0.05 level of significance 
 
Analysis revealed that the control group’s performance on the “with phrase” BERT and 
the total correct BERT score was correlated with performance on the BEES, a self-
report measure of the ability to experience the affective reactions to the emotional 
displays of others (emotional empathy).   However, no correlation was found between 
performance on the BEES and the “no phrase” part of the BERT.  The finding of no 
correlation is not surprising given the fact that nearly every participant in the control 
group got all of the “no phrase” items correct.  In other words there is a high ceiling 
effect.   
A correlation was found between the fantasy subscale of the IRI and the “with phrase” 
BERT and total correct BERT score.  However, correlations were not found with the 
other subscales of the IRI.  The IRI fantasy subscale measures the ability to put oneself 
in a fictional situation e.g to identify with fictitious characters in books or films.  The 
questions in the IRI that are used to measure the fantasy subscale are: I daydream 
and fantasise, with some regularity, about the things that might happen to me; I really 
get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel; Becoming extremely 
involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me; After seeing a play or 
movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters; When I am reading an 
79 
 
interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were 
happening to me.  
Associations between the BERT and the empathy measures (IRI and BEES) were 
hypothesised.  Accordingly, the finding of a correlation in the control group between 
the BERT and the IRI fantasy scale was hypothesised and suggests that the BERT 
detects some of the characteristic that these tests measure – the ability to empathise.   
Analysis revealed no correlations between the STW2 test and the control group’s 
performance on any parts of the BERT (“no phrase”,” with phrase” or total correct 
score) and no correlations between age and the “with phrase” BERT or total correct 
score.  However, analysis revealed a significant correlation between age and the “no 
phrase” BERT.   
3.4.2 Concurrent validity - ABI group 
Spearman’s Rho tests were run to determine the relationship between the ABI group’s 
performance on the BERT and the other measures.  The analysis is presented table 
7.  Analysis revealed that the ABI group’s performance on all parts of the BERT (“no 
phrase”, “with phrase” and total correct score) were correlated with the EET. This 
result was hypothesised and suggests that the BERT may measure the same concept 
as the EET, namely deficits in emotion recognition. 
Analysis revealed no correlation between the BEES and the BERT in the ABI group.  
This was not expected.  Possible explanations for this finding are contained in the 
discussion chapter.     
No significant correlations were found between STW2 and the ABI group’s 
performance on the “no phrase” BERT or the total correct BERT score.  A significant 
correlation was found between the STW2 and the “with phrase” BERT. 
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Table 7: Spearman’s Rho correlation figures and p<0.05 significance values for the ABI group on the 
BERT and other measures 





Total correct  
Age  -0.134 -0.098 -0.140 
 
EET  0.757* 0.780* 0.878* 
 
BEES   -0.211 0.005 -0.095 
 
STW2  0.266 0.584* 0.454 
 
IRI  Fantasy scale 0.808* 0.444 0.724* 
 
IRI  Empathic 
concern 
-0.303 -0.189 -0.270 
IRI  Perspective 
taking 
0.670 0.121 0.144 
IRI  Personal 
distress 
0.473 -0.399 -0.040 
n= 20 for all cells except for BEES correlation where n=16, IRI where n=12 and STW2 where n= 15 
*Correlation significant at the p<0.05 level of significance 
 
 
No significant correlations were found between age and ABI performance on any part 
of the BERT (“no phrase”, “with phrase” or total score).   
The analysis revealed a significant correlation between the fantasy subscale of the IRI 
and the ABI group’s performance on the “no phrase” and total score of the BERT 
(presented in table 7).  However, no significant correlations were found with the other 
subscales of the IRI - empathic concern; perspective taking and personal distress.   
 
3.4.3 Summary of concurrent validity analysis 
The performance of both groups on all parts of the BERT was correlated with the EET.  
This was as hypothesised. 
In the control group no correlation was found between STW2 and the BERT 
suggesting performance on the BERT is not affected by general intelligence in this 
group. No associations were found between age and the control group’s performance 
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on the “with phrase” and total correct BERT, though a significant association was 
found between age and the “no phrase” BERT. 
A correlation was found between the control group’s performance on the “with phrase” 
and total correct BERT score and the BEES and IRI fantasy subscale.  No correlation 
was found between the “no phrase” BERT and the BEES or IRI fantasy subscale.  
In the ABI group analysis revealed no association between performance on the BERT 
and BEES nor was any association found between age and performance on any part 
of the BERT. No correlation was found between the “no phrase” BERT or the total 
correct BERT score and STW2, though an association was found between the “with 
phrase” BERT and STW2.  A significant correlation was found between the “no phrase” 
and total correct BERT score with one of the subscales of the IRI - fantasy subscale. 
3.5 Discriminant Validity 
3.5.1 Between group differences on the BERT 
As hypothesised, analysis revealed that the ABI group’s performance on the BERT 
was poorer than the control group’s performance on the BERT.  Analysis is presented 
in table 8 and figure 2).  
The performance of the ABI group on the “no phrase” items of BERT was poorer 
(M=5.60, SD=1.5) than the control group’s (M= 6.95, SD=0.23); U (N1=20, N2=92) 
=395.5, p< 0.05). Individuals in the ABI group also correctly identified fewer 
expressions of the “with phrase” items of BERT (M=4.65, SD=1.60) than the controls 
(M=6.30, SD=0.91); U (N1=20, N2=92) = 364.5, p<0.05. The total BERT performance 
of the ABI group was poorer (M=10.25, SD=2.79) than that of the control group 
(M=13.25, SD=0.94); U (N1=20, N2=92) =270.0, p<0.05. 
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Table 8 Performance of the groups on the BERT  
 Control group ABI group Mann Whitney U 
(p value) 
 n mean SD n mean SD  
“no phrase”  1st 
 
92 6.95 0.23 20 5.60 1.50 395.50 
(p<.05) 
“no phrase”  2nd 
 
80 6.99 0.12 15 6.07 1.22 286.00 
(p<.05) 
“with phrase” 1st 
 
92 6.30 0.91 20 4.65 1.60 364.50 
(p<.05) 
“with phrase” 2nd 
 
79 6.61 0.74 15 4.73 1.62 220.00 
(p<.05) 
Total BERT 1st 
 
92 13.25 0.94 20 10.25 2.79 270.00 
(p<.05) 
Total BERT 2nd 
 
79 13.60 0.74 15 10.80 2.60 191.50 
(p<.05) 
 
3.5.2 Comparison of performance on the “no phrase” and “with phrase” BERT 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test analysis revealed that the performance of the control group 
on the “with phrase” BERT was significantly lower than the control group’s 
performance on the “no phrase” BERT (z=-5.483, p<.05).  Similarly, analysis revealed 
that the performance of the ABI group was also a significantly lower on the “with 




Figure 2: Means and SDs of the control and ABI groups’ scores on the BERT 
 
3.5.3 Multiple regression analysis on years education and STW2  
In view of the finding that the groups differed on STW2 (a measure of pre-morbid 
intelligence) and year’s education (see section 3.2 above), Stepwise multiple 
regression analysis was conducted to explore whether the variables group, STW2 and 
years education were significant predictors of performance on the “no phrase”, “with 
phrase” and total BERT.  Within the analyses, years education was not found to be a 
significant predictor of performance in relation to performance on any part of the 
BERT. 
In the “no phrase” BERT analyses, Stepwise analysis included the variables group 
and STW2.  A significant association was found (adjusted R²= .39), F (2,101) =34.40, 
p<.05. 
In order to explore the contribution of group and STW2 to performance on the “no 
phrase” BERT, multiple regression analyses were conducted. The first model, with 
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group entered at the first step, the model explained 35% of the variance (adjusted 
R2=.35, SE = .48; F (1, 102) =56.52; p < .01). The second model, which included both 
variables, explained 40.5% of the variance, F (2, 101) = 34.43, p < .01). Adding the 
STW2 measure explained an additional variance in performance (R squared change 
= .05, F change (2, 101) =8.29, p < .01). Group had a higher beta value (beta = -.40, 
p < .01) than the intelligence measure (beta = -.29, p < .05).  
In the “with phrase” BERT analyses, Stepwise analysis included the variable STW2.  
A significant association was found (adjusted R²= .27), F (1, 102) =39.38, p<.05. 
In order to explore the contribution of group and STW2 to performance on the “with 
phrase” BERT, multiple regression analysis was conducted. The first model, with 
group entered at the first step, the model explained 21% of the variance (adjusted 
R2=.20, SE = 1.02: F (1; 102) = 26.99; p < .01). The second model, which included 
both variables, explained 30% of the variance, F (2, 101) = 21.65, p < .01). Adding the 
STW2 measure explained an additional variance in performance (R squared change 
= .09, F change (2, 101) =13.10, p < .01). STW2 had a higher beta value (beta = .40, 
p < .01) than group (beta = -.20, p >.05). 
In the total BERT analyses, Stepwise analysis included the variables STW2 and group.  
A significant association was found (adjusted R²= .43), F (2,101) = 40.30, p<.05. 
In order to explore the contribution of STW2 and group to performance on the total 
BERT, multiple regression analysis was conducted. The first model, with STW2 
entered at the first step, the model explained 39% of the variance (adjusted R2=.38, 
SE = 1.18; F (1, 102) =65.14; p < .01). The second model, which included both 
variables, explained 44% of the variance, F (2, 101) = 40.32, p < .01). Adding the 
group explained an additional variance in performance (R squared change = .05, F 
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change (2, 101) = 9.85, p < .01). Intelligence (STW2) had a higher beta value (beta = 
.42, p < .01) than group (beta = -.31, p < .01). 
Summary statistics, beta values and t values for these analyses of the different 
independent variables are presented in table 9. 
Table 9. Results of multiple regression analysis for prediction of performance on the BERT 
 Variable Beta t Significance of t 
“no phrase” BERT Group -.04 -3.97 <.05 
 STW2 .29 2.88 <.05 
“with phrase” BERT STW2 .53 6.28 <.05 
Total BERT STW2 .42 4.28 <.05 
 Group -.31 -3.14 <.05 
Note: Beta values are the standardised regression coefficients. 
3.5.4 Between group differences on the other measures 
Table 10.  Groups’ performance on the EET, BEES and IRI 
 Control group ABI group Mann 
Whitney U 
p value 
 n mean SD n mean SD   
EET 
 
91 24.71 2.40 20 17.55 5.79 200.50* p<0.05 
BEES 
 
92 45.80 32.45 16 29.13 21.34 474.50* p<0.05 
IRI Fantasy 
 
92 15.89 4.52 12 15.5 4.91 520.00 p>0.05 
IRI Empathic 
concern 
92 16.38 4.48 12 17.25 6.05 490.50 p>0.05 
IRI Perspective 
taking 
92 13.35 3.74 12 18.00 4.51 241.00* p<0.05 
IRI Personal 
distress 
92 16.83 3.95 12 14.92 3.20 389.50 p>0.05 
*Correlation significant at the p<0.05 level of significance 
 
Analysis of the performance of the groups on the other measures (EET, BEES and 
IRI) is presented in table 10.  It revealed that the control group scored higher on the 
EET (M=24.71, SD=2.4) than the ABI group (M=17.55, SD=5.79); U (N1=91, N2=20) 
= 200.5, p<.05. It also showed that the control group scored higher on the BEES 
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(M=45.8, SD=32.45) than the ABI group (M= 29.13, SD=21.34); U (N1=92, N2=16) = 
474.5, p<.05. The individuals with ABI scored higher on the IRI perspective taking 
subscale (M=18.0, SD=4.51) than individuals in the control group (M=13.35, 
SD=3.74); U (N1=92, N2=12) = 241, p<.05). No significant difference was found in the 
performance of the groups in the IRI other subscales (fantasy, empathic concern or 
personal distress).  
Comparing the performance of the groups on the BERT 
3.5.5 The performance of the control and ABI participants on each item in the 
BERT  
Fisher’s exact test and percentage of participants who got the items in the BERT 
correct were calculated for each of the items to investigate differences in performance 
of the control and ABI group.  Alpha was adjusted to control for Type 1 errors. The 
results of Fisher exact test are shown in table 11. 
A statistically significant difference in performance p<0.05 and p< 0.007 (controlling 
for Type 1 errors) was found between the control and ABI group in five out of seven 
“no phrase” items (all the different emotion clips except angry and sad).   A statistically 
significant difference in performance p<0.05  was found between the control and ABI 
groups in five out of seven of the “with phrase” items (all the different emotion clips 
except sad and surprise) and two out of the seven “with phrase” items (angry and 






Table 11. The number of participants in the control and ABI groups who got each item of the BERT correct 
with the Fishers exact test result (significant at p<0.05 and p<0.007) 














Controls correct 87 92 92 92 92 92 92 
incorrect 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ABI correct 17 17 16 13 14 16 19 
incorrect 3 3 4 7 6 4 1 
Fishers exact test value 0.15 0.005 0.0008 2E-06 1.6E-05 0.0008 0.179 
significant p< 0.05 X Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes X 
significant p< 0.007 X Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes X 
 














Controls correct 90 80 92 79 88 73 79 
incorrect 2 12 0 13 4 19 13 
ABI correct 13 14 18 14 14 10 10 
incorrect 7 6 2 6 6 10 10 




0.0889 0.0306 0.1038 0.0021 0.0108 0.001 
significant p< 0.05 Yes X Yes X Yes Yes Yes 
significant p< 0.007 Yes X X X Yes X X 
 
3.5.6 The groups’ performance on the “no phrase” BERT 
The control groups’ performance was higher than the ABI groups’ performance on 
every item of the “no phrase” BERT.  Figure 3 shows the percentage of participants in 
the control and ABI groups who got each item of the “no phrase” BERT correct.  All of 
the 92 control participants got six of the seven items correct.  These were happy, 
disgusted, sad, surprise, neutral, frightened.  There was only one emotion, angry, that 
the control group had any difficulty with.  Five (5%) of the control group participants 
got this item incorrect.   
Fisher’s exact test revealed that the performance of the groups on the “no phrase” 
angry item was not statistically significant.  Interestingly, the angry item was not the 
item that caused most difficulty for the participants in the ABI group.  They struggled 
most with the emotion items fear and disgust. In other words the two items that had 
88 
 
most errors in the ABI group both had negative valence. The second emotion item in 
the “no phrase” test that was found not to be statistically different was the sad emotion 
item.  However, only one ABI participant got this item incorrect and none of the control 
group got it incorrect.   
Figure 3: Percentage of control and ABI participants who got each item of the “no phrase” BERT correct  
 
3.5.7 The groups’ performance on the “with phrase” BERT 
The percentage of participants in the control and ABI groups who got each item of the 
“with phrase” BERT correct is presented in Figure 4. 
In the control group, the emotion that had least errors was happy.  All of the 
participants in the control group got this item correct.  Most errors in the control group 
were made identifying the emotions surprise, sad and neutral. Fisher’s exact test (table 
11) revealed there was not a statistically significant difference between the groups 
performance on the “with phrase” sad, surprise, disgust, happy and neutral items. 
Analysis revealed that 87% of control participants and 70% of ABI participants 
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86% of control participants and 70% of ABI participants identified this emotion 
correctly.   
Figure 4: Percentage of control and ABI participants who got each item of the “with phrase” BERT 
correct  
 
In the ABI group, most errors were made recognising the emotions angry (35%; seven 
participants incorrect), disgust (50%; 10 participants incorrect) and neutral (50%; 10 
participants incorrect).  The ABI group made more errors identifying emotions with 
negative valence than positive valence. 
3.5.8 Between group differences on the other measures 
The control group’s performance on the EET was significantly better (M= 24.71, SD = 
2.4) than the ABI group’s (M= 17.55, SD= 5.79), U (91, 20) = 200.50, p<.05).   
The control group’s performance on the BEES was also significantly higher (M= 45.80, 
SD = 32.45) than the ABI group (M= 29.13, SD= 21.34), U (92,160) = 474.50, p<.05.   
A statistically significant difference between the two groups was found on the 
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4.51) than the control group (M= 13.35, SD=3.74), U (92, 12) = 241, p<.05.  However, 
no significant differences between the groups were found in the other subscales of the 
IRI (fantasy; empathic concern and personal distress).  Possible explanations for these 
findings are outlined in the discussion chapter. 
3.5.9 Summary of discriminant validity 
The control group performed statistically significantly better (p<0.05) on five of the 
seven video clips “no phrase” (all of the items except angry and sad).  The ABI group 
had most difficulty correctly identifying the emotions fear and disgust in the “no phrase” 
BERT.  
Analysis revealed that the control group performed significantly better in two of the 
seven “with phrase” items (angry and frightened).  
There was a statistically significant difference between the control group and the ABI 
group on all parts of the BERT (“no phrase”, “with phrase” and total score); the EET, 
BEES, IRI perspective taking scale and STW2.  The control group’s scores were 
significantly higher than the ABI group’s scores on all of these measures.  However, 
there was no statistically significant difference between the groups with regard to age 
or the other subscales of the IRI (fantasy; empathic concern and personal distress). 
3.6 Clinical cut off scores  
Analysis revealed that T1 and T2 scores for the control group did not differ significantly 
(presented in table 8 above).  In view of this finding T1 scores for the control group 
were used to generate the cut off scores. 
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Clinical cut off scores were determined to examine whether the number of correctly 
identified items on the “no phrase”, “with phrase” and the total correct BERT score 
could discriminate between the control and ABI groups.   
Clinical cut off scores are presented in table 12 together with the control group’s mean 
and SD performance, scores on the BERT and the percentage and number of 
participants in the control and ABI groups whose performance was below the clinical 
cut off scores.  
Table 12: Clinical cut off scores for the “no phrase”, “with phrase” and total correct score on the BERT 
and the percentage of participants below the cut off scores 





cut off score 
ABI  below cut 
off score 
“no phrase” 6.95 0.23 6.57 6 5% (5/92) 60% (12/20) 
“with phrase” 6.30 0.91 4.80 4 4% (4/92) 50% (10/20) 
Total correct 13.25 0.94 11.70 11 5% (5/92) 65% (13/20) 
 
Mann Whitney U analysis showed that there were significant correlations between the 
ABI participants who scored below the cut off score on the total BERT and their 
performance on the EET and IRI Fantasy subscale but there were no correlations with 
performance on the BEES or the other subscales of the IRI or on STW2 performance.  








Table 13. Means, SDs and p values for ABI participants who performed above and below the cut off 
score of the BERT and their performance on the EET, BEES, IRI and STW2 
 Above cut off Below cut off Mann 
Whitney U 
(p value) 
 n mean SD n mean SD  
EET 7 23.29 1.70 13 14.46 4.70 <.05 
BEES 6 25.67 24.06 10 31.20 20.62 >.05 
IRI Fantasy 6 19.00 2.97 6 12.00 3.85 <.05 
IRI Empathic 
concern 
6 16.83 6.11 6 17.67 6.53 >.05 
IRI Perspective 
taking 
6 19.50 5.17 6 16.50 3.56 >.05 
IRI Personal 
distress 
6 15.33 3.88 6 14.50 2.66 >.05 
STW2 6 83.67 6.12 9 70.89 18.13 >.05 
 
3.6.1 Summary of clinical cut off scores 
The clinical cut off scores for the BERT are: 
BERT “no phrase” – 6 
BERT “with phrase” – 4  










Chapter 4: Discussion of the findings  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses whether the research aims were achieved and the extent to 
which the findings support the research hypotheses. The study’s findings on valence 
and other issues relevant to the existing body of emotion recognition research are also 
discussed, together with the implications of the findings for counselling psychology, 
the limitations of the study and future research potential.  
The forthcoming discussion will contribute to the body of knowledge available on 
emotion recognition in ABI. 
4.2 Were the aims of the study achieved? 
4.2.1 Aim 1 - To develop a short simple valid and reliable screening instrument to use 
in clinical, research and rehabilitation contexts for detection of emotion recognition 
problems using contemporary stimulus items.   
A short simple to administer screening instrument of emotion recognition problems 
called the BERT was developed. It consists of contemporary stimulus items.  The 
validity and reliability of the instrument is discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 below.  
The potential use of the screening measure in clinical, research and rehabilitation 
contexts is discussed in sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9 below.   
4.2.2 Aim 2 - The new screening measure would consist of short video clips of actors 
portraying the six basic emotions and neutral.  There would be two parts to the test.  
One part would screen for deficits recognising facial expressions (no vocal cues), and 
the second part would screen for deficits recognising emotions expressed facially with 
prosody congruent to the facial expression.  
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This aim was achieved. The BERT has two parts.  The first uses facial expressions 
only (“no phrase” BERT) and the second uses facial expressions, neutral sentences 
and vocal prosody which is congruent with the facial expression (“with phrase” BERT).  
4.2.3 Aim 3 - To generate normative data from an age stratified sample of 
neurologically healthy participants and compare the performance of the neurologically 
healthy participants with a sample of participants with ABI. 
This aim was achieved.  Data from an age stratified sample of 92 neurologically 
healthy participants was obtained on performance on the BERT and other measures.  
This data was compared with data obtained from a sample of 20 participants with 
moderate to severe ABI. 
4.2.4 Aim 4 - To explore whether performance on the BERT had any association with 
general intelligence, gender, education or age.  
This aim was achieved.  
Pre-morbid intelligence (STW2) 
No significant correlations were found in the control group between performance on 
the BERT and the measure of pre-morbid general intelligence used in this study 
(STW2).  This finding suggests that in neurologically healthy individuals performance 
on the BERT is not affected by general intelligence as measured by STW2.   
In the ABI group no association was found between performance on the “no phrase” 
BERT and STW2 score.  However, a significant relationship was found between STW2 
score and performance on the “with phrase” BERT and a trend of a relationship was 
found between STW2 and total BERT score. Intelligence differences have been found 
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to have some influence on performance on the EET (McDonald et al., 2003). 
Accordingly, the finding in the current study is consistent with that finding.   
Cognitive reserve theories (Satz, 1993; Stern, 2002) suggest that pre-injury intellectual 
functioning can affect outcome after ABI, and individuals with higher intellectual 
function before their ABI tend to have better outcomes because of their higher 
intelligence. Cognitive reserve theory has some evidence to support it in other clinical 
populations.  For example, in Alzheimer’s disease higher premorbid intelligence has 
been found to be associated with later disease onset (Bigeo et al., 2002; Stern, 
Alexander, Prohovnik & Mayeux, 1992) and in HIV individuals with lower IQ have been 
found to have greater cognitive dysfunction than those with high IQ regardless of 
clinical severity (Basso & Bornstein, 2000, Stern, Silva, Chaisson & Evans, 1996).   
Therefore, a possible explanation for the finding in the current study that ABI 
participants with lower STW2 scores performed worse on the “with phrase” BERT and 
the finding of a trend of poorer performance on the total BERT score is that individuals 
with lower STW2 scores have less cognitive reserve than individuals with higher STW2 
scores, and this makes them more at risk of emotion recognition problems (Satz, 1993; 
Stern, 2002).  More research is needed to explore the relevance of cognitive reserve 
theory in ABI (Kesler, Adams, Blasey & Bigler, 2003) and whether pre-morbid 
intelligence is a relevant factor when considering emotion recognition problems after 
ABI.  A positive finding would have important implications for clinical practice as it 
could suggest that pre-morbid intelligence is a predictor of emotion recognition 
problems and consideration should be given to routinely screening for low pre-morbid 
intelligence.   
The findings in the current study suggest that STW2 scores differentiate between the 
control and ABI groups’ performance on the total BERT. The author and her 
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supervisory team have discussed this and suggest that the reason STW2 can predict 
differences between the groups on performance on the BERT, is probably because 
the variables group and STW2 are confounded, thus making it difficult to say what the 
actual contribution of STW2 is.  In other words, whilst STW2 seems to explain a 
significant amount of performance, the author and her supervisory team consider that 
it is possible that the BERT is picking up something other than pre-morbid intelligence.  
We know that many individuals with ABI have cognitive impairments (Bornhofen & 
McDonald, 2008a) and it is possible that the BERT may be picking up wider 
dysfunction such as executive functioning impairments. Executive function 
impairments were not measured in the current study.  Please see section 4.8.5 below 
for a discussion of this limitation.   
The size of the ABI sample in the current study was small and whilst both groups 
performed worse on the “with phrase” BERT, the ABI group found it particularly 
difficult.  Also, a significant difference was found between the STW2 scores of the ABI 
and healthy control groups, with the ABI group mean score being much lower and the 
standard deviation of the ABI group’s scores being much higher. Therefore caution is 
needed when drawing inferences from the findings in the current study.  Further 
research using larger samples of ABI participants is needed to explore the impact of 
STW2 score on performance on the BERT.   
Gender 
Some research has found females are better at emotion recognition than males (for 
example, Rigon, Turkstra, Matlu & Duff, 2016).  However, in the current study no 
significant gender differences were found in the control or ABI groups.  The findings in 
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the current study on gender suggest that the same clinical cut off scores can be used 
when the BERT is administered to men or women.  
Education 
A significant difference in years education was found between the healthy control and 
ABI groups.  However, analysis showed that education was not a significant predictor 
of performance on the BERT. 
Age 
No significant correlations between age and the “with phrase” or total correct BERT 
were found in the control group.  However, there was a significant correlation between 
age and the “no phrase” BERT.  As mentioned previously, the vast majority of the 
control group participants got all of the items correct in this part of the test.  Analysis 
of the data shows that of the five people who made an error on this item, four of them 
were in the older age group (65 to 80 years). All of these participants incorrectly 
identified the emotion of angry.  There is some evidence that older age produces a 
reduction in the recognition of anger (Calder, et al., 2003).  There is some evidence 
that older adults are less able to identify facial expressions than are young adults (for 
a meta-analysis, see Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone & Phillips, 2008), that they have 
better memory for positive than for negative faces (Mather & Carstensen, 2003), and 
that they attend less to negative than to neutral faces (Isaacowitz et al., 2006). 
There is some evidence for an own-age bias in face recognition and person 
identification.  Research suggests that adults of different ages are more likely to 
recognise faces of their own age group than faces and persons of other ages (Anastasi 
& Rhodes, 2006; Bäckman, 1991; Bartlett & Fulton, 1991; Lamont, Stewart-Williams 
& Podd, 2005; Wright & Stroud, 2002). Own-age bias is generally thought to be due 
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to the amount of exposure an individual has to certain classes of faces.  People 
typically see faces similar to their own more frequently and might, therefore, be more 
familiar with them (Bartlett & Fulton, 1991).  The actors used in the current study are 
young adults (aged less than 30), therefore own age bias may explain why it was some 
of the older adults in the control group who made most errors. The older adults in this 
study may have been disadvantaged relative to the younger participants because of 
the age of the actors in the clips used.  Further research using actors of different ages 
when comparing an age stratified sample is needed to investigate this further.  
4.3 The main findings and whether these support the hypotheses 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 – The new test would be reliable. There would be test retest 
reliability.   
Reliability of the BERT – control group 
The test retest data of the 79 neurologically healthy controls on the combined BERT 
total correct score (“no phrase” BERT and “with phrase” BERT) was statistically 
significant and suggests the BERT has some evidence of reliability.  Correlation was 
also found on the “with phrase” BERT. Whilst the correlation values are significant, 
ideally we would have liked them to be higher (around 0.7) as this would have indicated 
a very strong correlation. 
The finding of no significant correlation for the “no phrase” BERT on first and second 
administration may be explained by the high ceiling effect in the “no phrase” BERT.  
Nearly all the participants in the control group got all of the “no phrase” BERT items 
correct (maximum score).  The finding of no correlation may therefore be due to the 
lack of gradient in the data and support the strength of the psychometrics of the 
measure.  Indeed, the percentage agreement score across two administrations of the 
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“no phrase” BERT was 95% suggesting that the “no phrase” BERT does in fact have 
evidence of test retest reliability in terms of achieving the same score twice. The finding 
suggests that test retest in neurologically healthy individuals may not be needed. 
Indeed there are existing screening measures with high ceiling effects in the normal 
data that are used and found to be clinically useful, for example the “lift counting task” 
in the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA: Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway & Nimmo-Smith, 
1996). 
The percentage agreement scores for the “with phrase” and total correct combined 
BERT scores were slightly lower (65% and 61% respectively) than the percentage 
agreement score for the “no phrase” BERT.  These percentage agreement scores are 
lower than the usual criterion accepted for reliability which is 70%. A possible 
explanation for the lower percentage agreement scores is the slight variation in the 
items incorrectly identified on the second administration. The performance of the 
participants in the control group was slightly improved on the second administration.  
The mean total correct combined BERT score on first administration was 13.25 and 
was 13.60 on the second administration (see table 8).  As a result of the fact that the 
number of test items incorrectly identified by the control group was very small any 
variation in the data had an effect on the percentage agreement score. 
Reliability of the BERT – ABI group 
The percentage agreement figures are lower than we would have hoped especially 
given the strong Spearman Rho’s correlation values.  A possible explanation for the 
low percentage agreement scores is the variability in the data.  The ABI participants’ 
performance was slightly better in the second administration (see mean scores in table 
8).   
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The test retest reliability correlations for the ABI group were higher than those of the 
control group with the “no phrase”, “with phrase” and combined BERT total correct 
score having statistically significant correlation values.  These findings suggest there 
is good test retest reliability on both parts of the BERT and the total correct BERT  and 
suggests that administering the BERT on two occasions one week apart to someone 
who has an ABI may provide a good indication of whether the person has emotion 
recognition deficits.  
4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 – The new test would have evidence of validity. Performance 
on the BERT would be correlated with performance on the EET, an existing 
emotion recognition scale which will confirm criterion validity. 
The finding that the BERT was correlated with the EET an existing measure of emotion 
recognition deficits suggests that the BERT measures what it sets out to measure – 
emotion recognition deficits. However, whilst the correlation was reasonable for the 
ABI group it was lower than we would have liked for the control group. The finding of 
correlations does however give some support to the study’s hypothesis that the BERT 
would have validity.   
4.3.3 Hypothesis 3 – Performance on the BERT would be correlated with the 
ability to empathise as measured by scores on two existing empathy rating 
scales (BEES and IRI) 
The BEES was designed to assess emotional empathy “a vicarious emotional 
response to the perceived emotional experiences of others”, in other words measure 
the ability to feel what other people are feeling (Mehrabian & Epson, 1972).  It was 
found that the BEES was correlated with the control group’s performance on the “with 
phrase” BERT and the total combined correct score of the BERT.  This was as 
101 
 
hypothesised.  The finding suggests that the BERT may detect some aspects of 
emotional empathy.  The finding of no correlation in the control group’s performance 
on the “no phrase” BERT and BEES may be explained by the high ceiling effect in the 
data.  As mentioned earlier, nearly every participant in the control group got all of the 
“no phrase” items correct.   
No correlations were found between the ABI group’s performance on the BERT and 
the BEES.  Further, those ABI participants who scored below the cut off on BERT were 
not found to have lower BEES scores than those who scored above the cut off.  The 
reason for this is not clear.  The BEES was used in the current study because it has a 
good reliability coefficient and has been used in previous research investigating 
empathy deficits after ABI (for example; de Sousa et al., 2012; de Sousa et al., 2011; 
de Sousa et al., 2010; Rushby et al., 2013; Wood & Williams, 2008). A possible 
explanation for the lack of association in the current study is the small sample size.  
There were only 20 participants in the ABI group, and of these only 16 completed the 
BEES.  This could have prevented the detection of a significant relationship between 
the two measures.  Other possible explanations include the participants in the ABI 
group having difficulty completing the self-report measure.  Completing it demands 
cognitive processing including concentration and working memory which are known to 
often be affected after ABI.  
The finding of a significant difference between the control group and ABI group’s 
performance on the BEES supports previous research which has found emotional 
empathy is often reduced after ABI (for example; Rushby et al., 2013; de Sousa et al., 
2012;  de Sousa et al., 2011; de Sousa et al., 2012; Wood & Williams, 2008).  
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The other measure of emotional functioning used in the current study was the IRI, an 
existing multi-dimensional measure of cognitive empathy.  It was hypothesised that a 
correlation would be found between this measure and the BERT.  A significant 
correlation was found between the control group’s performance on the “with phrase” 
BERT and total combined BERT score and one of the subscales of the IRI, the fantasy 
subscale.  A significant correlation was also found in the ABI group’s performance on 
the “no phrase” BERT and total combined BERT score and the fantasy subscale of 
the IRI and it was found that ABI participants who scored below the cut off on BERT 
had lower IRI fantasy scores.   
The fantasy subscale of the IRI purportedly measures the ability to put oneself in a 
fictional situation.  For example to identify with fictitious characters in books or films.  
The finding in the current study may therefore mean that those people who are able 
to imagine themselves in fictional situations may be good at emotion recognition.  
However, there is some dispute about what the fantasy subscale actually measures.  
It has been suggested that it measures processes broader than empathy such as 
imagination which may be correlated with empathy but may not be empathy itself 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).  Thus, the finding of an association between 
performance on the BERT and this subscale is interesting, but further investigation 
and understanding of this subscale is needed to be certain about what such an 
association actually means. 
No associations were found between the control group’s or ABI group’s performance 
on the BERT and the other three subscales of the IRI which are: empathic concern 
(feeling warmth or compassion for others); perspective taking (the ability to shift to 
another’s emotional perspective i.e. ability to adopt the point of view of another 
person); and personal distress (fear or anxiety in response to seeing others in 
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distress).  ABI participants who scored below the cut off on BERT did not differ on 
these IRI subscales to those who scored above the cut off.  The finding of no 
associations between performance on the BERT and the three subscales of the IRI 
was not expected.  The reason for the lack of association in the current study is not 
clear, but suggests that the BERT does not detect the facets of cognitive empathy (or 
other deficits) that these subscales of the IRI measure.   
As with the fantasy subscale of the IRI there is some disagreement about what the 
other subscales of the IRI measure.  For example, it has been suggested that the 
personal distress scale may in part assess anxiety and the inability to monitor and 
inhibit emotional reactions (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). It seems that more 
investigations on the IRI would help give greater certainty and clarity as to what the 
various subscales measure so that a clearer picture of what correlations with the 
subscales may mean. 
The finding of no significant difference between the two groups’ performance on three 
of the four subscales of the IRI (fantasy; empathic concern; and personal distress) is 
interesting. The finding compares to existing research which has found that individuals 
with ABI self-report lower cognitive empathy than do matched controls (de Sousa et 
al., 2010; Grattan & Eslinger, 1989; Wells et al., 2005).   Only performance on the IRI 
perspective taking scale was found to be significantly different between the two groups 
which suggests that the ABI group was less able to shift to another’s emotional 
perspective i.e. had reduced ability to adopt the point of view of another person.  One 
issue that was apparent during the current study was that the IRI is quite a difficult 
self-report questionnaire to complete.  It uses a nine point Likert scale and a number 
of the questions are “reversed”.  Completion of the IRI was done online by all of the 
control group participants and the majority of the ABI participants.  Whilst this measure 
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has been used in other ABI research it appears that the IRI has been completed 
manually before.  The fact that it was completed online may have affected how 
participants answered the questions.  For example it may be that in the previous 
studies where the measure has been completed manually the questions have been 
read out to the participants and may have been explained or clarified whereas the 
online version requires the participants to read, understand and respond to the 
questions. In the current study the participants with ABI all completed the tasks on a 
desk top computer with a reasonably sized screen.  It is possible that factors such as 
clarity and size of the images on the screen could have affected performance as could 
completing the measures online.  Further research exploring these factors is needed. 
In summary the findings suggest that the BERT may pick up on some aspects of 
empathy.  This finding is not surprising as theories of empathy acknowledge that 
recognising emotions is a fundamental process involved in empathy (Feshbach, 1987; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002).  Those that have attempted to identify the components of 
empathy such as Rankin et al. (2005),  have identified that empathy has different 
cognitive components (including working memory; perspective taking; abstract 
reasoning; cognitive flexibility and reactive cognitive flexibility) as well as emotional 
components (which include recognising other’s emotions, emotional responsiveness, 
identifying one’s own emotional state and expressing one’s emotional state).  
However, empathy as a construct does not have a universally agreed definition and 
this has implications for understanding its role in emotion recognition and social 
cognition generally.  Ideally, it would be good if a clear definition of empathy and its 
components could be agreed and used in future research.  
4.3.4 – Hypothesis 4 – Performance of the ABI group would be worse than the 
neurologically healthy group on the BERT and EET  
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As hypothesised the performance of participants in the ABI group was found to be 
statistically worse than that of the control group on the all parts of the BERT (“no 
phrase” and “with phrase” and the total score.  The difference between the groups was 
statistically significant.  Whilst the sample size of the ABI group was small (20 adults) 
the finding provides some evidence of the construct validity of the BERT.  
Further the performance of the participants in the ABI group on the EET was 
significantly worse than the neurologically healthy controls.  This finding supports the 
general finding in the literature that after brain injury recognising emotions is often 
impaired (for example the studies of Knox & Douglas, 2009; McDonald et al., 2003; 
Williams and Wood, 2010b).  
4.3.5 Hypothesis 5 - Performance would be improved in both groups in the 
second part of the new test (“with phrase” BERT) which provides more cues 
(facial expression and vocal cues) and there would be smaller group differences 
for the “with phrase” BERT than the “no phrase” BERT 
It was hypothesised that performance on the “with phrase” BERT would be better than 
the “no phrase” BERT.  This hypothesis was based on the “with phrase” BERT having 
multimodal stimuli (neutral sentences and vocal prosody congruent with facial 
expressions) and evidence from previous research involving multi-modal stimuli which 
suggests the presence of more cues can help in the recognition of emotions.  For 
example, the presence of more cues being present in dynamic displays of emotion 
than static displays and this aiding emotion recognition has been proposed as a 
possible explanation in two studies for the finding that participants were better at 
recognising emotions in dynamic displays than static displays (McDonald & Saunders, 
2005; Williams & Wood, 2010a). 
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Contrary to the hypothesis both the control and ABI groups’ performed worse on the 
“with phrase” BERT than the “no phrase” BERT.  The ABI group performed 
significantly worse than the control group.  We know that individuals with ABI have 
difficulty recognising emotion in speech and facial expressions (McDonald et al., 2004) 
and face and voice discrimination have different cognitive demands (Dimoska et al., 
2010).  Emotions in voice are conveyed by two sources: speech content and prosody, 
making dual processing and working memory demands (Dimoska et al., 2010). Thus, 
impaired recognition of vocal cues may reflect a loss of efficiency, such as cognitive 
impairment that is not specific to vocal emotion. In the current study no general 
cognitive measures were taken.  This is a limitation of the study and is discussed in 
more detail in section 4.8.5 below. It would be useful if in future research using the 
BERT, cognitive measures are taken to explore what impact if any, these have on 
performance on the BERT.  However, existing research suggests that general 
cognitive impairment cannot fully account for deficits in prosodic perception, for 
example, it does not explain differential impairment identifying different emotions 
(Dimoska et al., 2010; Spell & Frank, 2000).  
 
A possible explanation for the finding in the current study is that different types of 
stimulus (visual and vocal) require different neural structures to be used (Adolphs et 
al., 2002; Adolphs et al., 2003; Brück, Kreifelts & Wildgrubber, 2011).   Whether stimuli 
are presented in one modality or multi modally is thought to involve different parts of 
the brain (Brück et al., 2011).   Most agree that emotional prosody engages brain 
systems (especially right hemisphere) which overlap with those used in facial 
expression recognition (Zupan et al., 2009).  However, there is evidence that they do 
not entirely coincide (Adolphs et al., 2002).  Another possible explanation is that the 
prosody used in the video clips was less well presented in some clips than others and 
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this could have distracted participants from recognising the facial expression.  Further 
work exploring this would be helpful as would investigations into the impact of possible 
order effect.  
The accurate interpretation of vocal cues of emotion is very important but not well 
researched (Zupan et al., 2009) despite the fact that successful social communication 
relies on understanding and being able to respond to multiple sources of information.  
Wildgruber et al., 2007 have put forward a “cerebral network model” to explain how 
multiple sources of information are processed.  This model advocates that there are 3 
stages.  In the first stage the brain has to extract the relevant visual and vocal signals 
that are being presented.  In the second stage the brain processes integrate the visual 
and vocal signals and in the third stage cognitive evaluation of the information takes 
place.  Thus, applying this model to the current study someone who performs poorly 
on the “with phrase” BERT may have a problem at any or all of these stages. Further 
research, exploring where and at what stage the deficit is, for example using neural 
imaging (MRI or fMRI) whilst the BERT is completed, is needed. 
Evidence suggests that individuals with ABI have greater impairment for vocal emotion 
recognition than facial recognition (McDonald & Saunders, 2005; Spell & Frank, 2000).  
Research investigating different modes of stimuli have shown that the performance of 
ABI individuals is worse when stimuli are presented auditorily only i.e. without visual 
cues (Marquardt at al., 2001).  Further, there is evidence that ABI individuals perform 
better on moving facial displays than audio visual display, audio only displays and 
static photos (McDonald & Saunders, 2005).  Thus, the finding in the current study 
that the ABI group was impaired on both the “no phrase” BERT and “with phrase” 
BERT and that both groups performed better on the “no phrase” BERT than the “with 
phrase” BERT fits with the findings of McDonald and Saunders in their 2005 study.  
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Another possible explanation for poorer performance on the “with phrase” BERT may 
be attributable to having used neutral phrases.  There is evidence that emotional facial 
expressions are more easily classified when accompanied by congruent emotional 
prosody (De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000).  In the current study the prosody was 
consistent with the facial expression being portrayed, however, the verbal content of 
was neutral which meant there was no supportive verbal content to help identify the 
emotion. The poorer performance of both groups on this part of the BERT may be 
explained by the neutral content of the verbal expression causing confusion and 
making the target emotion more difficult to identify.   
The performance of the ABI group was much lower than the control group’s on the 
“with phrase” BERT.  It may be that the individuals with ABI who performed poorly on 
the “with phrase” BERT relied on the verbal content at the expense of the facial 
expressions, prosody and non-verbal cues.  This explanation fits with existing research 
findings that individuals with ABI are more likely to give precedence to verbal content 
whilst people without ABI are more likely to attend to affective prosody when 
information is not congruent (Marquardt et al., 2001; McDonald & Saunders, 2005).  
Over reliance on vocal content could disadvantage the understanding of emotion as 
evidence suggests that 55 percent of the emotional meaning of a message is 
expressed through facial, postural, and gestural means, and 38 percent of the 
emotional meaning is transmitted through the tone of voice. Only seven percent of the 
emotional meaning is actually expressed with words (Mehrabian, 1997). 
Evidence suggests congruous and incongruous vocal content and prosody are 
encoded and processed by different parts of the brain and that when verbal content 
(congruent or incongruent) is present it requires engagement of additional cerebral 
resources (Brück, Kreifelts & Wildgrubber, 2011).  There is some evidence that when 
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verbal content is incongruous it is more difficult to decode the actual target emotion 
than when the verbal content is congruent (Zupan et al., 2009).  
In the current study the emotional prosody was congruent with the facial expression, 
but the verbal content was neutral. Only a small number of studies have investigated 
the ability of individuals with ABI and neurologically healthy people to identify emotion 
portrayed in neutral affective sentences. Marquardt at al., 2001 is one of the few 
studies that have.  As well as looking at congruous and incongruous sentences and 
finding (as in the current study) that the participants with ABI showed significantly 
reduced capacity to identify emotion irrespective of mode presented (whether the 
information was presented with facial expressions coded in the same way as the 
prosody or whether the congruous and ambiguous sentences were presented without 
visual clues, in other words by audio only) the study compared emotion recognition of 
congruous and neutral items.  It found that nearly all of the control group (99%) were 
able to correctly identify both types of items.  In comparison the study found that the 
majority (97%) of the ABI participants were able to correctly identify the congruous 
items, but only 86% were able to identify the neutral sentences. In the Marquardt et 
al. (2001) study, the percentage of the ABI group that were able to correctly recognise 
emotions when neutral sentences were used was higher than those found in the 
current study.  This may be explained by the fact that in the Marquardt et al. (2001) 
study, the participants had to pass a preliminary screening test to see if they were able 
to recognise emotions depicted in pictograms.  In other words, the participants had to 
be pretty good at recognising emotions to take part.  Also, the study was very small 
involving just seven ABI participants and seven matched controls.  The Marquardt et 
al. (2001) study’s findings on neutral sentences were similar to those in the current 
study, however the number of participants used in the study was very small and the 
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study involved selection criteria.  More research, using larger sample sizes is needed 
to investigate emotion recognition from neutral sentences.   
Finally, another possible reason for the better performance on the “no phrase” BERT 
is that the length of the video clips was slightly longer in the “no phrase” BERT than 
the “with phrase” BERT.  Accordingly, the better performance may be explained by the 
participants having more time to view the “no phrase” clips and therefore more time to 
decide which emotion was being portrayed.  A future study using the same length “no 
phrase” and “with phrase” video clips is needed to investigate whether length of clip 
can explain the difference in performance. 
4.3.6 Hypothesis 6 - It would be possible to calculate clinical cut off scores 
The data obtained from the neurologically healthy controls enabled clinical cut off 
scores for the “no phrase” BERT, “with phrase” BERT and total correct combined score 
on the BERT to be calculated.   In this group there was no evidence of a correlation 
between the STW2 scores and performance on the BERT. Further, no significant 
difference in performance on the total BERT was found between ABI participants who 
scored below the BERT cut off and those who scored above in terms of total STW2 
score suggesting that one set of clinical cut off scores can be used. However, 
performance on the BERT was found to be associated with STW2 score (see section 
4.2.4 above for discussion on this).   
BERT “no phrase” - clinical cut off score is 6  
The finding in this study was that the majority of the control group found the “no phrase” 
BERT very straightforward.  Using the clinical cut off score of 6 that has been 
calculated, 95% of the control group were above this score on first administration and 
99% on second administration. In comparison more than half of the ABI participants 
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scored below the cut off score on first administration (60%) and second administration 
(53%). The findings suggest that if someone gets even one item incorrect they may 
have problems with facial emotion recognition and warrant further investigations.  
BERT “with phrase” - clinical cut off score is 4  
The ABI group’s performance was much lower than the control group’s.  Applying the 
calculated cut off score of 4 for first administration, 96% of the control group scored 
above this score whereas only 50% of the ABI participants managed to do this.  The 
findings suggest that performance below the cut off score of 4 may be an indication 
that there are difficulties recognising emotions from facial expressions with congruent 
prosody and neutral verbal content and further investigations are warranted.    
Total combined correct BERT score - clinical cut off score is 11  
When the correct scores of the “no phrase” BERT and “with phrase” BERT are 
combined the cut off score is 11.  Applying this cut off score it was found that only just 
over a third of the ABI group (35%) performed above this compared to 95% of the 
control group.  The difference between the groups is marked. The finding suggest that 
administering both parts of the test may be a helpful way of screening for emotion 
recognitions problems. However, given the small sample size used further research is 
needed to confirm the cut off scores.   
4.4 How to use the BERT - What are the different parts of the BERT screening 
for?   
Administering both parts of the BERT (“no phrase” and “with phrase”) is efficient and 
cost effective.  Most people are able to complete it in about 5-10 minutes.  The current 
study is a new study, and accordingly, further research is needed to investigate its 
validity.  However, on the findings we have, it is possible to put forward suggestions 
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about what the two parts of the BERT are measuring and how they may be used in 
practice. There appears to be no reason why the two parts of the BERT could not be 
administered separately or together. 
4.4.1 The “no phrase” BERT 
The “no phrase” BERT detects problems recognising moving (dynamic) facial 
expressions and non-verbal cues.  It contains no vocal cues (prosody or content). A 
growing body of evidence shows that many adults are impaired in their ability to 
recognise facial emotions after ABI (see for example; McDonald, 2005; Babbage et al, 
2011). The results of this current study indicate that getting even one item in this part 
of the test incorrect is unusual in neurologically healthy controls.  This means the “no 
phrase” BERT could be a very useful screening tool of emotion recognition problems.  
It is quick and easy to administer and the results would give an indication of whether 
the person may have emotion recognition problems which warrant further 
investigations. 
4.4.2 The “with phrase” BERT  
The “with phrase” BERT detects problems recognising moving (dynamic) facial 
expressions and congruent prosody with neutral verbal content (the phrases are not 
consistent or inconsistent with the emotion being expressed).  Like the “no phrase” 
BERT it is a useful screening tool for emotion recognition problems.  It may detect 
problems processing multi-modal stimuli as well as being a useful screening tool to 
help identify those people who rely too much on verbal content with the consequence 
that they miss or are unable to identify the actual emotion someone is feeling. The 
findings suggest that individuals, both neurologically healthy controls and individuals 
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with ABI find this part of the BERT more difficult than the “no phrase” BERT with 
individuals with ABI finding it particularly more difficult.   
4.4.3 Administering both the “no phrase” and “with phrase” BERT  
Successful social communication relies on understanding multiple sources of 
information (Bornhofen & McDonald, 2008a).  Administering both the “no phrase” and 
“with phrase” BERT would provide more information about emotion recognition 
problems than administering just one of them.  The complete BERT may be a useful 
screening tool to identify if there are problems with facial emotion recognition when 
the stimuli is simple (dynamic visual facial expressions) and/or there are problems 
recognising emotions when the stimuli are dynamic facial expressions and vocal cues. 
Based on the findings in the current study it would be expected that individuals with 
ABI would struggle more on the “with phrase” BERT.  Thus, someone who scores 
above the cut off score on the “no phrase” BERT but below the cut off score on the 
“with phrase” BERT may be able to recognise emotions which are expressed without 
verbal content but struggle when there are multiple sources of information to process 
especially where some of the information (verbal content) is inconsistent with the other 
cues available.  This information may be helpful when assessing emotion recognition 
problems and planning rehabilitation. Further, it would be expected that individuals 
with ABI would struggle more when face and voice are incongruent (Zupan et al., 2009) 
so future work extending the current BERT to include congruent and incongruent vocal 
content would be useful. 
4.5 Findings on valence 
The participants found some emotions easier to identify than others.  This supports 
existing research which has found the nature of emotion recognition difficulties varies 
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depending on the emotional valence of the stimuli.  As previously found, (for example 
by Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; and Spell & Frank, 2000), happy was the easiest emotion 
to recognise for both the ABI and control group.  One explanation for happy being 
easier to recognise than negative emotions such as fear is that happy can be 
recognised by a single feature; a smile, whereas other emotions require attention to 
multiple aspects (Adolphs, 2002). 
Whilst surprise is recognised to be one of the standard emotions it does not have clear 
valence (Kreibig, 2010).  In the current study it was found that when the actors were 
asked to portray the emotion surprise, the majority expressed it in a positive way – a 
“happy” surprise. Accordingly, in the current study surprise has been categorised as a 
positive emotion.  The ABI participants in current study found the positive emotions 
(happy and surprise) easier to identify than the negative ones (fear, anger, disgust).  
This finding is consistent with earlier research (including: Adolphs et al., 1999; Croker 
& McDonald 2005; McDonald et al., 2003).    
Inconsistent with existing research findings, the negative emotion sad was not found 
to be particularly difficult to identify by participants in the control or ABI group in the 
present study.  Only one person in the ABI group got this wrong on the “no phrase” 
BERT and no-one in the control group got it incorrect.  In the “with phrase” BERT more 
of the ABI participants got the sad item incorrect (30%) and found it as difficult as 
frightened and surprise to recognise, though they found the other negative emotions 
(disgust and angry) and also the neutral item more difficult to recognise.  
The reason why sad was not found to be as difficult to recognise as the other negative 
emotions of disgust and fear is not clear.  It may be that the negative emotions of 
disgust and fear have a very clear basic evolutionary survival purpose and so are 
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easier to recognise.  Processing of these emotions has been associated with the 
“older” brain structures of the brain like the amygdala (Adolphs et al., 2002; Adolphs 
et al., 1994, 1995; Calder et al., 1996).  However, the amygdala has also been 
associated with recognising sad expressions (Adolphs & Tranel, 2004) so one may 
expect that someone who has difficulty recognising fear will also have difficulty 
recognising sad expressions, but in the current study this was not always the case. 
One of the most difficult emotions for the ABI group to identify was disgust.  Poor 
performance compared to the control group was very noticeable in the “no phrase” 
BERT where 30% incorrectly identified this emotion compared to none of the control 
group.   However, performance was even poorer in the “with phrase” BERT where only 
50% correctly identified disgust compared to 86% of the control group.  This finding 
supports previous research which has found problems recognising disgust after ABI 
(Hornak et al., 1996; Jackson & Moffat, 1987; and McDonald et al., 2003). 
As mentioned above significant differences were found between the performance of 
the neurologically healthy control group and ABI group on both the “no phrase” and 
“with phrase” BERT.  Analysis of the individual items, controlling for multiple 
comparisons (Type 1 error) found clear group differences in recognising happy, 
surprise, fear, disgust and neutral but not angry or sad in the “no phrase” BERT.  In 
the “with phrase” BERT, the percentage of participants who correctly identified each 
of the emotions in the “with phrase” BERT was higher for the neurologically healthy 
control group than the ABI group.  However, analysis controlling for multiple 
comparisons (Type 1 error) only found clear group differences in recognising angry 
and fear but not sad, disgust, happy surprise or neutral. Further investigations, using 
a larger and matched ABI group to explore this further would be useful.    
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The current study supports existing research (for example that of Calvo & Lundqvist, 
2008; Croker & McDonald, 2005; McDonald et al., 2003; Spell & Frank, 2000) that 
some emotions are easier to recognise than others after ABI. It has been suggested 
that different neurological pathways may be involved in processing different emotions 
(Adolphs et al., 1999; Kessels et al., 2014; Wood & Williams, 2010). There is some 
evidence to support this.  For example, there is evidence that the ventral striatum is 
involved in recognising anger (Calder, Keane, Lawrence & Manes, 2004) and 
neuroimaging studies investigating disgust (including those of Calder, Keane, Manes, 
Antoun & Young, 2000 and Sprengelmeyer et al.,1996), provide evidence that the 
facial expressions associated with disgust engage different regions of the brain (insula 
and putamen) than other facial expressions.  
It is possible that the reason why some participants had more difficulty recognising 
certain emotions than others is because of their particular type of ABI.  In other words 
because they have damage to particular regions or neurological networks and this 
damage affected their ability to recognise some emotions. The evidence suggests that 
whilst identifying different emotions may use some of the same neurological pathways 
they may also involve different ones.  For example, it has been estimated that 
approximately 50% of patients with amygdala damage have impaired ability to 
recognise sad facial expressions (Fine & Blair, 2000).  If exactly the same processes 
were involved then one would expect this figure to be nearer 100%.   Therefore, whilst 
existing studies provide us with some evidence of the neurological processes involved 
in emotion recognition, further research is needed to give us an even better 
understanding.  The BERT could be used in further investigations into whether 
different neurological pathways are involved in recognising different emotions and also 
in studies exploring the effects of particular types of brain injury on emotion 
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recognition.  Neuroimaging (for example MRI and fMRI scans) could take place whilst 
individuals with ABI complete the BERT to explore neurological differences whilst 
different emotions are being observed. 
The BERT could also be used to explore the theory that the reason for the current 
findings on valence is that impaired emotion recognition is associated with impairment 
of the ability to physiologically respond to emotionally charged stimuli (Rapcsak et al., 
2000).  It is proposed that fear is the most emotionally charged emotion so the lack of 
physiological response to fear is most noticeable (Hopkins, Dywan and Segalowitz, 
2002). Further research involving participants completing the BERT whilst their 
physiological responding is measured (for example using facial EMG; skin 
conductance, heart rate, eye tracking or EEG) would add to this area of knowledge. 
4.6 Contributions made by the current study 
The current study makes a number of contributions.  These will now be discussed. 
4.6.1 Development of a screening tool that can rapidly detect emotion 
recognition difficulties after ABI 
The current study has developed a new quick and easy to administer computerised 
screening tool that can be used to screen for emotion recognition problems in people 
who have ABI.  The BERT has a number of advantages over existing measures such 
as the EET.  These include it being an online measure; quicker and easier to 
administer; not visually outdated; and its results are available instantly on line.  These 
make it a useful clinical tool.  The BERT can be used to screen for emotion recognition 
problems and help identify if further evaluation of emotion recognition problems or 
preliminary interventions are needed.  It can be used in rehabilitation as a baseline 
measure to determine change; and being easy to administer means it can be 
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performed by support staff who have had training as well as clinicians (Roebuck-
Spencer et al., 2017).  Its implications for clinical practice and rehabilitation are 
discussed in more detail below.   
4.6.2 Screen for emotion recognition problems shortly after ABI 
The ease of administration of the BERT means it can be used to screen for emotion 
recognition impairments in the early stages after ABI. This has important implications 
for clinical practice because we know that emotion recognition problems are present 
straight after injury (Borgaro et al., 2004; Green et al., 2004) and the importance and 
usefulness of having a test that can assess possible problems in emotion recognition 
during early recovery has been highlighted (Borgaro et al., 2004).  The BERT is a brief 
screening measure that can be used in an acute setting where the patient’s ability to 
endure extensive assessment may be limited (Borgaro et al., 2004).  Further, there is 
evidence that deficits in emotion recognition can be a marker for behavioural problems 
and lack of insight in ABI patients (Spikman, et al., 2013), thus the BERT has clinical 
implications in being able to be a marker for these deficits and enable further 
investigations to be identified and rehabilitation interventions to be made.   
4.6.3 Informing rehabilitation 
To date there has been a lot of focus on cognitive function including memory, attention 
and processing speed as predictors of outcome (May et al., 2017). Cognitive deficits 
do affect individuals with ABI and there is evidence that measures of cognitive function 
such as working memory can predict psychosocial outcome following ABI (Wood & 
Rutterford, 2006).  However, having an acceptable level of cognitive function does not 
always predict ability to return to social functioning (Wood, 2001).  We now know that 
the ability to recognise and respond to social information (social cognition) is just if not 
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more important as other cognitive functions (May et al., 2017) and one may underlie 
the other.  
Currently, problems recognising emotions after ABI often go undetected even though 
these problems cause difficulties in interpreting situations and may result in 
inappropriate interactions and reduced communication.  Emotion recognition deficits 
have been associated with poor social outcome and community integration difficulties 
and have been highlighted as an area to target in rehabilitation (May et al., 2017).   
Identifying problems with emotion recognition has clinical implications for treatment 
planning.  Patients and families can be better informed about the difficulty the ABI 
person may be having in understanding emotions (and also possibly expressing 
emotions).  Understanding a problem helps people to deal with it (Tam, McKay, Sloan 
& Ponsford, 2015; Wood et al., 2005).  Interventions such as teaching strategies to try 
to minimise these problems are beneficial (Marquardt et al., 2001).  For example 
training family members to use statements that are congruent in affect, make the 
emotional meaning of their sentences as clear and unambiguous as possible and 
training them to use verbal qualifiers such as “Of course I was only joking when I said 
that” may be helpful (Marquardt et al., 2001).  For individuals with ABI with emotion 
recognition problems, helpful interventions include emotion identification training and 
helping them to identify statements that seem confusing and seek feedback to clarify 
meaning (Marquardt et al., 2001).  
Longitudinal research including that of Milders et al. (2003) and Ietswaart et al. (2008) 
suggests that impairments in emotion recognition are long lasting and do not change 
over time.  However, there is growing evidence that emotion identification training can 
result in significant improvements in facial emotion recognition (Bornhofen & 
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McDonald, 2007; Guercio, Podolska-Schroeder & Rehfeldt, 2004; Radice-Neumann, 
Zupan, Tomita, & Willer, 2009).  In other words that improvement is possible. This is 
not surprising as there is evidence that emotion recognition training is helpful in other 
clinical populations including autism (Bolte et al., 2002; 2006) and schizophrenia 
(Wolwer, Frommann, Halfmann, Piaszek, Streit & Gaebel, 2005).  Whilst it’s important 
to remember that the ABI population differs to these other populations the strategies 
used may be applicable and useful to the ABI population. The BERT could be a useful 
tool in facial recognition training and as a baseline measure of emotion recognition 
deficits.  The findings show that the “no phrase” BERT is easier than the “with phrase” 
BERT, so different parts of the BERT could be used according to the severity of 
emotion recognition problems.  In other words, the “no phrase” BERT could be used 
in emotion recognition training with individuals who need basic emotion recognition 
training and the “with phrase” BERT could be used with individuals who would benefit 
from complex emotion recognition training.   
4.6.4 Support for previous research findings 
The findings in the current study support previous research on problems with facial 
and vocal emotion recognition after ABI and previous findings on valence (outlined 
above). 
4.6.5 The finding that neutral verbal content appears to make emotion 
recognition more difficult 
 
The inclusion of neutral sentences in the “with phrase” BERT makes the current study 
unusual because there are few previous studies that have used neutral sentences.  
The findings in the current study suggest that neutral vocal content makes emotion 
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recognition more difficult and may provide a useful marker of emotion recognition 
problems.   
Zupan et al. (2009) suggests that the neural substrates of facial and vocal emotion 
recognition are shared, and the bimodal processing of facial and vocal information 
acts as an emotional or affective prime to trigger the stored emotional knowledge 
within emotion in the voice and face.  According to Zupan et al. (2009), when 
information from facial and vocal stimuli is not congruent (as is the case with neutral 
sentences) it can result in confusion (Zupan et al., 2009). 
Some of the problems individuals with ABI have with emotion recognition may stem 
from an impairment managing the dual processing demands of understanding the 
speech prosody (the how) and the content of the spoken speech (the what) (Dimoska 
et al., 2010).   We know that individuals with ABI find it more difficult to recognise 
emotion when the vocal content is incongruous (Marquardt et al., 2001; Zupan et al., 
2009) and rely more on verbal content than paralinguistic cues than matched controls 
(McDonald & Flanagan, 2004).  Dimoska et al. (2010) suggest that it is an impairment 
in processing of emotional prosody itself rather than semantic processing demands 
which leads to an over-reliance on the “what” rather than the “how” in conversational 
remarks. Thus, the use of neutral sentences in the current study may have confused 
the individuals with ABI.  Another explanation is that cognitive deficits such as poor 
working memory, information processing speed and reasoning resulted in an over 
reliance on semantic information at the expense of other cues such as prosody 
(McDonald, Bornhofen, Shum, Long, Saunders & Neulinger, 2006).   
The study’s findings highlight that the use of neutral sentences in emotion recognition 
tasks is an area that requires further investigation.  
122 
 
4.6.6 The BERT could add to the debate on theories of emotion recognition 
 The BERT could be used to add to the debate on theories of emotion recognition. 
Neuroimaging using MRI and fMRI could be done whilst individuals complete the 
BERT to explore whether Gallesse’s “shared manifold” hypothesis  of emotion 
recognition, namely that when we observe emotions in others our motor system 
becomes active and resonates with that emotion as if we were feeling the same 
emotion (Gallesse, 2003). The BERT could be used to add to the debate on the theory 
that emotion recognition involves the interpretation of our own emotional state to 
identify emotions in others (Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs et al., 2000). Whilst observing the 
different items in the BERT participants could be asked how they are feeling to explore 
this theory.   
The BERT could also be used to explore theories that physiological responding to 
emotion stimuli is affected after ABI (for example the research of Baker &Good, 2004; 
Hopkins et al., 2002, De Sousa et al., 2011; Wood & Williams, 2012).  Measures of 
physiological responding (using for example electro dermal activity (EDA), facial EMG, 
skin conductance using finger electrodes, eye blink component of startle reflex and 
heart rate) could be taken whilst the BERT is administered.  The effect of valence 
could also be explored using the BERT. 
4.7 Relevance of current study to Counselling Psychology  
People with ABI and their families may need professional assistance to maintain a 
reasonable quality of life even more than a decade post-injury (Hoofian et al., 2001).  
Anxiety and depression have been found to be evident in a significant proportion 
(approximately half) of people who have had ABI (Ponsford, Olver, Ponsford & Nelms, 
2002) and is evident in 25-30% of relatives with 60-80% reporting some emotional 
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distress (Kreutzer et al., 1994; Livingston et al., 1985). An individual with ABI or family 
member may be referred to a Counselling Psychologist or other psychological 
therapist because of anxiety, depression or other psychological distress. It is therefore 
important that Counselling Psychologists and others working with people affected by 
ABI understand as much as possible about the effects of ABI.   
As well as providing a screening measure of emotion recognition problems which may 
be helpful for counselling psychologists, the current study adds to the existing literature 
on emotion recognition impairments after ABI. It highlights the difficulties some 
individuals with ABI have with emotion recognition.  Hopefully this will help to enable 
their voice to be heard and influence the ways in which therapy is organised and 
developed (McLeod, 2009). For example, in a therapeutic capacity, if someone having 
therapy has difficulty recognising emotions then it is helpful for the therapist to be 
aware of this.  Having a good understanding of the person’s problems helps therapists 
retain an empathic position (Clarkson, 2003).  It may also help inform work done in 
therapy.  For example, it may be helpful to train someone who struggles with 
recognising emotions on how to ask for clarification when sentences seem confusing 
or surprising or help family members make their emotional meaning as clear as 
possible using verbal qualifiers such as “I was only joking when I said …” (Marquardt 
et al., 2001).  
An important factor in post-injury recovery is social behaviour (Struchen, Pappadis, 
Sander, Burrows & Myszka, 2011).  Changes in social behaviour including lack of 
concern for others, anger and irritability, self-centredness and inflexibility are known 
to be common and debilitating consequences of ABI (Williams & Wood, 2010a; Wood 
& Yurdakul, 1997). These changes are often a greater burden for patients and families 
than physical or cognitive deficits (Brooks et al., 1986; Katsifaraki & Wood, 2014). Up 
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until recently little has been understood about the neuropsychological deficits that may 
underpin changes in social behaviour (Cattran et al., 2011).  What is acknowledged is 
that understanding these deficits could potentially have important implications for the 
assessment, rehabilitation and prognosis of behavioural changes after ABI (May et al., 
2017). 
Emotion recognition is known to be related to social behaviour, particularly 
communication competence (Watts & Douglas, 2006) and social participation (Knox & 
Douglas, 2009).  Both these skills are important for successful relationships. 
Maintaining close relationships has been shown to be important in maintaining well-
being and a positive sense of self after ABI (Douglas & Spellacy, 2000).  Emotion 
recognition has been identified as one of the pre-requisites for adequate social 
functioning (May et al., 2017).  The BERT will make an important contribution in 
helping improve social functioning because it is a usable tool that can screen for 
emotion recognition problems.  Being able to identify and measure emotion recognition 
problems is important especially as it is not always associated with severity of ABI or 
time since injury (May et al., 2017). Research suggests there is a link between poor 
emotion recognition skills and inappropriate behaviour and poorer social 
communication skills post injury (Milders et al., 2008; Spikman et al., 2013) and social 
integration (Knox & Douglas, 2009; May et al., 2017; Struchan et al.,  2008).  The 
BERT will make an important contribution as it will enable emotion recognition 
problems to be screened for. 
Partners and family members are often the main social and emotional support 
available to individuals who have ABI (Wood et al., 2005).  They frequently have a 
huge burden upon them and have to deal with cognitive, behavioural and neuro-
physical changes, and suffer, often silently (Wood et al., 2005). We know that family 
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members’ capacity to make adjustments after ABI largely depends on how predictable 
the ABI person’s behaviour will be in various situations (Wood et al., 2005).  Currently, 
relatives are unprepared for the neuro-behavioural changes that occur as a result of 
ABI and consequently are unprepared for the demands that occur in their role as care 
taker (Man, 2002).    
The BERT has important implications for individuals with ABI and their families as it 
provides a means of screening for emotion recognition problems. Being able to identify 
these problems and explain them to the individual with ABI and their family, will help 
them understand the problem, inform treatment planning, and enable family members 
to predict and understand behaviour better which will result in them being prepared for 
the difficulties caused by poor emotion recognition (Marquardt et al., 2001).   
In summary, the BERT is important for counselling psychology because emotion 
recognition deficits have been shown to effect behaviour and the stability of 
relationships.  The BERT enables deficits in emotion recognition to be screened for.  
This will help identify when an individual has emotion recognition impairments.  The 
BERT is important in the assessment, rehabilitation and support of individuals with ABI 
and their families.  The more that can be done to support caregivers and individuals 
with ABI the better the outcomes will be (Marquardt et al., 2001; Wood et al., 2005).   
4.8 Limitations of the current study  
Like any research study, despite the significance of the findings and the contribution 
to the existing body of knowledge, this research study has some limitations and areas 
that require further investigations.  It is important to recognise that these limitations 




4.8.1 Floor or ceiling effects 
The emotions in the “no phrase” BERT were very easy for nearly all the participants in 
the control group to identify.  Whilst there is the argument that this introduces 
“problems with differential task difficulty and floor effects” (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; 
Rapcsak et al., 2000; Biel et al., 1997; Russell, 1994), it seems that this is not actually 
a problem for the BERT as the finding suggests that neurologically healthy people are 
able to correctly identify the emotions in the BERT and any error may indicate that the 
person has problems with emotion recognition.  
4.8.2 Is the BERT ecological?  
The six standard emotions and neutral were used in this study.  These were four 
negative emotions (fear, anger, disgust and sad), two positive emotions were used 
(happy and surprise) and neutral. Arguably using these means that it reduces the 
ecological validity because all the emotions that exist in real life are not displayed 
(Rosenberg et al., 2016) or available to choose from.    
Arguably the BERT is more ecological and real life than many previous tests as it 
consists of moving (dynamic) displays of emotion and multimodal stimuli whereas 
most previous studies have used static displays (photos) or unimodal stimuli.  
However, the BERT uses clips of actors portraying emotions and therefore the 
emotions displayed are different to those displayed in real life which are more 
spontaneous and changeable.  Accordingly the ecological validity of the BERT (the 
ability to predict real-life functioning) can be questioned. Notwithstanding this, the 
BERT may still be a very valuable screening tool for deficits in emotion recognition 




4.8.3 Participant sample 
The control group included a lot of UWE staff, hence there is a question of how 
representative of the general population the sample is.  This group had a significantly 
higher IQ (as measured by STW2) and education, than the ABI group.  The possibility 
that the control group’s better performance on the BERT may be due to the group’s 
higher IQ or years education was analysed. Education was not found to explain 
performance, however, STW2 appears to explain a significant amount of performance.  
Possible explanations for this are discussed earlier in this chapter in section 4.2.4.  
Another limitation is that the minimum age for participants in the study was 18 years 
old.  There is some evidence that participants under the age of 22 may be socially 
immature with regard to the social maturation of the frontal lobes and this could 
influence how they respond to the BEES (Wood & Williams, 2008) and possibly the 
other measures. 
The sample size of the ABI group was small (20 participants) so the findings may be 
influenced by low power.    Future studies using a larger sample size is needed.  Also, 
all the participants in the ABI group were recruited from Headway centres, had 
moderate to severe ABI and had to satisfy inclusion criteria.  It is possible that the 
participants who made up the ABI group may have included a disproportionate number 
of people who were not working (people who work may be less likely to attend 
Headway centres during the day) perhaps because of poor social behaviour or other 
difficulties, and may have had greater emotion recognition difficulties than if a different 





4.8.4 Ethnicity and age of the actors used in the video clips 
The actors used in the video clips for the new test were all of the same ethnicity (white 
British) and were all young adults.  As mentioned above, there is some evidence that 
own age bias exists in emotion recognition (Ruffman et al., 2008).  Therefore the use 
of young adult actors may have favoured the young adult participants. The lack of 
ethnic diversity in the actors used may also have influenced the results. Further 
research using actors of different ages and different ethnic backgrounds is needed to 
investigate this further.  
4.8.5 Are other executive function deficits involved? 
The consequences of ABI are multifactorial and can include executive and attentional 
dysfunction (Williams & Wood, 2010b).  Thus, whilst the findings suggest that the 
BERT has some evidence of validity as it correlates with the EET, an existing measure 
of emotion recognition, and is correlated with some measures of empathy (the BEES 
and fantasy sub-scale of the IRI) it is possible that the ABI group’s poor performance 
on the BERT was due or contributed to by other impairments. Emotion recognition 
problems may reflect a more general deficit in the capacity for emotional information 
processing (Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro & Kaszniak, 2000). 
In the current study executive function was not measured.  This is a limitation of the 
study. There is evidence that additional skills including working memory, reasoning 
and new learning contribute to dynamic emotion recognition (McDonald et al., 2006).  
A range of executive processes are needed to perform the BERT.  The person needs 
to be able to see and hear the stimuli on the computer screen.  Thus, poor performance 
may be due to visual or auditory impairments.  Whilst the qualifying criteria to take part 
in the study included no visual or auditory impairments, this was self-reported and not 
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measured.  Accordingly, it is not certain that the participants had no visual or auditory 
impairments.  Attentional control and working memory are important for emotional 
processing (Ridout et al., 2007) and poor performance on the BERT may have been 
due to executive processes which are commonly impaired after ABI, such as attention, 
processing speed, working memory, word retrieval or cognitive flexibility (Douglas, 
2004).   
In other words, it is plausible that the BERT may detect emotion recognition problems, 
or emotion recognition and other impairments, or impairments other than emotion 
recognition.  Further research is needed to investigate the sensitivity of the BERT to 
detect emotion recognition problems and understand which other areas of cognitive 
functioning need to be measured to ensure the BERT accurately measures emotion 
recognition problems rather than other impairments. Moreover, as impairments after 
ABI are often multifactorial (Brooks et al., 1986), measuring these other factors could 
also help highlight targets for interventions.  
4.8.6 Forced rather than open response 
The study used forced choice recognition rather than open-response.  The participants 
had to choose the emotion being portrayed from a choice of six alternatives and 
neutral.  One could argue that forced choice design does not represent an ecologically 
valid measure because having to put a label on an expressed emotion does not 
happen in social interactions and in real life emotions are often expressed quickly or 
in combination with others (Osbourne-Crawley & McDonald, 2016).  Future research 





4.8.7 Self-report questionnaires 
A number of self-report questionnaires were used in the current study.  Self-reports 
raise questions about the validity of the participants’ responses as they may be 
influenced by factors such as how the person would like to be seen or how they think 
about themselves and this may be different to how the person actually is.  Independent 
clinician ratings may be more accurate than self-ratings (Norris & Tate, 2000).   
We know that individuals with brain injury are sometimes unaware of their deficits 
(Spikman & Naalt, 2010) and self-report questionnaires only measure the person’s 
beliefs about their own abilities.  This factor may provide a possible explanation for the 
poor correlations between the self-report questionnaires used (BEES and IRI) and 
performance on the BERT.  In practice, it is helpful to ask relatives and carers for their 
views when building a picture of the ABI person’s difficulties (Spikman & van der Naalt, 
2010).  In other words, it is useful to compare the ABI person’s self-rated measures 
with their relative’s rated versions.  The accuracy of self-report is a very interesting 
issue in terms of over estimating (or under estimating) ability.  An interesting future 
study involving the BERT would be to ask how well people think they identify emotions 
and compare this with their actual performance. 
4.8.8 The use of STW2 
In the current study, a significant difference was found between the groups’ STW2 
scores, and STW2 was found to be a significant predictor of performance on the BERT. 
The use of STW2 in the current study is a potential limitation.  It was chosen because 
it is reported to be highly correlated with verbal intelligence (Raven, Raven & Court, 
2000), and correlates highly with other well-known tests of written vocabulary such as 
the National Adult Reading Test (NART) (r=0.87) (Nelson, 1982; Baddeley, Emslie & 
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Nimmo-Smith, 1993). It has been shown to be relatively stable following neurological 
impairment, and there is evidence it is a good estimator of premorbid abilities as it 
shows good discriminant validity (Yuspeh & Vanderploeg, 2000).  Another reason why 
STW2 was chosen was because no verbal response was needed, thus it avoided the 
potentially discouraging effects of repeated failure of word pronunciation that is 
associated with the NART (Baddeley et al., 1993).  
However, in the current study the groups differed on the number of years of education 
individuals had received.  Performance on STW2 has been found to be significantly 
influenced by education (Yuspeh & Vanderploeg, 2000) and so it is plausible that this 
affected the data.  Further research investigating the influence of education on STW2 
is needed to explore if some education adjustment is necessary when using the 
measure in clinical settings (Yuspeh & Vanderploeg, 2000).  It would have been 
preferable to use the NART instead of STW2 as the NART appears to be largely 
resistant to neurological damage (Crawford, 1992; O’Carroll, 1995).  Further research 
using the NART to measure intelligence is needed to explore the effect of intelligence 
on performance of the BERT. 
 4.8.9 Limitations of a computerised screening test 
The limitations of computerised screening measures have been detailed by Bauer et 
al. (2012). They include the technical characteristics of using a computer based test.  
Technical issues can affect test administration and reliability.  In the current study a 
number of technical issues arose.  There were a number of challenges getting the 
BERT online as well as technical problems administering the test.  Problems included 
the test not working reliably when Wi-Fi connection was poor and the test not working 
on particular web browsers or appliances.  In future work using the BERT, it will be 
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important to ensure that the test works smoothly and any ongoing technical issues are 
addressed. Other limitations of an online assessment are that performance may be 
affected by hearing, visual and cognitive deficits such as attentional focus and factors 
such as the size of screen and clarity of sound can impact on how easily stimuli are 
recognised. 
As with all screening tests the BERT is not diagnostic. Screening tests like the BERT 
give an indication that there may be a problem rather than diagnosing a problem 
(Cullen, O'Neill, Evans, Coen, & Lawlor, 2007).  They provide an indication that further 
investigations may be needed (Morley et al., 2015).   
The BERT can be administered by people other than clinicians. Whilst this has 
advantages, it also has disadvantages.  Important information may be overlooked such 
as premorbid abilities and behavioural or motivational issues that may affect test 
performance (Bauer et al., 2012).   Also, the potential to cause distress by false-
positive screening test results or over diagnosis has been highlighted (Bond, Garside, 
& Hyde, 2015; Krantz & Meyers, 2015), as have false-negatives or failure to detect 
impairments when present resulting in failure to treat appropriately.  
4.8.10 Limitation of not varying order of clips or counter balancing 
The aim of the study was to develop a standardised test of emotion recognition. For 
this reason the order of the video clips was the same for each participant. There was 
no counter balancing of faces or type of emotion nor were the facial expressions and 
vocal cues counterbalanced.  It is possible that how the facial expressions and vocal 
cues were paired resulted in some pairings being clearer and therefore easier to 
identify than others. This is a limitation of the study.  Presenting the clips in a different 
order and counterbalancing the clips may have produced different results.  For a 
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standardised test it is important that if there is a bias or impact arising from the order 
of the clips it will be the same for everyone.  However, it would be interesting to see if 
administering the test with the clips in a different order has any effect on performance.  
Further research investigating if varying the order of the clips and counterbalancing 
the facial expressions and word pairings affects results is needed.  
4.9 How work done in the current study could be developed 
The current study was a preliminary study.  It has fulfilled its aim of developing a new 
screening instrument of emotion recognition and has reported some interesting 
findings.  There is potential to investigate some of the findings further.    
4.9.1 Larger and different ABI samples 
The current study compared the performance of a neurologically healthy sample with 
a small group of people with ABI.  It would be informative to repeat the study using a 
larger sample of ABI participants.  This would help improve the power of the study.  
Further, repeating the study using ABI participants recruited from different sources, 
with different types, severity and time since injury, would help to explore and develop 
understanding about how these factors affect emotion recognition ability.  This has 
implications for being able to identify individuals who are more as risk of having 
emotion recognition problems. 
4.9.2 Influence of age on emotion recognition 
Further research is needed to investigate if age, particularly older age affects emotion 
recognition and performance on the BERT.  In the current study a correlation was 
found between performance on the “no phrase” test and the older participants. Should 
further investigation support this finding then adjustments may need to be made to 
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account for these differences, for example in how the clinical cut off scores are 
calculated for older people. 
4.9.3 Influence of pre-morbid characteristics  
Further research investigating how pre-morbid characteristics including education and 
intelligence affect performance on the BERT is needed.  Further findings that emotion 
recognition performance is impacted by pre-morbid IQ would add support to theories 
of cognitive reserve (Salz, 1993; Stern, 2002).  This would have important implications 
for clinical practice, as it would suggest that pre-morbid intelligence is a predisposing 
factor to emotion recognition problems and could result in the introduction of routinely 
measuring pre-morbid intelligence after ABI.   
4.9.4 Influence of affective state: anxiety, depression  
Another limitation is that measures of anxiety and depression were not taken in this 
study.  Whilst research has established that emotion recognition problems are present 
shortly after injury and therefore caused by the injury itself rather than secondary 
factors such as anxiety and depression (Borgaro et al., 2004; Green et al., 2004), we 
know that after ABI it is common for individuals to develop anxiety and depression 
(Ponsford et al., 2002).  Further, research suggests there is a mood congruent memory 
bias for the processing of emotional faces in some populations, for example, Ridout, 
Astell, Reid, Glen and O’Carroll (2003), found that individuals with dysphoria were 
impaired in recognising the emotions of sadness and neutral compared to individuals 
in a control group who did not have dysphoria.  Including measures of anxiety and 
depression in the current study was beyond the scope and resources available. 
However, affective state is undoubtedly an important factor in emotion recognition and 
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further research investigating the impact of affective state on emotion recognition in 
the ABI population is needed.   
4.9.5 The role of alexithymia 
Another possible limitation is that alexithymia was not measured in this study. As 
stated in the introduction chapter, the reasons for not measuring alexithymia included 
it being outside the scope and resources of the study; that currently, there are 
questions about the reliability of using the alexithymia measure (TAS-20) in ABI 
samples (Wood et al., 2009); and that current research findings on the association 
between alexithymia and emotion recognition in the ABI population are not clear.    
However, the fact that alexithymia may result in individuals being unable to vicariously 
experience the emotions of others (Williams & Wood 2010b; Wood & Williams 2013) 
is important.  Evidence suggests that the mechanism we use in our own subjective 
experiences of emotion are used when recognising the same emotions in others 
(Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001; Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009). Existing 
theories of emotion recognition suggest that if you cannot identify or describe your 
own emotions (as is suggested by the current research on alexithymia) then your 
ability to recognize emotions in others may also be impaired.  For example, Gallesse, 
(2001), in his “shared manifold” hypothesis suggests that when we observe someone 
expressing an emotion our motor system becomes active and “resonates” with that 
emotion as if we were feeling the same emotion.  In basic terms we interpret others’ 
emotions by processing our own.   
The role of alexithymia in emotion recognition, emotional difficulties and social 
behaviour generally needs to be better understood. There is evidence that individuals 
with somatoform disorders and disordered eating have impaired emotion recognition 
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and higher rates of alexithymia than healthy controls (Pedrosa-Gil et al., 2008; Ridout 
et al., 2010).  Bird and Cook (2013) argue that emotional difficulties in autism are due 
to alexithymia. Their “alexithymia hypothesis”, which they apply to autism may 
arguably equally apply to individuals with ABI.  In other words that there are 
disproportionate levels of alexithymia in ABI rather than emotion recognition and 
empathy deficits being a characteristic of ABI. We know that emotion recognition 
problems and alexithymia are higher in the ABI population (Williams and Wood, 2010) 
and this leads one to question whether the BERT (and possibly the EET) measures 
alexithymia rather than emotion recognition problems.   
However, the prevalence of alexithymia after ABI appears to be higher than the 
prevalence of emotion recognition problems (Babbage et al., 2011; Wood & Williams, 
2010b).  If Bird and Cook (2013) are correct and emotion recognition problems and 
empathy deficits are a consequence of co-occurring alexithymia rather than a primary 
feature of ABI then why aren’t the levels the same?  Also, alexithymia is not always as 
a result of ABI it occurs in 10-14.8% of the general population (Berthoz, Pouga & 
Wessa, 2010). Further research is needed to investigate the relationship between 
alexithymia and emotion recognition problems in individuals ABI.   
4.9.6 Further investigations of the characteristics and impairments of 
individuals who score below the BERT cut off score  
Research is needed to better understand the causes of emotion recognition difficulties 
after ABI.  As mentioned in section 4.8.5 above, ABI often results in a number of 
impairments which include, cognitive, behavioural and emotional problems (Wood et 
al., 2005). Yim, Babbage, Zupan, Neumann and Willer (2013), suggest that 
impairment in several cognitive processes, in particular non-verbal memory, working 
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memory and speed of processing, may contribute to emotion recognition deficits in 
individuals with ABI.  Indeed, studies have found that emotion recognition is related to 
executive functions (Lee, Lee et al., 2009; Henry, Philips, Crawford, Theodore & 
Summers, 2006), speed of processing, attention and working memory (Henry et al., 
2009; Mathersul et al., 2009; Philips et al., 2008) and language abilities (Barrett, 
Lindquist & Gendron, 2007).  However, other studies have failed to find any 
associations between emotion recognition and particular cognitive functions 
(Pinkman, Penn, Perkins, & Lieberman, 2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Shur, Baracai-
Goodman, Medlovich & Levkovitz, 2007). 
Therefore, whilst we know that cognitive functioning and facial emotion recognition are 
impaired in a significant proportion of people with moderate-to-severe ABI (Yim et al., 
2013), our understanding of the relationship of these two domains in the ABI 
population, as well as in other clinical and healthy populations, is limited and more 
research is needed to help us understand the links (Yim et al., 2013). The BERT could 
be used in further research to explore the links.  It could help identify individuals with 
emotion recognition problems (those below the cut off score), and further 
investigations to explore whether these individuals have any cognitive functioning 
deficits, or any behavioural and social problems could take place.  In other words, 
further testing of individuals who score below that BERT cut off score, could provide 
some very useful information about the impairments they have and the relationships 
between these impairments.  It could also explore whether individuals below the cut 
off score are more likely to have other characteristics, for example, an affective 
disorders, lower intelligence, lower empathy, or alexithymia. This further research 
would help explore the inter-relationship of different impairments which could help 
target appropriate rehabilitation interventions.   
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4.9.7 Understanding the role of emotion recognition in social behaviour and 
social cognition 
Emotion recognition problems are now understood to play a role in reduced and 
difficulties in interpersonal relationships (May et al., 2017).  However, we know that 
other factors also influence interpersonal social skills and impede social relationships 
(Milders et al., 2003).  Amongst these are impaired self-regulatory behaviour 
(Ganesalingam, Sanson, Anderson & Yeates, 2007); inappropriate behaviour and 
indifference (Groom, Shaw, O’Connor, Howard & Pickens, 1998); problems with word 
retrieval (Douglas 2004); cognitive flexibility (Prigatano, 1992); inaccurate self-
appraisal (Kervick & Kaemingk, 2005) and impairments in disinhibition and inflexibility 
(McKinlay, Brooks, Bond, Martinage & Marshall, 1981; Tate & Broe, 1999).  In addition, 
psychological reactive factors such as depression, anxiety and poor self-esteem may 
also impact on relationships and affect psychosocial outcome (McDonald, 2003).   
Social cognition plays an important role in social behaviour (May et al., 2017), and we 
are learning more about the part played by emotion recognition/perception of social 
cues in this.  Theories of social cognition have identified it as one of three main 
functions involved, the others being retrieval of social knowledge/understanding other 
people’s intentions and selecting an appropriate response (Adolphs, 2009; Corrigan 
1997; Ochsner 2008).  In a recent study investigating the impact of the social cognition 
functions (May et al., 2017) emotion recognition was found to be the most strongly 
associated with post-injury behaviour and community integration.  The study’s finding 
provides further evidence that problems in emotion recognition have a big impact on 
people with ABI and their families and reinforces the importance of identifying emotion 
recognition problems after ABI. 
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In addition, the May et al. (2017), study supports earlier research (for example the 
studies of Knox & Douglas, 2009; Milders et al., 2008; Spikman et al., 2013; Struchan 
et al., 2008; Watts & Douglas, 2006) that the association between emotion recognition 
problems and post injury social functioning cannot be fully explained by the severity of 
the injury, time since injury or education.  The fact that these earlier studies used 
different emotion recognition tasks suggests that the association is not dependant on 
the task used.   
The relationship between emotion recognition problems, cognitive deficits (including 
intuition), social behaviour and social cognition is not clear.  Whilst there is mounting 
evidence that emotion recognition problems are associated with post injury social 
functioning, some research has found that problems with social behaviour exist where 
patients do not have problems recognising facial expressions (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, 
Scabini & Knight, 2003).  Also, there is evidence that facial emotion recognition can 
be impaired when there is no deficit in cognitive abilities (Yim et al., 2013) and a wide 
range of social cognition measures including emotion recognition have been found to 
be unrelated to particular general cognitive functions such as memory, attention, 
executive functioning (Spikman et al., 2012).  More research is needed to understand 
the links and relationships between emotion recognition deficits and these other 
factors.  
4.9.8 Rehabilitation training 
As well as being a useful screening tool to help identify people with emotion recognition 
deficits, there is potential for the BERT to be used in rehabilitation to target particular 
emotion recognition deficits and as a baseline measure. There is already some 
evidence that emotion recognition training can improve facial emotion recognition and 
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follow up at six months post training has demonstrated that these changes are 
maintained (Zupan, Neumann, Babbage & Willer, 2015).  However, there is some 
research that suggests that identification training has not always been linked with 
improvements in social behaviour (McDonald, 2011). Improving outcome through 
appropriate rehabilitation is extremely important.  The BERT could be used in further 
research investigating emotion recognition training, how long treatment gains remain, 
how/if they generalise to everyday life and whether emotion recognition training does 
positively impact outcome.    
4.9.9 Other clinical populations with emotion recognition problems 
Difficulty recognising facial expressions is known to be impaired in other conditions 
including autism (Bauminger, 2002; Boraston, Blakemore, Chilvers & Skuse, 2007; 
Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers,1990); schizophrenia (Edwards, Jackson & Pattison 
2002; Gessler, Cutting, Frith & Weinman, 1989; Hooker & Park, 2002; Mandal, Pandey 
& Prasad, 1998; Sergi, Rassovsky, Nuechterlein & Green, 2006); learning disabilities 
(McKenzie, Matheson, McKaskie, Hamilton & Murray, 2000);  frontotemporal dementia 
(Keane, Calder, Hodges & Young, 2002; Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit & Van der 
Linden, 1999); multiple sclerosis (Beatty, Orbelo, Sorocco, & Ross, 2003:  Weinstein, 
Patterson & Rao,1996); Parkinson’s disease (Dujardin et al., 2004; Kan, Kawamura, 
Hasegawa, Mochizuki & Nakamura, 2002).   The BERT may be useful in screening 
tool for emotion recognition impairments in other clinical groups.  Further research is 
needed to investigate this.  
Once emotion recognition problems have been identified it is possible that theories of 
emotion recognition and strategies used in other clinical populations with emotion 
recognition problems, for example autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995) and eating disorders 




The principal goal of this study was to create a valid, reliable method of rapidly 
screening for emotion recognition difficulties in people with ABI.  The new test, BERT, 
addresses the need to have an online screening measure of emotion recognition 
difficulties that is efficient, easy to use and is quicker to administer than existing 
measures.  
 
In summary, the BERT has two parts.  The “no phrase” BERT consists of moving facial 
expressions and non-verbal cues (no verbal content).  The “with phrase” BERT 
contains moving facial expressions with neutral carrier phrases (prosody congruent 
with facial expression).   Administration of both parts is quick – it only takes around 
five to ten minutes, though there is potential for the two parts to be administered 
separately. An age stratified sample of 92 neurologically healthy adults with a variety 
of occupations and different educational backgrounds performed at a high level on the 
BERT.  Performance was found not to be affected by gender in either the control or 
ABI group suggesting the same cut off scores can be used when administering the 
test to males or females.  Intelligence (as measured by STW2) was not found to affect 
performance on any part of the BERT in healthy controls or on the “no phrase the “no 
phrase” BERT in the ABI group.  However, it was found to be associated with 
performance on the “with phrase” BERT in the ABI group.  Possible explanations for 
this finding are discussed in this chapter including cognitive reserve theory (Salz, 
1993; Stern, 2002), and that the BERT may be picking up other impairments, such as 
executive dysfunction.  The further work needed to explore these explanations is 




No association was found with age and performance on the “with phrase” BERT, but 
a correlation was found between the “no phrase” BERT and age.  Further research on 
the effect of age, particularly older age on performance of the BERT is needed. The 
study found some evidence of validity in that performance on the BERT was found to 
be correlated with performance on an existing measure of emotion recognition (EET).  
The BERT was also found to be associated with some existing measures of empathy. 
 
Comparison of the performance of the neurologically healthy controls with that of 20 
adults who had sustained moderate-to-severe brain injury, found that the participants 
with ABI performed significantly worse on both parts of the BERT.  This finding 
suggests the ABI group were significantly impaired in emotion recognition relative to 
the neurologically healthy controls which is consistent with existing research. The 
findings of the study suggest that identifying even one item incorrectly on the “no 
phrase” BERT may indicate deficits in recognising moving facial expressions with non-
verbal cues, and a low score on the “with phrase” BERT may indicate impairments 
recognising moving facial expressions with verbal cues. The finding that both groups 
performed less well on the “with phrase” BERT was not expected.  It had been 
anticipated that performance on the “with phrase” BERT would be better, due to there 
being vocal cues as well as visual cues.  Possible explanations for this finding including 
how the use of neutral sentences may have made it difficult to process multiple 
sources of information (Wildgruber, et al., 2007), and areas for future research, are 
discussed in this chapter.   
 
Further studies replicating the use of the BERT are needed to demonstrate its 
psychometric qualities and its performance in larger samples of ABI participants. 
However, the work done to date suggests the BERT will be a useful tool for clinicians 
143 
 
and others working with individuals with ABI in assessment, treatment and research 
capacities.   The development of BERT is important because having a measure that 
can efficiently and easily screen for emotion recognition impairments in the ABI 
population was needed. We know that emotion recognition problems occur after ABI 
and that these problems impact negatively on psychosocial functioning and effect 
relationships (Rosenberg et al., 2016).  We also know that problems are not limited to 
severe ABI (Kubu, 1999) and the extent of deficits varies (McDonald & Saunders, 
2005) probably due to the different pathology of brain injury as well as the impact of 
other factors including cognitive deficits (Allerdings & Alfano, 2006).  
 
This study makes an important contribution to counselling psychologists and others 
working with individuals with ABI and their families.  It helps highlight the need to 
understand how emotion recognition problems affect psychosocial functioning. The 
better we are at identifying and understanding emotion recognition problems, the 
better we will become at predicting and working with problematic behaviour (Wood et 
al., 2005). This will improve rehabilitation and psychosocial interventions which will 
help to decrease problems of loneliness, sense of isolation and relationship problems 
that often exist after ABI.  Moreover, improved support will help to reduce the likelihood 
of the development of affective disorders in those with ABI and their families and 
improve outcomes. Improvement in psychosocial functioning is very cost effective both 
in financial and personal terms.  
In terms of its use, the BERT could be a useful tool in future research investigating 
emotion recognition problems.  As well as being a useful screening measure in the 
ABI population, it could potentially play a useful role in other populations where 
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problems recognising emotions have been identified, such as schizophrenia (Edwards 
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Volunteers required for research into emotion recognition 
by Tony Ward, Health and Applied Science 
  
UWE Bristol postgraduate, Jo Howe, is researching emotion recognition with the aim of 
identifying where people have problems recognising emotion (for example, after a stroke or 
head injury) and develop ways in which to support them. 
  
To support her research Jo requires volunteers to take part in a short online trial to gauge 
how difficult it is to recognise different emotions. 
  
The trial will take no longer than 15 minutes and can be accessed from any computer with 
an internet connection. A five minute follow up would also be required one week later. 
  
Anyone who completes the trial will be given a £10 Amazon voucher. 
  










Volunteers required for research into emotion recognition 
 
I’m a postgraduate at the University of the West of England, Bristol and 
am researching emotion recognition with the aim of identifying where 
people have problems recognising emotion (for example, after a stroke 
or head injury) and develop ways in which to support them. 
To support my research I need volunteers to take part in a short online 
trial to gauge how difficult it is to recognise different emotions. 
The trial will take approximately 45 minutes and can be accessed from 
any computer with an internet connection. A five minute follow up 
would also be required one week later. 
Anyone who completes the trial will be given a £10 Amazon voucher. 













Participant Information Sheet - A 
 
Study: Emotion Recognition and Empathic Functioning after Brain Injury: Development of 
a new test 
 
Why have I been given this form? 
This information sheet is to give you information about what will be involved if you decide to take 
part in the study in order to help you decide whether or not you would like to take part. Please read 
it carefully. 
 
Who is the researcher and what is the research about? 
The researcher is Jo Howe, a Counselling Psychologist in Training studying at UWE.  This study is 
about developing a new test to measure emotion recognition and empathy.  Empathy is the ability 
to understand and share the feelings of others. People with poor empathic skills often encounter 
difficulties in their daily lives, particularly with relationships.  It has been known for some time that 
people who have had a head injury often have reduced emotion recognition and empathic skills.  
This study aims to understand more about this and develop a test that can identify if someone has 
reduced emotion recognition or empathic skills so that they can receive appropriate help, support 
and treatment.  
 
Why have I been approached? 
Because you are someone who may be interested in taking part in this study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  Participation in this study is voluntary. 
 
Can anyone take part? 
Yes, provided you are over 18, have not had a head injury and do not have problems with your sight 
or hearing that would make it difficult to complete tasks on a computer. 
 
Can I withdraw from the study? 
Yes. You are free to withdraw from the study without giving a reason at any time until the research 
report has been submitted for assessment or publication, by contacting the researcher, Jo Howe.    
 
What does participation involve? 
You will be asked to complete a number of tasks on a computer. Before completing the tasks you 
will be asked to confirm that have read this participant information sheet.   
 
The researcher will send you information explaining how you access the tasks on your computer.  
The new test will include watching short video clips of actors portraying various emotions and then 
answering some questions.  Full explanations about the items in the test will be given and you will 
be able to practice each item.   
 
You will also be asked to answer some basic demographic questions, such as whether you are 
male or female and your age and complete a few other tests that measure empathy and a short 
cognitive function test. 
 
In order to see if the test is reliable you will be asked to complete some of the tasks in the test twice, 
approximately one week apart.   
 




What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will get the opportunity to participate in a research project and experience the research process 
in general. Also, after completing the test twice you will receive a £10 voucher as a thank you.    
 
Hopefully this study will provide useful information about emotion recognition and empathy after 
brain injury.   
 
Are there any risks in taking part? 
It is not anticipated that there will be any risks in taking part in this research.  However, there is 
always the possibility for research participation to raise uncomfortable or distressing issues.  Should 
this happen then you can contact the researcher, her Director of Studies or NHS Direct. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
Any information that could identify you will be removed.  The data will be anonymized.  All 
information which is collected during the course of the study will be kept strictly confidential and will 
be locked in a secure place.  
  
What will happen to the results of the research? 
The research findings will be put in a report and used by the researcher as part of her studies.  It 
may also be sent to an academic journal for publication or used in presentations. Your identity will 
not be revealed in any report, publication or presentation. 
 
What do I do now? 
If you want to take part in this research please contact the researcher, Jo Howe by e-mailing her at 
joanne.howe4@btinternet.com 
 
What if I have questions about the research? 
Should you have any questions about the research before, during or after it, then please contact 
the researcher Jo Howe, by e-mailing her at joanne.howe4@btinternet.com or the researcher’s 
Director of Studies, Dr. Tony Ward, Associate Professor of Health and Counselling, Faculty of Life 
and Health Sciences, Frenchay Campus, Coldharbour Lane, Bristol BS16 1QY, Tel: 0117 328 3109; 







Thank you for your interest in taking part in my study. 
 
To do the test you will need the following: 
 A computer or lap-top running MS-Windows - the test will not work on tablets, smart-
phones etc. 
 The internet browser Google Chrome.                            
 
 If you have not go this browser then please let me know.  
The test will not work on other internet browsers – such as Explorer, Edge, Mozilla etc. 
 A decent internet connection because the test includes video clips. 
A wired connection is preferable to a Wi-Fi connection 
 The sound must be on – some of the video clips have sound 
 Enough time to complete all the tasks that make up the test in one sitting. 
This should take approximately 40 to 60 minutes 
Here is the link to the test 
http://neuro-assess.com/recruit/form/b 
The easiest way to access the test is to copy the link and to paste it in to your Google chrome 
address box 
 
The password in test 
Once you have accessed the test website, you will need to insert your email address in the big box in 




You will need to repeat a couple of the tasks again after a week which will take about 5 – 10 
minutes. 
You will receive an email reminder about this. After completing the test twice you will be sent a code 
to redeem a £10 Amazon voucher. 
Should you experience any problems or have decided you do not want to take part, the please let 
me know. 
Thank you for taking part. I hope you enjoy the test 










Thank you for taking part in this study which is designed to find out some information about 
how people recognise other people's emotions.  
 
A week or so ago you completed a number of tasks and now is the time to complete part of 
the test again. It should take about 10 minutes to complete the task today. 
 






                             APPENDIX 6 
 
Email from Paul White, Statistician about the power calculation 
 
 
From: Paul White  
Sent: 15 March 2018 16:20 
To: Tony Ward; Joanne Howe (Student - SOLS) 




Power is a pre-data collection concept.  If you get a significant result and then use the sample means 
and standard deviations from the data to then power you would get sample sizes which are probably 
smaller than you had; conversely if you did not get a significant effect, and used the sample means 
and standard deviations to estimate the sample size then the sample size estimates would be larger 
than you had.  It is for this reason that SPSS and similar do not (as part of their output) then go on 
and give power/sample sizes to achieve power as it would simply recast the data you have. 
 
If BERT is useful at discriminating between ABI and Control then to have clinical utility then it should 
show good sensitivity and good specificity (i.e. to be able to discriminate between the two groups 
without incurring too many false positives and false negatives).   
 
In general, effect size, using Cohen’s d has broad interpretations of 
 
d = 0                             indicates the absence of an effect 
For statistically significant effects,  
0 < d < 0.1                    indicates a trivial effect,  
0.1 < d < 0.2                 indicates a small effect,  
0.2 < d < 0.5                 indicates a moderate effect,  
0.5 < d < 0.8                 indicates a medium size effect,  
0.8 < d < 1.3                 indicates a large effect,  
1.3 < d < 2.0                 indicates a very large effect  
d > 2.0                          huge!! 
In these sense d is the number of standard deviations which separate the two groups. With a head 
injury groups you might expect differences to be anywhere between d = 0.5 to d = 1.0.  d = 0.5 would 
probably indicate “yes there is a difference” but the scale would not have good utility.  d = 0.8 … is 
probably getting to the level where you might say “this scale is showing levels of sensitivity and 
specificity which could make a difference in practice”.  Of course a d > 0.8 would be even better … but 
that might be very much wishful thinking at the outset.  So … let’s suppose we stick with d = 0.5 to 
0.8.  
 
At the outset you would not know how many participants you would get.  Agreed it is easier to get 
more controls than case.  So let’s suppose we aim for N = 100, thinking an 80:20 split would be 
okay.  Suppose you are going to use the Mann Whitney (Mann Whitney Wilcoxon test).  Below is the 
output from each of 10,000 simulations for d = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 with an 80:20 split.   
 




Numeric Results for Testing Mean Difference = Diff0.    Hypotheses: H0: Diff1 = Diff0; H1: Diff1 
≠ Diff0 
H0 Dist's: Normal (M0 S) & Normal (M0 S) 
H1 Dist's: Normal (M0 S) & Normal (M1 S) 
Test Statistic: Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test 
 
                                     H0           H1     Target     Actual                            
Power        N1/N2        Diff0        Diff1      Alpha      Alpha        Beta        M0        M1          S               
                      
0.482           20/80          0.0         -
0.5       0.050       0.047       0.518        0.0        0.5        1.0                                     
(0.010)        [0.473      0.492]                                  (0.004)      [0.043   0.051] 
 
0.643           20/80          0.0         -
0.6       0.050       0.053       0.357        0.0        0.6        1.0                                     
(0.009)        [0.633      0.652]                                  (0.004)      [0.049   0.057] 
 
0.764           20/80          0.0         -
0.7       0.050       0.046       0.236        0.0        0.7        1.0                                     
(0.008)        [0.756      0.773]                                  (0.004)      [0.042   0.051] 
 
0.869           20/80          0.0         -
0.8       0.050       0.051       0.131        0.0        0.8        1.0                                     
(0.007)        [0.862      0.876]                                  (0.004)      [0.047   0.055] 
 
Notes 
Pool Size: 20000. Simulations: 10000. Run Time: 12.52 seconds. 
 
References 
Chow, S.C.; Shao, J.; Wang, H. 2003. Sample Size Calculations in Clinical Research. Marcel Dekker. 
New York. 
Devroye, Luc. 1986. Non-Uniform Random Variate Generation. Springer-Verlag. New York. 
Matsumoto, M. and Nishimura, T. 1998. 'Mersenne twister: A 623-dimensionally equidistributed 
uniform 
   pseudorandom number generator.' ACM Trans. On Modeling and Computer Simulations. 




Power is the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis. 
N1 is the size of the sample drawn from population 1. 
N2 is the size of the sample drawn from population 2. 
Diff0 is the mean difference between (Grp1 - Grp2) assuming the null hypothesis, H0. 
Diff1 is the mean difference between (Grp1 - Grp2) assuming the alternative hypothesis, H1. 
Target Alpha is the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis. It is set by the user. 
Actual Alpha is the alpha level that was actually achieved by the experiment. 
Beta is the probability of accepting a false null hypothesis. 
Second Row: (Power Prec.) [95% LCL and UCL Power] (Alpha Prec.) [95% LCL and UCL Alpha] 
 
Summary Statements 
Group sample sizes of 20 and 80 achieve 48% power to show a difference in means when there is a 
difference of 0.5 between the null hypothesis mean difference of 0.0 and the actual mean 
difference of -0.5 at the 0.050 significance level (alpha) using a two-sided 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test. These results are based on 10000 Monte Carlo samples from the null 
distributions: Normal (M0 S) and Normal (M0 S), and the alternative distributions: Normal (M0 S) 
and Normal (M1 S). 
     
 




If I tweak the parameters e.g. a sample size of N = 110 keeping approximately the ratio you did get … 




Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Tests (Simulation) 
 
Numeric Results for Testing Mean Difference = Diff0.    Hypotheses: H0: Diff1 = Diff0; H1: Diff1 
≠ Diff0 
H0 Dist's: Normal (M0 S) & Normal (M0 S) 
H1 Dist's: Normal (M0 S) & Normal (M1 S) 
Test Statistic: Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test 
 
                                     H0           H1     Target     Actual                            
Power        N1/N2        Diff0        Diff1      Alpha      Alpha        Beta        M0        M1          S               
                      
0.513           21/89          0.0         -
0.5       0.050       0.050       0.488        0.0        0.5        1.0                                     
(0.010)        [0.503      0.522]                                  (0.004)      [0.046   0.054] 
 
0.663           21/89          0.0         -
0.6       0.050       0.048       0.337        0.0        0.6        1.0                                     
(0.009)        [0.653      0.672]                                  (0.004)      [0.044   0.052] 
 
0.796           21/89          0.0         -
0.7       0.050       0.048       0.204        0.0        0.7        1.0                                     
(0.008)        [0.788      0.804]                                  (0.004)      [0.044   0.052] 
 
0.889           21/89          0.0         -
0.8       0.050       0.050       0.111        0.0        0.8        1.0                                     
(0.006)        [0.883      0.895]                                  (0.004)      [0.045   0.054] 
 
Notes 
Pool Size: 20000. Simulations: 10000. Run Time: 13.46 seconds. 
 
References 
Chow, S.C.; Shao, J.; Wang, H. 2003. Sample Size Calculations in Clinical Research. Marcel Dekker. 
New York. 
Devroye, Luc. 1986. Non-Uniform Random Variate Generation. Springer-Verlag. New York. 
Matsumoto, M. and Nishimura, T. 1998. 'Mersenne twister: A 623-dimensionally equidistributed 
uniform 
   pseudorandom number generator.' ACM Trans. On Modeling and Computer Simulations. 




Power is the probability of rejecting a false null hypothesis. 
N1 is the size of the sample drawn from population 1. 
N2 is the size of the sample drawn from population 2. 
Diff0 is the mean difference between (Grp1 - Grp2) assuming the null hypothesis, H0. 
Diff1 is the mean difference between (Grp1 - Grp2) assuming the alternative hypothesis, H1. 
Target Alpha is the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis. It is set by the user. 
Actual Alpha is the alpha level that was actually achieved by the experiment. 
Beta is the probability of accepting a false null hypothesis. 
Second Row: (Power Prec.) [95% LCL and UCL Power] (Alpha Prec.) [95% LCL and UCL Alpha] 
 
Summary Statements 
Group sample sizes of 21 and 89 achieve 51% power to show a difference in means when there is a 
difference of 0.5 between the null hypothesis mean difference of 0.0 and the actual mean 
difference of -0.5 at the 0.050 significance level (alpha) using a two-sided 
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Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test. These results are based on 10000 Monte Carlo samples from the null 
distributions: Normal (M0 S) and Normal (M0 S), and the alternative distributions: Normal (M0 S) 
and Normal (M1 S). 
 
 
 i.e. 89% power.   
 
In the above simulations, I simulated from a normal distribution.  I could use other distributions.  Some 
distributions would give an increase in power (relative to the normal) and others a decrease in power 
(relative to the normal). A good rule of thumb is to reduce overall sample size by pi/3 (pi being the 
number 3.14159 ….) to get a lower bound on power.  If I do this (I won’t give all of the output) … 
power comes in at 85%. 
 
So … if we were starting right at the beginning and were blind to data … but had a gut feeling that 
BERT would show some good discriminatory powers … and you felt n = 110 was viable with a 90:20 
split … then we would have guestimated a power of about 85%.   
 
I can see you have Total Bert 2 … I am not sure how those data were obtained (e.g. same 
participants) … but that data looks good too.   
 
I am not sure if this helps? 
 
P. 








Participant Information Sheet - B 
 
Study: Emotion Recognition and Empathic Functioning after Brain Injury:  
Development of a new test 
 
Why have I been given this form? 
This information sheet is to give you information about what will be involved if you decide 
to take part in the study in order to help you decide whether or not you would like to take 
part. Please read it carefully. 
 
Who is the researcher and what is the research about? 
The researcher is Jo Howe, a Counselling Psychologist in Training studying at UWE.  This 
study is about developing a new test to measure emotion recognition and empathy.  
Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. People with poor 
empathic skills often encounter difficulties in their daily lives, particularly with relationships.  
It has been known for some time that people who have had a head injury sometimes have 
reduced emotion recognition and empathic skills.  This study aims to understand more 
about this and develop a test that can identify if someone has reduced emotion recognition 
or empathic skills so that they can receive appropriate help, support and treatment.  
 
Why have I been approached? 
Because you are someone who may be interested in taking part in this study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  Participation in this study is voluntary. 
 
Can anyone take part? 
Yes, provided you are over 18, and have had a head injury which resulted in you losing 
consciousness and/or having post traumatic amnesia.  Also, to be able to take part you will 
not have a psychiatric or developmental disorder or have problems with your sight or 
hearing that would make it difficult to complete tasks on a computer. 
 
Can I withdraw from the study? 
Yes. You are free to withdraw from the study without giving a reason at any time until the 
research report has been submitted for assessment or publication, by contacting the 
researcher, Jo Howe.    
 
What does participation involve? 
You will be asked to complete a number of tasks on a computer. Before completing the 
tasks you will be asked to confirm that have read this participant information sheet.   
 
The researcher, Jo Howe will be with you when you complete the tasks or will send you 
information explaining how to access the tasks on your computer.  The tasks will include 
watching short video clips of actors portraying various emotions and then answering some 
questions.  Full explanations about the tasks will be given and you will be able to practice 




You will also be asked to answer some basic demographic questions, such as whether you 
are male or female and your age and complete a few other tests that measure empathy and 
a short cognitive function test. 
 
In order to see if the test is reliable you will be asked to complete some of the tasks in the 
test twice, approximately one week apart.   
 
Completing the tests and other information will take approximately 40 minutes.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will get the opportunity to participate in a research project and experience the research 
process in general. Also, after completing the test twice you will receive a £10 voucher as 
a thank you.    
 
Hopefully this study will provide useful information about emotion recognition and empathy 
after brain injury.   
 
Are there any risks in taking part? 
It is not anticipated that there will be any risks in taking part in this research.  However, 
there is always the possibility for research participation to raise uncomfortable or distressing 
issues.  Should this happen then you can contact the researcher, her Director of Studies or 
NHS Direct. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
Any information that could identify you will be removed.  The data will be anonymized.  All 
information which is collected during the course of the study will be kept strictly confidential 
and will be locked in a secure place.  
 
Relatives’ questionnaire 
Part of the study involves asking relatives and carers of people who have had a head injury 
to complete a short questionnaire about their experiences of living with or caring for 
someone with a head injury. You will be asked on the consent form if you are happy for 
your relative/carer to complete a questionnaire about their view of your ability to recognize 
emotions and be empathic. 
  
What will happen to the results of the research? 
The research findings will be put in a report and used by the researcher as part of her 
studies.  It may also be sent to an academic journal for publication or used in presentations. 
Your identity will not be revealed in any report, publication or presentation. 
 
What do I do now? 
If you want to take part in this research please contact the researcher, Jo Howe by e-mailing 
her at joanne.howe4@btinternet.com 
 
What if I have questions about the research? 
Should you have any questions about the research before, during or after it, then please 
contact the researcher Jo Howe, by e-mailing her at joanne.howe4@btinternet.com or the 
researcher’s Director of Studies, Dr Tony Ward, Associate Professor of Health and 
Counselling, Faculty of Life and Health Sciences, Frenchay Campus, Coldharbour Lane, 






Participant Identification Number for this trial: 
CONSENT FORM C (ABI PARTICIPANT) 
Title of Project: Emotion Recognition and Empathic Functioning in Brain Injury: Development of a new 
test 
Name of Researcher: Jo Howe 
Please 
tick box  
1. I confirm that I have read the participant information sheet for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
3. I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by regulatory authorities. 
I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records.  
4. I understand that the information collected about me may be used to support other research in 
the future, and may be shared anonymously with other researchers. 
5. I understand that all information provided will be anonymised and kept confidentially. 
6. I understand that after the research has been completed it may be published in a journal, report 
or presented to other students of professionals.  I understand that my identity will not be 
revealed in    any report, publication or presentation. 
7. I agree to take part in the above study. 
8. I confirm I am happy for my relative/carer to complete a questionnaire about their views of my         
ability to recognise emotions and be empathic.                                                                                
           
               
Name of participant              Date    Signature 
 
             
Name of person taking consent  Date    Signature 
181 
 
                          APPENDIX 9  
 
Recognition rates of the 10 individuals who rated the 16 “no phrase” clips, the clips 
that were selected for the “no phrase” BERT, and the recognition rates of the control 
group on the “no phrase” BERT items  
 “no phrase” item 
and whether 
selected for BERT 
(X – not selected for 
“no phrase” BERT) 
Recognition rates of 
the 10 individuals 
presented with 32 
clips (%) 
Recognition rates 
of control group 
(%) 
Happy Practice 1 100 N/A 
Sad Practice 2 100 N/A 
Angry 1 100 95 
Surprise 2 100 100 
Neutral 3 100 100 
Fear 4 90 100 
Disgust 5 100 100 
Happy 6 90 100 
Sad 7 100 100 
Anger X 60 N/A 
Disgust X 70 N/A 
Fear X 70 N/A 
Surprise X 90 N/A 
Neutral X 70 N/A 
Fear X 80 N/A 







Recognition rates of the 10 individuals who rated the 16 “with phrase” clips, the clips 
that were selected for the “with phrase” BERT, and the recognition rates of the control 
group on the “with phrase” BERT items   
  “with phrase” item 
and whether 
selected for BERT 
(X – not selected for 
“with phrase” BERT) 
Recognition rates 
of the 10 individuals 
presented with 32 
clips (%) 
Recognition rates 
of control group 
(%) 
Disgust P1 100 N/A 
Happy P2 100 N/A 
Angry 1 90 98 
Sad 2 90 87 
Happy 3 90 100 
Surprise 4 90 86 
Fear 5 90 96 
Disgust 6 80 80 
Neutral 7 90 86 
Angry X 100 N/A 
Surprise X 70 N/A 
Fear X 90 N/A 
Neutral X 70 N/A 
Angry X 60 N/A 
Surprise X 70 N/A 





























































































































































































































                  APPENDIX 11 
 
 
      The p values of Kolmogorov-Smirov test of Normality for the BERT 
 Application Control group 
1st application n=92 
2nd application n=79 
ABI group 
1st application n=20 
2nd application n=15 
“no phrase” 
 
1st  0.54* 0.30* 
 
2nd  0.53* 0.28* 
 
“with phrase” 1st  0.32* 0.15 
 
2nd  0.42* 0.21 
 
Total correct 1st  0.31* 0.23* 
 
2nd  0.42* 0.20* 
 









Demographic details of neurologically healthy participants 




(see note below) 
1 46 F 2 18 
2 53 M 1 16 
3 46 F 1 13 
4 43 M 1 16 
5 40 M 3 13 
6 22 M 3 16 
7 52 M 1 18 
8 30 M 3 18 
9 27 M 2 16 
10 55 F 2 16 
11 55 F 2 13 
12 56 F 1 18 
13 39 F 2 16 
14 28 F 2 18 
15 28 F 2 16 
16 61 F 3 18 
17 35 F 2 18 
18 30 F 3 18 
19 59 F 2 16 
20 51 F 2 18 
21 62 F 1 18 
22 49 F 3 16 
23 58 M 4 18 
24 48 F 1 13 
25 34 M 3 16 
26 70 M 3 9 
27 47 F 2 16 
28 64 F 3 16 
29 31 F 2 18 
30 54 M 3 13 
31 29 M 3 16 
32 25 F 3 13 
33 75 F 3 9 
34 36 F 3 18 
35 37 M 2 16 
36 46 F 2 16 
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37 34 M 2 16 
38 45 F 3 13 
39 35 M 2 18 
40 37 F 2 11 
41 33 F 2 16 
42 49 F 3 18 
43 23 F 3 16 
44 75 M 3 11 
45 59 F 2 16 
46 31 F 2 18 
47 58 M 2 16 
48 49 M 2 16 
49 70 M 3 11 
50 29 F 3 16 
51 29 F 2 18 
52 31 F 3 16 
53 48 M 2 18 
54 31 F 3 18 
55 72 F 3 11 
56 60 F 3 13 
57 69 F 3 16 
58 74 M 1 9 
59 56 F 2 16 
60 43 F 2 16 
61 51 M 4 11 
62 46 F 1 11 
63 64 M 3 13 
64 50 M 2 16 
65 55 M 2 16 
66 64 M 2 13 
67 75 F 3 13 
68 58 F 1 16 
69 37 F 2 16 
70 31 M 2 16 
71 55 M 2 13 
72 50 F 2 16 
73 55 F 1 16 
74 26 M 3 18 
75 32 F 4 18 
76 55 F 3 16 
77 68 M 2 13 
78 57 F 3 13 
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79 80 F 2 16 
80 37 M 3 18 
81 70 F 3 16 
82 70 M 4 13 
83 27 M 3 16 
84 46 M 1 18 
85 29 M 3 16 
86 80 M 4 16 
87 54 M 2 16 
88 44 M 2 16 
89 31 M 3 16 
90 25 M 3 16 
91 50 M 2 16 
92 25 M 3 16 
 
 
Key explaining occupations 
Number Occupation type 
1 Senior managerial/professional 
2 Intermediate managerial/administrative/professional 
3 Junior managerial/administrative/professional 
4 Skilled manual worker 
5 Semi-skilled manual worker; 
6 Retired, casual or lowest grade worker, student, unemployed 
 
Years education 
The mean years education for the neurologically healthy participant group is 15.58 
years (SD 2.34) 
The table below shows how years education has been calculated. 
Participants were asked to say the highest level of education they completed 
Highest level of education completed No. of years education assumed 
No formal education 9 
Secondary school 11 
BTEC/A levels 13 
Degree 16 







Demographic details of ABI participants 
Participant Age M/F Occupation 
(see key below) 
Years Education 
(see note below) 
Type of ABI 
ABI 1 46 F 5 11 Stroke 
ABI 2 56 M 3 13 RTA 
ABI 3 52 M 3 13 RTA 
ABI 4 58 M 6 13 RTA 
ABI 5 54 M 5 9 Stroke 
ABI 6 40 F 3 11 Aneurysm 
ABI 7 49 F 2 13 Stroke 
ABI 8 67 F 3 9 Stroke 
ABI 9 52 M 6 9 Aneurysm 
ABI 10 37 F 2 16 Stroke 
ABI 11 52 F 3 11 Stroke 
ABI 12 32 F 3 13 Brain Haemorrhage 
ABI 13 50 M 2 13 brain tumour 
ABI 14 63 M 4 13 Stroke 
ABI 15 25 M 4 11 Brain Haemorrhage 
ABI 16 80 F 6 9 RTA 
ABI 17 36 M 6 9 Brain Haemorrhage 
ABI 18 44 F 3 13 Stroke 
ABI 19 70 F 6 9 Brain Haemorrhage 
ABI 20 51 M 3 13 RTA 
Key explaining occupations 
Number Occupation type 
1 Senior managerial/administrative/professional 
2 Intermediate managerial/administrative/professional 
3 Supervisory or clerical, junior managerial/administrative/professional 
4 Skilled manual worker 
5 Semi and unskilled manual worker 
6 Pensioner, casual or lowest grade worker, student, unemployed 
 
Years education 
The mean years education for the ABI participant group is 11.55 years (SD 2.04) 
The table below shows how years education has been calculated. 
Participants were asked to say the highest level of education they completed. 
 
Highest level of education completed No. of years education 
No formal education 9 
Secondary school 11 
BTEC/A levels 13 
Degree 16 






(Loss of consciousness) 
0 =No LOC; 1=<30 mins; 2= 1-
24 hrs; 3=>24hrs;? = no 
information 
PTA 
(Post trauma amnesia) 
0 = No PTA; 1= <1hr PTA; 
2= 30 min-24hrs PTA; 3= > 1 
day;? = no information 
Time since injury 
(years) 
ABI 1 ? ? 22 
ABI 2 3 2 32 
ABI 3 3 3 25 
ABI 4 3 3 35 
ABI 5 3 3 5 
ABI 6 2 2 20 
ABI 7 2 ? 5 
ABI 8 2 ? 4 
ABI 9 2 ? 48 
ABI 10 3 ? 7 
ABI 11 3 ? 5 
ABI 12 3 3 10 
ABI 13 2 ? 40 
ABI 14 3 3 3 
ABI 15 3 ? 1 
ABI 16 3 3 2 
ABI 17 3 3 19 
ABI 18 3 0 2 
ABI 19 3 ? 3 
ABI 20 3 3 3 
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